PREVIOUS WRITINGS OF 
PAUL S. REINSCH 

The Common Law in' the Early American 

Colonies, 1899. 
World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth 

Century as Influenced by the Oriental 

Situation, 1900. 
Colonial Government, 1903. 
Colonial Administration, 1905. 
American Legislatures and Legislative 

Methods, 1907. 
Intellectual Currents in the Far East, 1911. 
International Unions, 1911. 
An American Diplomat in China, 1913-1918, 

1922. 



SECRET DIPLOMACY 



HOW FAR CAN IT BE ELIMINATED? 



BY 

PAUL S. REINSCH 



i 




NEW YORK 
HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY 



1^^*^^ 

i^*^ 



COPYRIGHT, 1923, BY 
HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY, INC. 



PRINTED IN THE U S. A. BY 

THE QUINM & CODEN COMPANY 

RAHWAY. N J. 



FEB -9 1922 
^nf,A653796 



3^-^ 



The principal conclusions based on the material 
contained in this book were presented by the Au- 
thor at a joint meeting of the American Historical 
Association and the American Political Science 
Association, in his address as President of the 
latter, on December 28th, 1920. 





CONTENTS 






Intkodtjction 


PAGE 

3 


CHAPTER 
I. 


Eighteenth Century Diplomacy 


22 


II. 


Old Diplomatic Correspondence 


36 


III. 


After the Congress op Vienna . 


45 


IV. 


Napoleon III, Disraeli, Bismarck . 


58 


V. 


Triple Atjjance Diplomacy and Mo- 


« 




rocco 


70 


VI. 


Entente Diplomacy . . 


84 


vn. 


The Crisis of 1914 


102 


vin. 


The Secret Treaties op the War . 


116 


TX. 


Hopes for Improvement Deferred . 


129 


X. 


The Destruction of Public Confi- 






dence 


136 


XI. 


Parliament and Foreign Affairs . 


149 


XII. 


The Public and Diplomacy . . . 


166 


XIII. 


A Survival op Absolutism 


181 


XIV. 


Eecent American Experience . 


194 




Conclusion 


211 




Index 


225 



SECRET DIPLOMACY 



INTRODUCTION 

Is secret diplomacy the evil spirit of modern 
politics? Is it the force that keeps nations in a 
state of potential hostility and does not allow a 
feeling of confidence and of wholehearted co- 
operation to grow np? Or is it only a trade de- 
vice, a clever method of surrounding with an aura 
of importance the doings of the diplomats, a race 
of men of average wisdom and intelligence who 
traditionally have valued the prestige of dealing 
with ''secret affairs of state"? Or is it some- 
thing less romantic than either of these — merely 
the survival from a more barbarous age of in- 
stincts of secretiveness and chicane acquired at 
a time when self-defense was the necessity of 
every hour ? 

It is quite patent that the practice of secret 
diplomacy is incompatible with the democratic 
theory of state. Even in the Liberal theory of 
state it finds little favor, although that is dis- 
posed to grant a great deal of discretion to the 
representatives who are given the trusteeship of 
public affairs. Yet the essential idea of Liberal- 
ism, government by discussion, includes foreign 



4 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

affairs within its scope fully as much as those of 
purely domestic concernv.4 In applying to public 
affairs the experience of private business it is 
often argued that as the directorate of a corpora- 
tion could not be expected to transact its busi- 
ness in public, even so diplomatic conversations 
are not to be heralded from the house tops. How 
far this particular analogy between private busi- 
ness and public affairs will hold, is a point we 
shall have to examine later. At first sight the 
planning of private enterprises and the considera- 
tion of benefits and losses, can hardly furnish 
completely satisfactory rules for the conduct of 
public affairs, particularly those involving the 
life and death of the persons concerned. Stock- 
holders would be reluctant to allow such matters 
to be determined by a board of trustees in secret 
conclave. 

Divesting ourselves of all prejudices, even of 
righteous indignation against plainly unconscion- 
able practices, we shall try to examine and analyze 
the action of great diplomats and to see to what 
extent really important results achieved by them 
have depended upon the use of secret methods. 
In the 18th Century, diplomacy was still looked 
upon as a sharp game in which wits were matched, 
with a complete license as to the means pursued; 



INTRODUCTION 6 

provided, however, that embarrassing discovery 
must be avoided, in other words, that the exact 
method of deception must be so closely guarded 
that only the results will show. The great diplo- 
mats of the beginning of the 19th century — Met- 
ternich, Talleyrand, Pozzo di Borgo — while they 
talked much about humanitarian principles, con- 
tinued to play a barren game of intrigue. Napo- 
leon III, that master of devious statecraft, will 
always be cited by excoriators of secret diplomacy 
as an abhorrent example — a man undone by the 
results of his own plotting. Bismarck indeed 
prided himself on looking down upon petty se- 
cret manoeuvering and cast a certain amount of 
contempt on the whole diplomatic business; he 
often disconcerted his opponents by an unaccus- 
tomed frankness. Yet the orientation of his 
statesmanship was based upon the idea of helping 
history to find a short-cut to her aims through 
masterful plotting. He took the reins out of the 
hands of Providence. 

But let us return to our first question: ''Is 
secret diplomacy the evil spirit of modern poli- 
tics?" It is indeed worth inquiring how far our 
secretive methods in foreign affairs are to blame 
for the pitiful condition in which the world finds 
itself to-day. No doubt there is a general belief 



6 SECRET DIFEOMACY 

that secret diplomacy and/ever-mcreasing arma- 
ments led Europe into the terrible destruction of 
the Great "War and that the continuance of such 
methods is chiefly to blame for the deplorable 
condition since the Armistice. There may be 
deeper causes, but these evidences are so obtru- 
sive that they naturally attract most attention and 
are given most blame for the evils we endure. It 
is plain that secret diplomacy is a potent cause 
for continued distrust, fear and hate. There are 
few statesmen that would not shrink from deliber- 
ately planning and staging a war. Yet they 
nearly all participate in methods of handling pub- 
lic business from which it is hardly possible that 
anything but suspicion, fear and hatred should 
arise. Distrust is planted everywhere. There is 
no assurance of what is the truth; true reports 
are questioned; false reports, believed. All mo- 
tives are under suspicion. The public conscience 
and will are beclouded; nothing stands out as re- 
liable but stark military force. ' ^ 

It would seem that we have learned very little 
from the war. The same dangerous and un- 
healthy methods continue to be used with in- 
veterate zeal. The result is that suspicion has 
now grown up among those who fought side by 
side and who shed their blood together. Realiz- 



INTRODUCTION 7 

ing the fundamental importance of basing inter- 
national life on sound opinion and fair dealing, 
the framers of the League of Nations tried to se- 
cure the publicity of all international agreements. 
Yet this moderate provision of the covenant has 
not been obeyed by some of the strongest contract- 
ing powers. Some outsiders, indeed, such as Rus- 
sia, have quite willingly pubhshed their treaties 
and furnished them to the bureau of the league. 
That the first act of peace-making was to shut 
the door of the council chamber in the face of the 
multitudes who had offered their lives and shed 
their blood for the rights of humanity was a tragic 
mistake. In the defense of secret procedure, pub- 
lished on January 17, 1919, it was said ''To dis- 
cuss differences in the press would inflame public 
opinion and render impossible a compromise." 
So all connection between the great public that 
was paying the price of the game and the benevo- 
lent elder statesmen who thought they would 
shoulder the burden of responsibility alone, was 
cut off. The men in the council chamber were not 
strengthened in this great crisis by a feeling of 
intimate touch with a strong and enlightened pub- 
lic opinion. The public itself was disillusioned; 
suspicion and contempt were the natural result. 
The bald statements given to the press concern- 



8 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ing the negotiations did not satisfy any one. 
Most of what was going on became known to out- 
siders. But its authenticity was so uncertain and 
it was so commingled with mere rumor that the 
public soon gave up in despair. It will be impor- 
tant to inquire as to what is the proper perspec- 
tive between confidential deliberation and public- 
ity of results, in conferences, which are becoming 
the usual agency for discussing and settling inter- 
national affairs. 

When secrecy is confined merely to the methods 
of carrying on negotiations, its importance for 
good and evil is certainly not so great as when 
the secrecy of methods includes concealment of 
aims and of the agreements arrived at. We 
could imagine that even a statesman who seeks 
the closest relationship with public opinion, even 
a Lincoln, could not at all times eliminate all 
use of confidential communications. But the 
temper of the whole system of foreign affairs is 
a different matter; and any broad effort to con- 
ceal the tendency of action or its results is cer- 
tainly productive of evil, no matter how salutary 
or beneficial it may seem to the men employing it 
at the time. 

But, it is said, we must trust to experts. In- 
ternational relations are so intricate and have so 



INTRODUCTION 9 

many delicate shadings that they elude the grasp 
of the ordinary man, and can be held together and 
seen in their proper relations only by the com- 
prehensive and experienced mind of the seasoned 
statesman. There is, however, a distinction 
which ought to be noted. The public relies in 
most cases unreservedly upon expertship in mat- 
ters of engineering, science, accounting, business 
management, and even in medicine, though in the 
latter with a feeling of less complete security. In 
all these cases we know that the processes applied 
and the methods pursued are demonstrable, and 
mathematically certain to produce the results an- 
ticipated. But in the affairs of international poli- 
tics into which, the human equation and other in- 
exactly calculable factors enter, there is no such 
mathematical certainty which can be tested and 
ascertained by any group of experts. It is all a 
matter of wisdom in choosing alternatives, and 
we may well doubt whether any man or small 
group of men, under modern conditions of life 
and public state action, can be wiser in such mat- 
ters by themselves than they would be if they con- 
stantly kept in direct touch with public opinion. 
Society, when properly organized, will have at its 
disposal on every question of importance, groups 
of men who have expert knowledge. Expertship 



10 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

in foreign affairs is not confined to the foreign 
offices or the chanceries; many thoughtful men 
observing and thinking intensely, traveling widely, 
seeing foreign affairs from an independent angle, 
have opinions and judgments to contribute that 
the officials cannot safely ignore. In an inquiry 
of this kind we shall have to consider the broader 
setting of diplomacy as a part of public life within 
the nation and throughout the world. The ele- 
ment of secrecy is appropriate only when we con- 
sider diplomacy as a clever game played by a 
small inner privileged circle; it appears out of 
place in a society organized on a broader basis. 
As a matter of fact the defense of secrecy, from 
the point of view of the inner politics of the state, 
resolves itself almost entirely into an opinion that 
the ignorance and inexperience of the people does 
not fit them to judge of foreign relations. That, 
it must be confessed, does not seem to be a very 
sound or convincing basis for the choice of meth- 
ods of public action in a modern state. 

But the real strength of the argument for se- 
crecy comes when the external aspects of state 
action are considered. Then there is, on the sur- 
face at least, an apparent justification for se- 
cretiveness, in the interest of a closely knit society 
engaged in competitive struggle with similar so- 



INTRODUCTION 11 

cieties and obliged to defend itself and to safe- 
guard its interest by all available means. 

Kegarded in its broader aspects there are two 
conceptions of diplomacy which are quite antag- 
onistic and which have divided thinkers since the 
time of Machiavelli and Grotius. These two 
great minds may indeed be considered as typify- 
ing the two tendencies and expressing them in 
themselves and through the sentiments which 
their thought and writings have engendered in 
their successors. 

We have the conception of diplomacy as work- 
ing out a complex system of state action, balanc- 
ing and counterbalancing forces and material re- 
sources and giving direction to the innermost 
purposes of the state. It is probable that all 
professional diplomats are more or less enchanted 
by this ideal. Up to the great war, Bismarck was 
generally considered the ablest master of diplo- 
macy, and his action seemed to supply short-cuts 
for historical forces to work out their natural 
aims. Nationalism was the word of the day and 
the creation of the German national state, fore- 
ordained as it seemed by the laws of history, was 
accelerated by the masterful action of the great 
diplomat. But we are now able to see wherein 
lay the limitations of this method as applied by 



12 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

Bismarck. Notwithstanding his grasp of historic 
principles of development, he did not, after all, 
work in unison with broad natural forces, but re- 
lied on his power to dominate other men through 
forceful mastery, with dynastic associations. He 
was a superman rather than a great representa- 
tive of a people's aspirations. So while he pro- 
claimed the truthfulness of his diplomacy, it was 
nevertheless kept essentially as his own and his 
master's affair and business, rather than the peo- 
ple's. The base of his policy was narrow. He 
understood nationalism from a Prussian point of 
view. He severed Austria from Germany, and 
then antagonized France by taking Lorraine ; far 
more important still, he failed to strengthen Ger- 
man relations with Central Europe and thus made 
it later seem necessary for Germany to go on to 
the sea and thus to arouse the apprehensions and 
enmity of England. Thus while he himself would 
probably have in the end avoided confronting the 
entire world as enemies, the foundations he had 
laid did not provide a safe footing for the more 
ordinary men who followed him. His diplomacy, 
once considered so great, had contained no ade- 
quate and sound foundation for permanent na- 
tional life. Such have been the results of the 
most distinguished and successful work of manip- 



INTRODUCTION 13 

ulative diplomacy during the Nineteenth Century. 
What then shall we say of the justification of 
wars brought about as a part of such a system; 
under which statesmen consider it quite natural 
to contemplate ''preventive war" and to assume 
responsibility for wholesale slaughter because 
their plan of action seems to reveal a necessity 
for it. The idea of conscious planning, or striv- , 
ing to subject national and economic facts and 
all historic development to the conscious political 
will, — that conception of diplomacy is synony- 
mous with the essence of politics and will stand 
and fall with the continuance of the purely polit- 
ical state. Manipulative, and hence secret, di- 
plomacy is in fact the most complete expression, 
of the purely political factor in human affairs. 
To many, it will seem only a survival of a hyper- 
political era, as human society now tends to out- 
grow and transcend politics for more comprehen- 
sive, pervasive and essential principles of action. 
We need not here rehearse the fundamental char- 
acter of politics as a struggle for recognized au- 
thority to determine the action of individuals, 
with the use of external compulsion. Politics is 
a part of the idea of the national state seen from 
the point of view of a struggle for existence 
among different political organizations, in which 



14. SECRET DIPLOMACY 

one class originally superimposed its authority 
upon a subject population and in which, after au- 
thority is firmly established within, political power 
is then used to gain advantages from, or over, 
outside societies. It is Machiavelli as opposed 
to Grotius who gives us the philosophy of this 
struggle. The narrowness of this basis for hu- 
man action and the direful effect of conscious and 
forceful interference with social and economic 
laws, is now beginning to be recognized. 

But there is also a broader conception of diplo- 
macy which is influencing the minds of men al- 
though it is not yet fully embodied in our daily 
practice. This conception looks upon humanity, 
not as a mosaic of little mutually exclusive areas, 
but as a complex body of interlocking interests 
and cultural groups. As this conception gains in 
strength, the center of effort in diplomacy will 
not be to conceal separatist aims and special plots, 
but to bring out into the clear light of day the 
common interests of men. The common work for 
them to do in making the world habitable, in dig- 
nifying the life of men and protecting them 
against mutual terror and massacre, — that ideal 
of cooperation and forbearance, is as yet only 
partially embodied in our international practices, 
although it arouses the fervid hopes of men 



INTRODUCTION 15 

throughout the world. Whether a system of local 
autonomy combined with full cooperation and free 
interchange of influences can be brought about 
without the exercise of an overpowering influence 
on the part of a group of allied nations, is still 
doubtful. But if it should be achieved, then 
plainly the old special functions of diplomacy will 
fall away and administrative conferences will take 
the place of diplomatic conversations. When 
Portugal became a republic, the proposal was 
made to abolish all diplomatic posts and have the 
international business of Portugal administered 
by consuls. That would eliminate politics from 
foreign relations. 

Diplomacy in the spirit of Grotius has always 
had its votaries even in periods of the darkest 
intrigue, but there has only recently come into 
general use a method of transacting international 
business which favors open and full discussion of 
diplomatic affairs. Such business will be dealt 
with less and less in separate negotiation between 
two powers ; there will generally be more nations 
involved, and conferences and standing commit- 
tees or commissions will be at work, rather than 
isolated diplomats. Indeed, international con- 
ferences are still largely influenced by the old 
spirit of secretive diplomacy. Yet the practice 



16 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

of meeting together in larger groups is itself 
inimical to the strict maintenance of the older 
methods and we may expect a natural growth of 
more simple and direct dealings. It will be in- 
teresting to watch the use of the older methods 
of diplomacy under these new conditions and to 
see how far and how fast they will have to be 
modified in order to bear out the underlying prin- 
ciple in human development to which action by 
conference responds. 

The Washington Conference of 1921 afforded 
the first notable occasion for bringing into use 
open methods in diplomatic discussion. Secre- 
tary Hughes in his introductory speech struck a 
keynote hitherto not heard in negotiations on in- 
ternational matters. A new era seemed to have 
dawned in which great issues and all-important 
interests could be discussed openly and decided 
on their merits. A great wave of enthusiasm 
passed over the public. But it cannot be said that 
the temper of this auspicious opening was sus- 
tained throughout. As the conference descended 
from general declarations to important questions 
of detail there was an unmistakable reversion to 
old methods, which obstructed the straightforward 
aims of Secretary Hughes. Even the generous 
initial proposal of the American government wa^ 



INTRODUCTION 17 

made by one of tlie powers a trading subject. The 
result was that some of the attendant evils of se- 
cret diplomacy invaded even this conference, and 
that the public soon became somewhat confused as 
to its object and purposes, through an abundance 
of guesses which put a premium on the sensational 
imagination. It must be said that the temper of 
the press, encouraged by the manner in which the 
Conference had been inaugurated, was one of re- 
straint and responsibility. Viewing the questions 
which were before this Conference, there can be 
no doubt that the very problems about which 
there was hesitation and exaggerated secretive- 
ness, were exactly those which could have been 
best judged of by the well-informed public opin- 
ion. One could not avoid the conclusion that the 
fear of publicity is in all cases inspired by mo- 
tives which cannot stand the test of a world-wide 
public opinion. 

At the present day, as yet, the fatal circle has 
not been broken: secret diplomacy, suspicion, 
armaments, war. "We had thought that we should 
escape from it quite easily, after the terrible sac- 
rifices laid on mankind and the light which had 
been flashed on us in that darkness. But the pas- 
sions which had been stirred up and the fear and 
terror which had been aroused in that dire ex- 



18 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

perience may for some time yet serve to 
strengthen the reactionary forces in human af- 
fairs, and retard those which tend to liberate hu- 
manity from terror and suffering. But it is lack 
of leadership toward better things, that is most 
to blame. 
"-~4- To America, to the government and the people, 
the elimination of secret dealings in international 
affairs is nothing short of a primary interest* 
The entire character of our foreign policy is in- 
spired with, and based upon, the belief in open 
dealings and fair play. "We have a broad conti- 
nental position which makes secret plotting and 
devious transactions unnatural, inappropriate 
and unnecessary. Our national experience of one 
hundred and fifty years has expressed itself quite 
spontaneously in proposals for the peaceful set- 
tlement of international disputes by discussion, 
for the improvement of international relations 
through conferences, and in the great policies of 
the Open Door, which means commercial fair play, 
and the Monroe Doctrine, which means political 
fair play to the American sister republics. A 
policy such as this has nothing to seek with secret 
methods and concealed aims. 

To tolerate secrecy in international affairs 
would mean to acquiesce in a great national dan- 



INTRODUCTION 19 

ger. For good or ill we can no longer conceive 
ourselves as isolated. Our every-day happiness 
and permanent welfare are directly affected by 
what other nations do and plan. Continued se- 
crecy would mean that we should feel ourselves 
surrounded by unknown dangers. We should have 
to live in an atmosphere of dread and suspicion. 
We could find peace of mind only in the security 
of vast armaments. In international affairs we 
would be walking by the edge of precipices and 
over volcanoes ; our best intentioned proposals for 
the betterment of human affairs would be secretly 
burked, as in the case of Secretary Knox' plan 
of railway neutralization in Manchuria. Our 
rights would be secretly invaded and our security 
threatened, as at the time when England and 
France agreed with Japan that she should have 
the North Pacific islands, behind our backs, 
though our vital interests were involved. In all 
such matters secrecy will work to the disadvan- 
tage of that power which has the most straight- 
forward aims and policies. America cannot will- 
ingly submit to such a condition. It is unthink- 
able that with our traditions of public life and 
with our Constitutional arrangements, we should 
ourselves play the old game of secret intrigue; 
it is for us to see, and to the best of our power 



20 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

and ability to assure, that it will not be played in 
the future by others. 

Nations will respond to the call for absolutely 
open dealings in international affairs, with a 
varying degree of readiness and enthusiasm. We 
are perhaps justified in saying that wherever the 
people can make their desires felt they will be 
unanimously for a policy of openness. The Eng- 
lish tradition of public life would also be favor- 
able to such a principle of action, were it not that 
such special imperial interests as the British raj 
in India frequently inspires British diplomacy 
with narrower motives and with a readiness to 
depart from open dealings from a conviction that 
imperial interests so require. The Eussian So- 
viet government in giving to the public a full 
knowledge of international affairs, was at first 
inspired primarily by a desire to discredit the 
old regime. But it is also undoubtedly true that 
the hold which this government has on the party 
which supports it, is in a measure due to the fact 
that all foreign policies and relationships are 
freely reported to, and discussed in, the party 
meetings and the Soviets. No matter what the 
aims of this government may be, it cannot be de- 
nied that it has strengthened itself by the open- 
ness of its foreign policy. The Chinese people 



INTRODUCTION 21 

have manifested a deep faith in public opinion and 
their chief desire in international affairs is that 
there shall be open, straightforward dealings so 
that all the world may know and judge. Through 
all their difficulties of the last decade they have 
been sustained by this faith in the strength of a 
good cause in the forum of world-wide public 
opinion. 

The peoples of the Continent of Europe un- 
doubtedly would welcome a reign of openness 
and truth, for they have suffered most from se- 
cret dealings in diplomacy. But those who gov- 
ern them find it difficult to extricate themselves 
from the tangle of intrigue. As President Wil- 
son expressed it : 

** European diplomacy works always in the dense 
thicket of ancient feuds, rooted, entangled and en- 
twined. It is difficult to see the path; it is not always 
possible to see the light of day. I did not realize it all 
until the peace conference; I did not realize how deep 
the roots are." 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 

nI During the eighteenth century, diplomatic ac- 
tion was dominated entirely by the tactics and 
stratagems of war. Diplomacy was a continuous 
struggle for political advantage and power, seek- 
ing to accomplish the purposes of war through 
keen intriguing; it was war pursued in the coun- 
cil chamber. The temper of diplomacy was not 
that of a commercial transaction, or of coopera- 
tion in the works of peace and betterment ; but it 
was intent upon selfish advantage — power, pres- 
tige, preferment, and all the outward evidences 
of political success. It did not have the con- 
science of peaceful enterprise and cooperation, 
but on the contrary emulated the keen, restless, 
alert, and all- suspecting spirit of the military 
commander in action. All the ruses, deceptions, 
subterfuges, briberies and strategies which the 
struggle for existence in war appears to render 
justifiable, diplomacy made use of. It., was es- 
sentially a political secret service informed with 
the spirit of life-and-death competition.'i.^As, 

22 ^ 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 23 

among individuals in that society, all action was 
dominated by the constantly overhanging haz- 
ard of private duel, bringing into life something 
of the keenness and cruelty of the tempered 
blade ; so among nations warlike rivalry inspired 
all political action. War was either going on or 
impending and being prepared for ; humanity was 
living true to the old adage: ''Man a wolf to 
man. ' ' 
.1 Diplomacy was personal in that the ambassa- 
'dor was held to be an alter ego of the monarch. 
It was surrounded with the glamor of high state 
and important enterprise, and inspired with a 
great pride of office. The fact that he repre- 
sented absolute power in its contact with the ab- 
solute power of others, gave t|ie diplomat a sense 
of high importance. The nionarchs, themselves, 
were generally governed by personal motives and 
considerations. They looked upon politics as a 
keen game for personal or family power in which 
populations of subjects, territory, and war in- 
demnities were the stakes, and human lives the 
pawns; the highest happiness and good fortune 
of the subject was supposed to be the right to 
die for his king. The diplomatic representatives 
quite naturally fell into the same way of regard- 
ing affairs of state from the viewpoint of political 



24 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

power to be gained, maintained and constantly in- 
creased. It was a rather narrow game as seen 
by the rank and file of the diplomatic world; 
only a few far-seeing and statesmanlike minds 
could at that time appreciate the broad under- 
lying human foundation of all political action. 

Such broader insight would often have been a 
real obstacle to the success of the keen and clever 
player of the game. The mastery of underlying 
principles which made Grotius famous for all ages 
did not contribute to his success as a diplomat. 
The wheel of fortune turned fast, and fleeting ad- 
vantage had to be caught by quick, clever though 
often superficial, machinations. Even as late as 
1830, John Quincy Adams observed that deep in- 
sight and unusual ability was something of a 
hindrance to a diplomat. Yet the keen edge of 
the successful diplomats of the powdered wig pe- 
riod is in itself one of the noteworthy qualities 
of that sociable though unsocial age. 

Throughout this period Machiavelli's Prince 
may be taken as the fitting commentary on po- 
litical action. The men of this age had not yet 
grown up to the realization which Machiavelli al- 
ready had of the nature and importance of the 
national principle; but Machiavelli's thought con- 
cerning the means by which, in a period of unrest 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 25 

and sharp rivalry, political power may be estab- 
lislied, built up and preserved, with total disre- 
gard of every feeling and ideal and the single- 
minded pursuit of political success, — that thor- 
oughly explains the spring of action of this period. 

In reading the memoirs and letters of this time, 
one will encounter a great many protestations of 
conventional morality, as well as an understand- 
ing of human nature and a comprehensive grasp 
of the details of international rivalry. But far- 
seeing ideals of wisdom, moderation, and justice, 
and of human cooperation will not frequently be 
met with ; there is no searching vision of realities. 
Nor will one gain from these memoirs very spe- 
cific information about the actual methods of 
doing diplomatic business. These methods, even 
the particularly unscrupulous ones, were prob- 
ably considered almost as natural processes, to 
be passed by without mention. But incidentally, 
one may receive hints, even in the correspondence 
of the most correct and guarded diplomat, suf- 
ficient to reconstitute their current manner of 
thought and action. 

We encounter there all the artifices of a secret 
service versed in the stratagems and tricks 
through which information can be obtained, — the 
stealing of documents, bribery of public officials, 



26 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

general misrepresentation and deceit. Matters 
are often so inextricably complicated that it must 
have required the greatest effort to remember 
what each participant in that particular intrigue 
knew or was supposed not to know, what he could 
be told and what must be kept from him. These 
are still the more venial methods; but when the 
welfare of the state required, it might even be 
necessary, as in the case of war, to dispose of in- 
convenient and obstructive individuals by wreck- 
ing their reputation or even by putting them out 
of the way altogether. 

Even the learned and dignified authorities on 
international law could not entirely ignore the 
methods employed in actual diplomatic inter- 
course. Grotius held that '' amphibologies " — a 
term apparently coined by him to designate state- 
ments which could be understood in several ways 
— were admissible, except in certain cases where 
there existed a duty to unmask, as in matters 
involving the ''honor of God," or charity towards 
a neighbor, or the making of contracts, or others 
of like nature. His successor, Vattel, draws a 
disdnction between a downright lie, "words of 
him who speaks contrary to his thoughts on an 
occasion when he is under obligation to speak the 
truth"; and a "falsiloquy," which he considers 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 27 

venial, and which is ''an untrue discourse to per- 
sons who have no right to insist on knowing the 
truth in a particular case," This distinction 
gives a rather ample latitude to the discretion 
of a diplomat in the matter of truthfulness. Ac- 
cording to the good and learned Vattel, the duty 
of any one to tell the truth was binding only 
towards another who had the right to demand 
that the truth be spoken. In his day, very few 
people indeed could claim the right of demanding 
an insight into diplomatic affairs, so that his rule 
did not put the diplomat under a very severe 
moral constraint. Even to the present day there 
have been known individual envoys whose utter- 
ances plainly are made in the spirit of Vattel's 
distinction. 

Callieres, who wrote on the Practice of Diplo- 
macy, in the year 1716, is full of admiration of 
all that a shrewd, clever diplomat may accomplish 
in stirring up trouble and confounding things gen- 
erally in the state to which he is accredited. To 
the question, ''What can be achieved by a negotia- 
tor?" Callieres answers, "We see daily around 
us its definite effects — sudden revolutions favor- 
able to a great design of state, use of sedition and 
fermenting hatreds, causing jealous rivals to arm, 
so that the third party may rejoice {ut tertius 



28 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

gaudeat), dissolution by crafty means of the clos- 
est unions. A single word or act may do more 
than the invasion of whole armies, because the 
crafty negotiator will know how to set in motion 
various forces native to the country in which he 
is negotiating and thus may spare his master the 
vast expense of a campaign. ... It frequently 
happens that well chosen spies contribute more 
than any other agency to the success of great 
plans. They are not to be neglected. An am- 
bassador is an honorable spy because it is his 
function to discover great secrets. He should 
have a liberal hand." That admiration of suc- 
cessful deceit and mental cleverness in obtaining 
results that could only be gained by force through 
great sacrifice of life, inspired also the Italian 
admiration for clever deceit, such as shown by 
Machiavelli in his eulogy of Pope Alexander VI 
for his unrivaled eminence in prevarication. 

It is remarkable that the famous witticism of 
Sir Henry Wotton that ''an ambassador is a per- 
son sent abroad to lie for the good of his coun- 
try," did not occur to some one much earlier; but 
though the hon mot had not been coined, the idea 
itself was quite familiar. Louis XI quite bluntly 
instructed his embassies, "If they lie to you, lie 
still more to them." But through all this period 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 29 

the virtue of sincerity and of truthfulness also 
had their admirers : Callieres, speaking of the suc- 
cessful diplomat, says, "Deceit is but the measure 
of smallness of mind and intelligence. A diplo- 
mat should have a reputation for plain and fair 
dealing and should observe the promises he has 
made.'* It may, however, be suspected that the 
good writer here contemplates the dangers of un- 
successful deceit and of too transparent ruses, 
rather than the positive value of truth itself. 

James Harris, Lord Malmesbury, who was cer- 
tainly conversant with all the ins and outs of 
eighteenth century diplomacy, wrote in a letter 
of advice (April 11, 1813) addressed to Lord Cam- 
den: "It is scarce necessary to say that no oc- 
casion, no provocation, no anxiety to rebut an 
unjust accusation, no idea, however tempting, of 
promoting the object you have in view, can need, 
much less justify, a falsehood. Success obtained 
by one is a precarious and baseless success. De- 
tection would ruin, not only your own reputation 
for ever, but deeply wound the honor of your 
Court." In this sage advice, too, the dominant 
idea seems to be that detection is ruinous. The 
homage which is thus paid to the ideal of truth 
and sincerity is compatible with the use of quite 
opposite methods provided they are successful 



30 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

and so cleverly guarded that they are not dis- 
covered. 

However, at all times there must have existed, 
among the people at large and even among those 
playing the game of politics, men who had a nat- 
ural inborn desire for truth and a simplicity of 
nature which brought them closer to the true un- 
derlying forces than were the common run of 
courtiers and politicians. The ever recurring ad- 
miration expressed for the diplomacy of Cardinal 
d 'Or sat, the envoy of Henry IV to the Pope, in- 
dicates a real appreciation, even among the pro- 
fession, of high standards of straightforwardness 
in diplomatic negotiations. Cardinal d'Orsat 
seems to have disdained all shallow devices of 
deceptive cleverness. He relied upon simple rea- 
sonableness and honesty in proposing an arrange- 
ment mutually beneficial, to win after others had 
exhausted all possible tricks and stratagems. In 
discussing diplomacy, Mably says that such meth- 
ods alone are calculated to secure positive and 
permanent results while the devices of clever de- 
ceit can only serve to delay and confuse. 

Several statesmen have discovered that the 
telling of the actual truth often exerts a some- 
what befuddling effect on diplomats, so that they 
may easily be misled by telling them real facts 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 31 

which they will interpret in a contrary sense. 
This method has usually been associated with the 
name of Bismarck who on one occasion said, ''It 
makes me smile to see how puzzled all these diplo- 
mats are when I tell them the truth pure and sim- 
ple. They always seem to suspect me of telling 
them fibs." The discovery had, however, been 
made by many statesmen before Bismarck. As 
early as 1700, de Torcy had arrived at the con- 
clusion that the best way of deceiving foreign 
courts is to speak the truth. Lord Stanhope said 
quite complacently that he could always impose 
upon the foreign diplomats by telling them the 
naked truth, and that he knew that in such cases 
they had often reported to their courts the oppo- 
site to what he had truthfully told them to be 
the facts. At a later date, Palmerston also 
prided himself on being able to mislead by the 
open and apparently unguarded manner in which 
he told the truth. It would, however, manifestly 
be difficult to use this method successfully more 
than in spots; it would have to be interspersed 
from time to time with a judicious amount of pre- 
varication, in order to throw the other party off 
the scent. 

To appear simple and true has always been 
greatly desired of diplomats. Count Du Luc, 



32 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

French Ambassador to Vienna, said in a letter, 
"My great desire, if I may be permitted to speak 
about myself, is to appear simple and true. I 
flatter myself that I possess the latter qualifica- 
tion; but you know my method of manoeuvering. ' * 
The appearance of frankness has indeed been 
most valuable to diplomats in all ages ; though one 
naturally suspects the man who in and out of 
season explicitly declares and protests that vir- 
tue. Diplomatic frankness is a part of that elab- 
orate and complicated system of self-control and 
coolness together with a mastery of all the out- 
ward expressions of different affections and pas- 
sions, which notable diplomats have sought to 
achieve. It would not take an expert to advise 
against pomposity. Callieres counsels, ''Be 
genial. Avoid the sober, cold air. An air of mys- 
tery is not useful. ' ' 

In that century in which keenness and clever- 
ness were so intensively cultivated with the high 
pitch of the personal duel transferred to affairs 
of state, the complete self-control of diplomats, 
their quickness and their gift of taking advantage 
of any favorable turn in the situation, are cer- 
tainly worthy of admiration, as we reanimate in 
our minds the life portrayed in these old memoirs 
and letters. Occasionally a mishap occurs like 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 33 

tliat of the British Minister, Mr. Drake, who 
boasted to Mehee de la Touche of the very care- 
ful precautions he had taken to gnard his secret 
correspondence; which vainglory resulted quite 
disastrously to liis collection of secrets. In- 
stances of delightful cleverness and cool-headed- 
ness are frequent. Cardinal Mazarin, who in his 
methods and principles was quite the opposite to 
Cardinal d'Orsat and who was particularly free 
from any scruples whatsoever concerning the 
truth, won his first striking diplomatic success 
through a mse. What a quick mind and daring 
spirit his, when on his first mission to the court 
of the Duke of Feria, as a very young man, he 
attained his object so completely. How other- 
wise could he have ascertained the true opinion 
of His Highness on the matter of great impor- 
tance to the Court of France which Mazarin was 
especially sent to ascertain, as there were great 
doubts about it and the duke entirely unwilling 
to express himself? A keen observer, Mazarin 
had soon learned that the duke was irascible and 
unguarded when in anger; but few would have 
followed him in suddenly, out of the clear sky, 
deliberately, so stirring the duke to anger that he, 
entirely off his guard, blurted out things which 
unmistakably gave a clue to his real opinions o-n 



34 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

the important matter of state in question. What 
a vivid satisfaction the young man must have had, 
which, however, he needs must carefully conceal 
to feign grief and despair hecause he had been 
hapless enough to arouse the ill will of His High- 
ness. Mazarin was throughout his life noted for 
a perfect command of the expressions of all the 
moods, sentiments and passions, used by him at 
will so that it was impossible for any one to pene- 
trate his mask. The same achievement was at- 
tained in a notable manner by the great diplomats 
of the old school, Talleyrand and Metternich, who 
held the stage at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century; and it has been emulated in greater or 
less perfection by successive generations of Min- 
isters, Counselors, and Secretaries. 

"When Cromwell had allowed himself to be 
tangled up in double-faced negotiations with the 
Spanish and the French courts of which the lat- 
ter had obtained complete knowledge, the French 
envoy, DeBass, very cleverly rebuked him for the 
inconstancy and disingenuousness of his action. 
The envoy related to Cromwell in complete detail, 
but as an "unauthenticated report," all the facts 
of the dubious negotiation, and then asked the 
Protector kindly to extricate him from this laby- 
rinth. Cromwell was entirely taken aback and 



EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY 35 

took his departure abruptly on urgent business, 
leaving his secretary to make excuses. The star 
performance of Metternich was when Napoleon, 
returning from a hunt in a fit of heated excite- 
ment, in the presence of the other foreign repre- 
sentatives, rushed up to him shouting, "What the 
deuce does your Emperor expect of me?" Met- 
ternich replied with the greatest composure, ' ' He 
expects his ambassador to be treated with re- 
spect. ' ' 



II 

OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 

The correspondence of diplomats of the eight- 
eenth century is full of interest because of the 
particular intimacy which characterized social life 
at that time. But we receive from it also direct 
and invaluable information on the spirit and 
methods of diplomacy. The correspondence from 
St. Petersburg at the time of Catherine the Great 
gives a complete picture of the less noble features 
of diplomatic life and action. At that Court, pre- 
sided over by a woman of great ambition whose 
every movement and mood the diplomats felt nec- 
essary to take into account and carefully to cal- 
culate, at a time when England and France as 
well as other nations were involved in almost con- 
stant hostilities, the sharpest characteristics of 
eighteenth century diplomacy came to the surface. 
Politics is seen as a game of forfeits and favors 
in which wars were made for personal and dynas- 
tic reasons and territories traded off in the spirit 
of the gamester without regard to natural or 
ethnic facts, or the welfare of the population. 

36 



OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 37 

A letter written near the beginning of Cather- 
ine's reign, addressed by Sir George Macartney 
to the Earl of Sandwich, most strikingly illus- 
trates the character of the period. The British 
Minister first reports that M. Panin, the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, had signed a treaty 
of alliance with Denmark, contemplating war with 
Tarkey. By a most secret article, Denmark 
promises ''to disengage herself from all French 
connections, demanding only a limited time to en- 
deavor to obtain the arrears due to her by the 
Court of France. At all events, she is immedi- 
ately to enter into all the views of Russia in 
Sweden, and to act entirely, though not openly, 
with her in that kingdom." The writer then re- 
ports that it is the ardent wish of the Empress 
"to make a common cause with England and 
Denmark, for the total annihilation of the French 
interest there (in Sweden). This certainly can- 
not be done without a considerable expense; but 
Russia, at present, does not seem unreasonable 
enough to expect that we should pay the whole." 
The amount necessary absolutely to prevent the 
French from ever getting at Stockholm again is 
suggested. As the Swedes are highly sensitive 
because of their dependent situation in recent 
years, the Russian Court desires "that we and 



38 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

they should act upon separate bottoms, still pre- 
serving between our respective Ministers a con- 
fidence without reserve. That our first care 
should be, not to establish a faction under the 
name of a Russian or of an English faction; but, 
as even the wisest men are imposed upon by a 
mere name, to endeavor to have our friends dis- 
tinguished as the friends of liberty and inde- 
pendence." The Minister then reports that an 
alliance with Russia is not to be thought of un- 
less by some secret article England would agree 
to pay a subsidy to Russia in case of a Turkish 
war (Turkey happened at the time to be in al- 
liance with England). The Minister relates that 
a similar proposal which was put up to the King 
of Prussia by a Russian official who was his mor- 
tal enemy and who hoped greatly to embarrass 
him thereby, was unexpectedly and quite blandly 
accepted by Frederick II. The letter closes with 
the earnest entreaty on no account to mention to 
M. Gross, the Russian Minister in London, the 
secret article of the treaty which his own Gov- 
ernment had just concluded with Denmark. 

The correspondence of James Harris, Lord 
Malmesbury, is a particularly full and continuous 
account of court and diplomatic life in the eight- 
eenth century. In describing his diplomatic 



OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 39 

struggles in a Court in which everything turned 
round the whims and ambitions of an unscrupu- 
lous woman who had come to the throne through 
putting out of the way its rightful occupant, the 
vicious practices of the day are presented in all 
their corruption and deceitfulness. Before going 
to Russia, Sir James Harris was Minister at Ber- 
lin. He paints the character of Frederick the 
Great in the following words: "Thus never los- 
ing sight of his object, he lays aside all feelings 
the moment that is concerned; and, although as 
an individual he often appears, and really is, hu- 
mane, benevolent, and friendly, yet the instant he 
acts in his Royal capacity, these attributes for- 
sake him, and he carries with him desolation, mis- 
ery^ and persecution, wherever he goes. ' ' A Ger- 
man scholar of the period, an admirer of the 
great monarch, used the following language: 
''The art, till then unknown in Europe, of con- 
cluding alliances without committing one's self, 
of remaining unfettered while apparently bound, 
of seceding when the proper moment is arrived, 
can be learnt from him and only from him." 
These descriptions of the political character of 
Frederick II set forth the essential political fac- 
tor as it was understood at the time and as it has 
been understood by a continuous li-ne of states- 



40 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

men from Machiavelli to the present. As in 
physical science, every factor has to be disre- 
garded except those essential to the experiment 
which is being conducted, so in the intensive poli- 
tics of the modern state, in the mind of such men, 
abstraction is made from all sentiment, virtue and 
quality, to the sole pursuit of a closely calculated 
political effect. The same German scholar cred- 
its Frederick the Great with a superior straight- 
forwardness. That quality, however, is mani- 
fested by such a man mostly on occasions where 
he is so sure of himself and of his plans that he 
can challenge the worst attempts of his enemies 
to upset them and can confound them utterly by 
flinging his plans in their faces, as did Bismarck 
at a later time. A startling and fearless frank- 
ness is one of the characteristics of political 
genius. 

But to return to the correspondence of Lord 
Malmesbury. All the devices and foibles of the 
profession at that period are there mirrored. 
When he (still as Sir James Harris) reports the 
coming of a new French Minister to St. Peters- 
burg, he expresses the hope that the new envoy 
will not be so difficult to deal with as the present 
charge d 'affairs, **who, though he has a very 
moderate capacity, got access to all the valets de 



OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 41 

chambre and inferior agents in the Russian 
houses,, who very often conjured up evil spirits 
where I least of all expected them. ' ' A little later 
he reports to the British Foreign Minister, Lord 
Stormont, as follows: ''If, on further inquiry, 
I should find, as I almost suspect, that my friend's 
(Prince Potemkin) fidelity has been shaken, or 
his political faith corrupted, in the late confer- 
ences, by any direct offers or indirect promises 
of reward, I shall think myself, in such a case, 
not only authorized but obliged to lure him with 
a similar bait." He reminds His Lordship of 
the fact that Prince Potemkin is immensely rich 
and that, therefore, perhaps as much may be re- 
quired as de Torcy offered to the Duke of Marl- 
borough (two million francs). 

In a letter of June 25, 1781, Sir James Harris, 
writing to the same Minister, speaks of having 
obtained information of the conclusion of a secret 
treaty between Russia and Austria from the con- 
fidential secretary of a Russian minister. He 
adds: "I trust I shall keep him to myself, since 
I have lost almost all my other informers by 
being outbid for them by the French and Prus- 
sians." He adds that it is painful to him that 
the secret service expenses come so very high but 
he explains that the avid corruption of the court 



42 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

is ever increasing and that his enemies are fa- 
vored by the fact that they can join in the ex- 
pense against him, their courts moreover supply- 
ing them most lavishly. He adds: ''They are 
also much more adroit at this dirty business than 
I am, who cannot help despising the person I cor- 
rupt. ' ' 

The Foreign Minister of Russia at this time, 
and for many years before and after, was Count 
Panin. It was then suspected and is now known 
that he was firmly bought by Frederick II. But 
there has been some doubt as to whether he en- 
tered upon this corrupt relation behind the back 
of Empress Catherine or at her bidding. It is 
known that she often encouraged her ministers 
at foreign courts to accept bribes and apparently 
to sell themselves to foreign governments, be- 
cause through the relationship of confidence thus 
established they might gather information use- 
ful to their own government. This is one of the 
many ways in which the game of corruption 
tended to defeat itself. 

As far as the letters of this period deal with 
diplomatic policies they are no more reassuring 
than when they relate the details of diplomatic 
practice. On August 16, 1782, Sir James Harris 
made a long confidential report to Lord Grantham. 



OLD DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 43 

He observes that Count Panin is powerfully as- 
sisting the King of Prussia, the French Minister 
is artful and intriguing, working through Prince 
Potemkin and the whole tribe of satellites which 
surrounded the Empress, whom he calls "barber 
apprentices of Paris." He then unfolds his own 
policy of winning the favor of the Empress for 
England by giving her the island of Minorca as 
a present. His idea had been adopted by the 
British Foreign Office and he writes, "Nothing 
could be more perfectly calculated to the meridian 
of this Court than the judicious instructions I re- 
ceived on this occasion." He decided, — hand in 
hand with the proposed cession of Minorca, — to 
designate the Empress as a friendly mediatrix be- 
tween England and Holland; he says: "I knew, 
indeed, she was unequal to the task but I knew 
too how greatly her vanity would be flattered by 
this distinction." Farther on he reports how, 
gradually, after several British Ministers had in- 
curred the ill humor of Catherine, Fox and the 
present Minister of Foreign Affairs have finally 
found favor and smoothed the road for Sir James. 
He hopes that all these great efforts and sacri- 
fices may result in "lighting the strong glow of 
friendship in Her Imperial Majesty in favor of 
England." At this distance a slim result of so 



Y 



44 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

much effort. The characterization of Catherine 
with which he closes, few historians would now ac- 
cept.* 

American diplomats had their first taste of Eu- 
ropean diplomatic methods in 1797, when Pinck- 
ney, Gerry and Marshall were sent to Prance on 
their special mission. Every attempt at delay 
and mystification was practised on them. After 
various secret agents had tried the patience of the 
Americans and had finally come out with the plain 
demand of Talleyrand for a million francs as the 
price for peace and good relations, they resolutely 
turned their back on Paris. Meanwhile Pitt was 
seriously considering buying peace on similar 
terms. 



y- 



* "With very bright parts, an elevated mind, an uncommon 
sagacity, she wants judgment, precision of ideas, reflection, and 
I'esprit de combinaison." 



Ill 

AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 

The convulsions of the French revolution and 
the Napoleonic conquests did not seem materially 
to affect the principles and practices of diplo- 
macy. When the Congress of Vienna met to re- 
arrange the state of Europe, it was guided by 
men who still looked upon diplomacy entirely in 
the manner of the 18th century, when, in the 
words of Horace Walpole, ''it was the mode of 
the times to pay by one favor for receiving an- 
other.'' The idea of restoring the balance of 
Europe or patching up the rents and cracks in the 
old system which had been so severely shaken was 
the purpose which animated these men. They 
viewed everything from the dynastic interests of 
their respective rulers and traded off lesser king- 
doms and slices of territory with the same spirit 
of the gamester that has always characterized 
the absolutist diplomacy. 

Of the three master minds of the Congress of 
yienna, Talleyrand, Metternich and Pozzo di 

45 



46 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

Borgo, it may indeed be said that they illustrated 
both the qualities and the vices of the old diplo- 
macy in a superlative degree. The last named 
has characterized Talleyrand as ''a man who is 
unlike any other. He wheedles,, he arranges, he 
intrigues, he governs in a hundred different man- 
ners every day. His interest in others is pro- 
portioned to the need which he has of them at 
the moment. Even his civilities are luxurious 
loans which it is necessary to repay before the 
end of the day.*' Talleyrand, himself, has said: 
*'Two things I forbid — too much zeal and too 
absolute devotion — they compromise both persons 
and affairs." He did not, indeed, betray his 
great master Napoleon, he only quitted him in 
time. 

Metternich, who resembled Talleyrand in the 
complete self-control of a passionless diplomat, 
had a long and brilliant, but essentially sterile, 
career. His correspondence shows a keen and 
luminous spirit with a great mastery of detail, 
and capacity for manipulating the human pawns ; 
but there is no deep insight, no real constructive 
policy. Indeed, he supported Alexander I in his 
efforts for a Holy Alliance or sacred league 
among nations, but it was conceived in such a 
form that it would not have interfered with the 



AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 47 

traditional game of diplomacy. Metternicli in- 
deed often pays his compliments to the ideal, as 
when he praises the league as resting on the same 
basis as the great Christian society of man, 
namely, the precept of the Book of Books, "Do 
unto others as you would that they should do 
unto you." But the details of his policy were 
governed entirely by the barren principles of 
balance of power and legitimacy, and showed an 
utter disregard for the natural and ethnic facts 
underlying government. Metternich indeed him- 
self at times realized the vanity of political in- 
trigue, as when he wrote to his daughter from 
Paris in 1815, ' ' This specific weight of the masses 
will always be the same, while we, poor creatures, 
who think ourselves so important, live only to 
inake a little show by our perpetual motion, by 
our dabbling in the mud or in the shifting sand." 
When Alexander himself left the realm of vague 
ideals and descended to details, his impulses often 
took a form somewhat like the proposal made to 
Castlereagh at Vienna, ''We are going to do a 
beautiful and grand thing. We are going to raise 
up Poland by giving her as king one of my broth- 
ers or the husband of my sister." The British 
statesman does not seem to have been immedi- 
ately carried away with this generous design. 



48 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

It was consistent with the character and tem- 
per of the Congress of Vienna that there flowed 
in it innumerable currents and counter-currents 
of intrigue. In January, 1815, the representa- 
tives of England, France and Austria agreed upon 
a secret treaty of alliance, directed against Rus- 
sia and Prussia. When Napoleon returned from 
Elba he found this document and showed it to 
the Russian Minister before tearing it up. 

The first half of the nineteenth century was 
dominated by the principles that had prevailed at 
Vienna. In the details of diplomatic intercourse, 
indirection, bribery and deceit continue to prevail 
although in a less flamboyant fashion than in the 
eighteenth century. As the principle of nation- 
alism comes more clearly to emerge, the secrecy 
of diplomatic methods is distinguished from the 
secrecy of diplomatic policy with increasing con- 
demnation of the latter; a greater sense of re- 
sponsibility to the nation as a whole begins to 
show itself, and the traditional resources of di- 
plomacy are no longer quite adequate. 

Nevertheless, the diplomatic literature of the 
age still looks upon diplomacy as essentially a 
tactical pursuit, conditioned by the continuous 
enmity of states. The French writer, Garden, in 
his Traits de diplomatie, gives the following 



AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 49 

elucidation: ''Put on tliis plane, diplomacy be- 
comes like a transcendent manoeuvering of which 
the entire globe is the theater, where states are 
army corps, where the lines of combat change un- 
ceasingly, and where one never knows who is a 
friend, and who is an enemy. It is a political 
labyrinth in the midst of which ability alone is 
capable of moving with ease and without being 
smothered by detail." 

The memoirs and anecdotal literature of the 
period afford numerous instances of the persist- 
ence of that desire for cleverness in dealing with 
secrets, which often brings about amusing inci- 
dents. 

At the time when Frankfort was the capital of 
the North German Confederation, the Austrian 
government provided its representative there 
(Count Rechberg) with duplicate instructions; 
one to the effect that he must exhaust every en- 
ergy to maintain the most friendly and mutually 
helpful relations with Prussia; the other of quite 
the opposite tenor. The former was to be shown 
to the Prussians. Unfortunately, at the critical 
moment the Austrian Minister showed the wrong 
letter to Bismarck, who guessed the situation; 
suppressing his amusement as best he could, Bis- 
marck tried to console the embarrassed Austrian 



50 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

by promising not to take any advantage of the 
slip. 

A Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(Mantenffel) had hired a police agent to sneak 
into the French Embassy in order to secure some 
documents there. When he delightedly showed 
one of the letters secured to General Von Gerlach, 
the latter said: ''I could have written you ten 
such letters for what this cost you." 

Disraeli, in a letter to his sister, spoke of the 
Danish Minister at London as his secret agent in 
the diplomatic corps. 

There were also more innocent means of gain- 
ing advantages such as are practised in many 
other branches of human enterprise. For in- 
stance, Labouchere relates his discovery, when 
attache at Washington, that Secretary Marcy was 
put in a terrible ill-humor whenever he lost at 
whist. Upon a hint from Labouchere, the British 
Minister managed thereafter regularly to lose in 
his games with Marcy who was immensely pleased 
at ''beating the British at their own game." La- 
bouchere adds : ''Every morning when the terms 
of the treaty were being discussed we had our 
revenge and scored a few points for Canada." 

There was all this time an increasing tendency 
to discount the importance of the traditional arts 



AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 51 

of diplomacy and to believe that a great deal of 
this carefully nurtured secrecy was merely a trick 
of the trade. Bismarck expressed himself in the 
following language on diplomatic literature: 
''For the most part it is nothing but paper and 
ink. If you wanted to utilize it for historical 
purposes, you could not get anything worth hav- 
ing out of it. I believe it is the rule to allow his- 
torians to consult the Foreign Office archives at 
the expiration of thirty years (after the date of 
despatches). They might be permitted to exam- 
ine them much sooner, for the despatches and let- 
ters, when they contain any information at all, are 
quite unintelligible to those unacquainted with the 
persons and relations treated of in them." In 
reporting this statement, Labouchere observes: 
"If all foreign office telegrams were published 
they would be curious reading. ' ' * He also re- 

* He writes that when "I was an attache at Stoekholm, the 
present Queen, the Duchess of Ostrogotha, had a bahy, and a 
telegram came from the Foreign Office desiring that Her Majes- 
ty's congratulations should be offered, and that she should be 
informed how the mother and child were. The Minister was 
away, so off I went to the Palace to convey the message and to 
inquire about the health of the pair. A solemn gentleman re- 
ceived me. I informed him of my orders, and requested him to 
say what I was to reply. 'Her Royal Highness,' he replied, 'is 
as well as can be expected, but His Royal Highness is suffering 
a little internally, and it is believed that this is due to the fact 
of the milk of his nurse having been slightly sour last eve- 
ning.' I telegraphed this to the Foreign Office." 



52 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

lates how his youthful efforts at secret diplomacy 
were received by the Foreign Office. He had suc- 
ceeded at St. Petersburg in being able quite regu- 
larly, through the assistance of a laundress, to 
get from the government printing office loose 
sheets of confidential minutes of State Council 
meetings. When Lord John Russell discovered 
the method in which this interesting information 
was obtained, he put a stop to the simple intrigue ; 
Labouchere concludes his account of this experi- 
ence thus : ^'For what reason, I wonder, did Rus- 
sell imagine diplomacy was invented?" 

The term ''secret diplomacy" is during this 
period used in a special sense, referring to a se- 
cret intrigue on the part of a monarch or minis- 
ter without the knowledge of those who have the 
public responsibility in the matter. Earlier mon- 
archs often played their own game without in- 
forming their ministers and attempted to keep the 
threads of foreign intrigue in their own hands. 
Louis XV did great injury to his country by pur- 
suing this method. 

Napoleon III was a great offender in this re- 
spect. Not only was his international policy 
prone to unscrupulous attempts and proposalsj 
but he acted in these matters frequently without 
informing those who were responsible before the 



AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 53 

country. Most of his secret advances to Bis- 
marck were made entirely on his own responsi- 
bility; lie did not inform the Foreign Minister, 
Ollivier, of the fateful instructions to Benedetti 
to the effect that he should demand of Prussia 
assurances that no German prince should ever 
again be suggested for the Spanish throne; his 
Mexican policy, too, was worked out by himself, 
in conjunction with the Due de Morny and Jecker, 
the banker, rather than with his ministers. The 
disastrous consequences of the secret diplomacy 
of Napoleon III will be reverted to later on. 

It has also repeatedly happened that envoys 
have incurred a strong suspicion of playing a 
political game of their own without the author- 
ization or even the knowledge of their Foreign 
Minister. While a diplomatic representative in 
taking such action risks disavowal and dismissal, 
yet the temptation felt by a strong-willed man 
who is confident that he knows the local situation 
and the needs of his country there better than 
any one else, has often been too powerful to be 
resisted. When the unauthorized action has been 
successful in gaining some advantage, it has gen- 
erally been condoned.* But though the home gov- 

* Frequently, indeed, ministers have been encouraged to make 
certain demarches "on their own account"; if successful, they 



64 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ernment is at all times able theoretically to dis- 
avow unauthorized actions of its foreign repre- 
sentatives, yet the latter through their self-willed 
acts may have set in motion forces which can no 
longer be controlled. Very often also doubt and 
confusion is cast on the real causes of important 
events and a general feeling of suspicion is thus 
generated. 

One of the most self-willed of British Ministers 
was Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Red- 
cliffe). It is generally accepted that his personal 
diplomacy at Constantinople, where he began his 
diplomatic career in 1808 and where he ended it 
in 1858 after various intervening missions, was 
one of the causes which brought on the Crimean 
war. After reciting that Lord Stratford con- 
stantly held private interviews with the Sultan 
and did his utmost to alarm him, urging him to 

could be sanctioned after the event. Such is the procedure which 
Palmerston criticized in a letter to Lord Clarendon (May 22, 
1853): 

"The Eussian Government has always had two strings to its 
bow — moderate language and disinterested professions at Peters- 
burg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the 
scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the 
Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which 
it did not intend, but cannot, in honor, recede from. If the 
local agents fail, tliey are disavowed and recalled, and the lan- 
guage previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents 
have overstepped their instructions." 



AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 55 

reject accommodation with Russia, and promising 
him the armed assistance of England, John 
Bright stated that all this was done without in- 
structions from the home government. Lord Clar- 
endon wrote : ' ' He is bent on war and on playing 
the first part in settling the great Eastern ques- 
tion." When the war came on, Lord Granville 
wrote: ''We have generals whom we do not 
trust, and whom we do not know how to replace. 
We have an Ambassador at Constantinople, an 
able man, a cat whom no one cares to bell, whom 
some think a principal cause of the war, others 
the cause of some of the calamities which have at- 
tended the conduct of the war; and whom we 
know to have thwarted or neglected many of the 
objects of his Government." 

Labouchere, who served under Lord Stratford 
in 1862, wrote afterwards that the despatches of 
Stratford during the Crimean war could not be 
recognized as the originals from which Mr. King- 
lake drew his material for a narrative of the am- 
bassador's career.* He thought that Stratford's 
great power at Constantinople was due to his long 

* Labouchere wrote : 'Xord Stratford was one of the most 
detestable of the htunan race. He was arrogant, resentful and 
spiteful. He hated the Emperor Nicholas because he had de- 
clined to accept him as Ambassador to Russia, and the Crimean 
war was his revenge. In every way he endeavored to envenom 
the quarrel and to make war certain." 



56 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

stay there which made it necessary for the Turks 
to remain, on good terms with him. Labouchere 
also claims that Lord Stratford misled his own 
government by getting the Sultan to publish cer- 
tain reform decrees which he would send home as 
evidence of good government, never explaining 
that such decrees were entirely dead letters. 

The danger and disadvantage of having a diplo- 
mat or ruler inject his personal ambitions and dis- 
likes into his diplomacy have, unfortunately, been 
frequently exemplified. With respect to the 
causes of the Crimean war, it will be remembered 
that Napoleon III had a personal grudge against 
Emperor Nicholas who had addressed him "Sire 
and Good Friend" instead of ''Brother" as is 
customary among monarchs. Though Napoleon 
answered him, acknowledging the compliment im- 
plied from the fact that one may choose one's 
friends but not one's brothers, yet he never for- 
got the slight. 

Lord Palmerston as Foreign Minister quite 
openly regarded himself as a power independent 
not only of Parliament but of the Cabinet itself, 
and not bound to consult his colleagues provided 
he could justify himself later before the House of 
Commons. But when in December, 1851, he had 
entirely on his own responsibility approved the 



AFTER THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 57 

coup d'etat by which Napoleon III made himself 
emperor, Lord John Russell instantly dismissed 
him and thus vindicated the rule that the Foreign 
Minister must always pay regard to the joint re- 
sponsibility of the Cabinet. 

In 1861 a select committee of Parliament on 
the diplomatic service was appointed. It took 
evidence, among other things, on the existence of 
''secret diplomacy" in the British service. By 
this term was understood private correspondence 
or private action affecting the conduct of pub- 
lic affairs, which did not become part of the rec- 
ord in the ministry. Lord Stratford de Red- 
cliffe, the Earl of Clarendon, Lord Cowley, and 
Lord John Russell, all gave evidence with re- 
spect to the conduct of business by private cor- 
respondence. They all seemed to agree that pri- 
vate correspondence between the Foreign Minis- 
ter and the individual representatives abroad was 
useful and even necessary for supplementing the 
formal instructions and reports. But they stated 
their belief that whenever any such private cor- 
respondence should begin to affect the actual con- 
duct of public affairs it would certainly get into 
the record; if, however, it should come to noth- 
ing, then it might not be referred to in public 
despatches. 



IV 

NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 

We have so far been dealing primarily with the- 
methods of diplomacy. During the old regime 
both the methods and the general policy of diplo- 
matic action were controlled by the secret coun- 
cils of the monarch and of a few ministers. With 
the growth of representative government public 
opinion began to concern itself more directly with 
foreign affairs. There grew up gradually, al- 
though with many relapses and with many breaks 
of continuity, a consensus that while the methods 
of diplomatic action might be secret, the general 
trend of policy should regularly be laid before 
the representatives of the people who should also 
be informed of any individual action involving the 
responsibilities of the nation. When, therefore, 
in contemplating the history of the last one hun- 
dred years, secret diplomacy is spoken of in con-|| 
demnatory terms, the attempted secrecy of na- 
tional foreign policy, rather than of methods, is 
usually thought of. When important engage- 
ments are undertaken which involve the nation in 

58 



NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 59 

responsibility to others, particularly for the use 
of armed forces ; when by a series of specific acts 
a tendency is given to foreign policy which is not 
avowed to the representatives of the people ; then 
there exists secret diplomacy in a reprehensible 
sense. A further method of concealment works 
through a false statement of motives. Often nar- 
rowly selfish action has been camouflaged with the 
avowal of noble aims and high ideals ; or there has 
been fencing for position in order that at the be- 
ginning of a war the opprobrium of being the 
assailant could be thrown on the other party. 
Undoubtedly sometimes statesmen may persuade 
themselves of the presence of high motives in 
matters in which their specific action or that of 
their successors, working with the same materials, 
takes on a contrary direction. 

At the conclusion of the Crimean war, Lord 
Palmerston wrote to Lord Clarendon (March 1, 
1867) as follows: 

"... the alliance of England and France has de- 
rived its strength not merely from the military and 
naval power of the two states, but from the force of 
the moral principle upon which that union has been 
founded. Our union has for its foundation resistance 
to unjust aggression, the defence of the weak against 
the strong, and the maintenance of the existing balance 
of power. How, then, could we combine to become un- 



60 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

provoked aggressors, to imitate in Africa the partition 
of Poland by the conquest of Morocco for France, of 
Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of Egypt 
for England? And, more especially, how could Eng- 
land and France, who have guaranteed the integrity of 
the Turkish Empire, turn round and wrest Egypt from 
the Sultan? A coalition for such a purpose would re- 
volt the moral feelings of mankind, and would certainly 
be fatal to any English Government that was a party 
to it. Then, as to the balance of power to be main- 
tained by giving us Egypt, but we do not want the bur- 
den of governing Egypt, and its possession would not, 
as a political, military, and naval question, be con- 
sidered, in this country, as a set-off against the posses- 
sion of Morocco by France. Let us try to improve all 
these countries by the general influence of our com- 
merce, but let us all abstain from a crusade of conquest 
which would call upon us the condemnation of all other 
civilized nations." 

This program of liberal principles applied to for- 
eign affairs, of high-toned and high-minded di- 
plomacy, one reads with mixed feelings in view 
of the things which have come thereafter. 

Iq the period between the Crimean and the 
Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon pursued a policy, 
or a series of policies, which fitly illustrate the 
worst features of secret diplomacy. In 1858 
Napoleon III obtained from Cavour a promise 
that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to France. 
These arrangements, made without the knowledge 



NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 61 

or the desire of the French people, involved Napo- 
leon in the war of 1859 and led to a fatal weak- 
ening of his position. In 1864 Napoleon se- 
cretly suggested to Prussia that she might take 
Schleswig-Holstein, thus greatly encouraging her 
to undertake the war of 1864. France at this 
time was under treaty obligations to Denmark 
which made such action doubly dishonest. When 
the war between Austria and Prussia broke out 
in 1866, Napoleon concluded a secret treaty with 
Austria which contained a bargain that he would 
assist Austria to recover Silesia in return for a 
cession of Venetia to Italy, to compensate the lat- 
ter for Savoy and thus to eradicate the evil ef- 
fects of the arrangement of 1858. As this treaty 
became known, it absolutely alienated Prussia 
from France. At the same time Napoleon had se- 
cretly demanded from Prussia the cession of the 
Rhenish Palatinate which belonged to Bavaria; 
this would mean of course that Prussia and 
France together would first have to take it from 
Bavaria. Bismarck secretly informed Bavaria of 
this demand and thus turned her decisively 
against Napoleon ; so that he was enabled to make 
secret treaties of alliance not only with Bavaria 
but with Wurtemberg and Baden for their mili- 
tary support in case of war. Napoleon had thus 



»^ 



62 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

managed unwittingly to bring about the coalition 
of German states which proved disastrous to him 
in 1870. Had the French government known of 
these three German treaties, it would probably 
have avoided war ; as it was, France did not know 
that she would have all Germany against her. In 
1866 Napoleon, through Benedetti, submitted to 
Bismarck a draft treaty according to which, in 
case the French Emperor should decide to send 
his troops to enter Belgium, the King of Prussia 
would grant armed aid to France and support her 
with all his forces, military and naval, in the face 
of and against every other power which might in 
this eventuality declare war. Though this draft 
treaty, which became known in Great Britain and 
caused high excitement there, was not adopted in 
this form, a secret compact was made between 
France and Prussia in 1867, one article of which 
stated that Prussia would not object to the an- 
nexation of Belgium by France. The fact that 
both of these powers had signed the treaty of 
1839, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, ag- 
gravates the noxiousness of this conspiracy. 
Early in 1870 Napoleon was secretly negotiating 
with Austria with a view to a joint war against 
North Germany. The negotiations were in prog- 
ress when the war of 1870 broke out. Probably 



NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 63 

Bismarck was informed of what was going on 
and was therefore the more anxious to face at 
once what he considered an inevitable war. As 
already stated, Napoleon did not communicate to 
his responsible minister his decision to require of 
the King of Prussia the absolute assurance that 
no German prince should ever again be nominated 
for the throne of Spain. In doing so he put him- 
self in a position where Bismarck could manoeuver 
him into a dilemma from which there seemed no 
exit except war. 

This was done by the famous editing of the 
Ems dispatch through which, taking advantage 
of King William's permission to modify and 
eliminate, Bismarck gave to the report sent by 
the king the appearance that nothing further 
could be said between the king and the French 
envoy and that therefore the only alternative to 
the French was retreat or war. This act illus- 
trates one of the most terrible dangers of secret 
diplomacy in that just at the time when inflam- 
mable material is at hand in abundance, one word 
or phrase may give a decisive turn to develop- 
ments and force an issue, in a certain direction, 
without allowing a chance for calm consideration 
of all that is involved. 

Bismarck considered that the unification of Ger- 



64 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

many required a war because only thus could the 
feeling of unity among the German people, until 
then divided into numerous small states, be 
molded into political oneness. But in bringing 
on the Franco-Prussian war, no, matter how in- 
evitable he might consider such a struggle, he 
was too confident of his ability to play the part 
of a Providence and to cut short the slow proc- 
esses of historic development. Therefore, though 
he attempted to work in the interest of outstand- 
ing national factors, his policy was not of a na- 
ture to develop that public confidence in the aims 
of his nation on which alone a statesman can per- 
manently build. His was the diplomacy of au- 
thority, often announcing its aims with great 
frankness, indeed, but always retaining the old 
method so that the public mind remained often 
in the dark. His politics directed German devel- 
opment into a dangerous course. He abhorred 
German disunion, but tried to cure it with means 
too forceful and artificial. The solutions brought 
about further problems. The taking of Alsace- 
Lorraine was the cause of future war. In 1871, 
Bismarck offered Mulhouse to Switzerland se- 
cretly, but the gift was declined. In the years 
after 1871, Bismarck always threatened Parlia- 



NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 65 

ment with the danger of war whenever he wanted 
to put anything through. 

The Eusso-Turkish war of 1878, being in its na- 
ture a conflict about the merits of which only 
vague ideas could be current among the Western 
nations, produced a whole nest of secret treaties. 
The treaty of San Stefano itself was kept secret 
by Russia and Turkey. The British Foreign Sec- 
retary in a diplomatic note which was much ad- 
mired at the time, demanded that the treaty must 
be submitted to the European powers. 

Meanwhile a second secret treaty had been made 
between Russia and Austria wherein, as is cus- 
tomary in such transactions, "compensations" 
were distributed out of property belonging to 
neither of the contracting parties, at the cost of 
somebody else ; it was agreed that Austria should 
have Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile the 
British Foreign Office, though it had just de- 
claimed in indignant tones against the secret 
terms of San Stefano, made an agreement, equally 
secret, with Russia (May 30, 1878), concerning the 
points on which Great Britain would insist in the 
final adjustment. Through the wrongful action 
of an employee of the Foreign Office this agree- 
ment leaked out and a sunomary of it was pub- 



66 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

lished on May 31st. When questioned in the 
House of Lords, the Marquis of Salisbury, who 
at all times had a well-deserved reputation for 
sincerity, nevertheless qualified the statement in 
the Glohe as *^' wholly unauthenticated and not de- 
serving of any confidence on the part of the House 
of Lords." The full text of the agreement was 
published by the Globe on June 14th, and when 
challenged by Lord Rosebery concerning his 
dementi, Lord Salisbury calmly stated: ''I de- 
scribed it as unauthentic simply because it was so, 
and because no other adjective actually described 
it, and I shall be able to state why I so described 
it." The explanation which followed was, how- 
ever, quite lame, and consisted mainly in stating 
that the document as published did not give a com- 
plete view of the situation. The impression pro- 
duced by these tactics was far from favorable. 
Lord Granville, with a great deal of justice, 
wanted to know "where the House of Lords would 
have been had it not been for the immoral action 
of the man who gave the secret treaty to the news- 
paper. They would have had blue books and cop- 
ies of instructions, protocols and other docu- 
ments, but they would have been perfectly duped 
as to the way in which the government had actu- 
ally proceeded." 



NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISMARCK 67 

But there followed another, a fourth secret 
treaty, growing out of the Turkish situation, an 
agreement between Great Britain and Turkey con- 
cluded on June 4th, at Constantinople. As a re- 
sult of erroneous information having been tele- 
graphed from Constantinople by Mr. Layard, the 
British envoy, to the effect that in spite of the 
armistice the Russians were moving on Constan- 
tinople, a large war credit was voted in the Brit- 
ish House, although against the opposition of the 
Liberals under Gladstone and Bright. Orders 
were also given to the Indian Government to send 
troops to Cyprus. A secret treaty was then con- 
cluded in which Great Britain received a protec- 
torate over Cyprus in return for the engagement 
on her part to protect the Asiatic domains of 
Turkey. Never was the blood of a nation with- 
out its own knowledge and consent risked in a 
more doubtful adventure than in this famous 
transaction of Lord Beaconsfield. Gladstone, on 
July 20th, analyzed the treaty as providing for 
three things: the occupation and annexation of 
Cyprus, the defense of Turkey in Asia against 
any attempt Russia may make ("to go two thou- 
sand miles from your own country, alone and sin- 
gle handed, in order to prevent Russia making 
war at any time upon Turkey in Asia"), and re- 



68 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

sponsibility for the government of Turkish terri- 
tory in Asia ; and all that was undertaken without 
the consent and knowledge of the British people, 
to be done at their expense by the blood of their 
children. Mr. Gladstone concluded: "There is 
but one epithet which I think fully describes a 
covenant of this kind. I think it is an insane cove- 
nant.'* 

Disraeli had formerly said of Palmerston: 
*'With no domestic policy, he is obliged to divert 
the attention of the people from the consideration 
of their own affairs to the distraction of foreign 
politics. His scheme of conduct is so devoid of 
all political principle that when forced to appeal 
to the people, his only claim to their confidence 
is his name." The same language could with 
equal justice have been applied to Beaconsfield 
himself. His speeches in defense of his foreign 
policy are usually a superficial appeal to imperial- 
ist passion, and deal in such phrases as "Wliat 
is our duty at this critical moment?" "To main- 
tain the empire of England." (Loud cheers.) 
"Empire" is taken for granted as covering every- 
thing desirable, but the actual relationship of 
these adventurous foreign policies to the welfare 
and true development of the English people is 
never reasoned out. 



NAPOLEON III, DISRAELI, BISIHARCK 69 

While Beaconsfield had opposed the first 
Afghan war, he readily changed his views when 
he came into power and began the second war in 
1878 on the avowed ground that the Ameer had 
refused to receive a British mission. But with a 
sudden change of tactics, at a dinner at the Man- 
sion House on November 9, Lord Beaconsfield sol- 
emnly announced that the war had been made be- 
cause the frontier of India was * ' a haphazard and 
not a scientific one." Yet a little before, when 
condemning the first Afghan war, he had de- 
scribed the frontiers of India as "a perfect bar- 
rier." He did not give to any organization of 
public opinion a chance to influence him in this 
matter, or even to be heard. On December 9, 
Lord Derby said in the House of Lords: "We 
are discussing, and we know we are discussing, an 
issue upon which we have no real or practical in- 
fluence. ' ' 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND 
MOROCCO 

TowAED the end of the nineteenth century the 
dominating development in the diplomacy of Eu- 
rope was the actual formation of the two great 
alliances — the Triple Alliance created by Bis- 
marck, and the Russo-French Alliance which had 
come into being in 1896 as a counterpoise to the 
former. The treaties upon which these alliances 
rested were made secretly; they were part of an 
authoritative policy based on the theory of bal- 
ance of power. The texts of the Triple^ Alliance 
Treaty were not published until after the begm^"* 
ning of the Great War. The so-called Counter- 
Insurance Treaty with Russia by which Bismarck 
attempted to stabilize the situation and isolate 
France through a mutual neutrality agreement 
between Russia, Austria and Germany, was one 
of the most characteristic examples of compli- 
cated methods followed by the old diplomacy ; it 
was, of course, also kept secret. When after Bis- 

70 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 71 

marck's retirement the German Government did 
not renew this secret treaty, it made possible 'a 
fundamental change in the grouping of powers 
with the result that Russia, after a very short in- 
terval, identified herself with France in the Dual 
Alliance. 

While Bismarck had been in control of German 
diplomacy, the main lines of German foreign pol- 
icy were kept quite clear and their general direc- 
tion was definite, no matter how complicated and 
indirect were the means frequently applied to 
carry it out. Emperor William II sought to free 
himself from the tutelage of the powerful Chan- 
cellor, but from then on the orientation of Ger- 
man diplomacy was far from definite. No one 
could be clear where its main objective lay; it 
seemed to seek expansion of influence in Asia 
Minor, the Far East, Morocco, South Africa, and 
almost everywhere, even with the inclusion of 
South America. Germany appeared to have 
many irons in the fire, although meanwhile she 
did not make much progress in any specific direc- 
tion. This uncertainty of her diplomatic aims in 
an increasing manner aroused the apprehension 
of her neighbors ; none of them felt any assurance 
about what Germany actually wanted. That her 
actual wants may not have been unreasonable, 



^72 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

that she herself apparently did not know exactly 
which of her interests should predominate, did 
not help matters ; all those who had more posses- 
sions than she felt themselves endangered, and a 
general suspicion and lack of confidence resulted. 

In the years after the Chino-Japanese war the 
German Government showed a great desire to 
play a prominent part in Far Eastern affairs. 
Thus, it took the lead in bringing about the joint 
intervention of Russia, France and Germany, 
which obliged Japan to surrender Port Arthur, 
a part of the spoils of war just taken from China. 
The three powers who had thus come to the res- 
cue, however, forthwith proceeded to exact from 
China an enormous commission for their good of- 
fices, and forced her to make to them grants of 
lease-holds and other concessions, in which was in- 
cluded the very territory that they had rescued 
from Japan. In this keen onset, which amounted 
to an attempt to divide up the Chinese Empire, 
Great Britain in her turn also participated. The 
Far Eastern situation was rendered decidedly un- 
stable, and the frantic and unorganized resistance 
of the Boxer levies was the result. 

After the settlement of these troubles, in 1901, 
the German Government, as we now know, tentar 
tively suggested the formation of an alliance in- 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 73 

eluding Great Britain and Japan. This proposal 
shows how far German diplomacy at the time had 
departed from the fundamentals of policy under 
Bismarck. Japan proceeded most assiduously to 
work on this suggestion, but Germany was left out 
when the highly important Anglo-Japanese Al- 
liance was secured by the Japanese Minister in 
London. Negotiations between Great Britain and 
Japan were carried on with the greatest secrecy. 
Lord Lansdowne himself seems at one time to 
have been very anxious for prompt action; he 
said to Count Hayashi, as reported by the latter, 
that *' there was great danger in delay, as the 
news of the proposed treaty might leak out and 
objections might then be raised," 

It is significant that while Lord Lansdowne 
and Count Hayashi were in the depth of their 
negotiations, Marquis Ito, on his return journey 
from the United States, proceeded to Russia and, 
entirely in opposition to the express judgment 
of Count Hayashi, "plunged into conversations 
on the most delicate of matters" at St. Peters- 
burg. In fact, the Japanese Government allowed 
almost identical secret negotiations to be carried 
on in London and St. Petersburg at the same time. 
Count Hayashi considered this procedure as im- 
plying "a lack of faith and a breach of honor." 



74 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

Wlien the Anglo-Japanese treaty had been ac- 
tually signed it was, through the indiscretion of 
some official, published in Japan three days too 
soon. The Japanese Foreign Office promptly de- 
nied its existence, and Baron Rosen, the Russian 
Minister at Tokyo, who no doubt knew of the Ito 
negotiations at St. Petersburg, very emphatically 
denied the very possibility of such a treaty. The 
effect on Russia of the truth when it became 
known there, can be readily imagined. In the 
Anglo-Japanese treaty, England, which had re- 
cently joined in the solemn guarantee of the in- 
tegrity of China and of the independence of 
Korea, made engagements scarcely consistent 
with either. 

Lord Rosebery, in a public address, October, 
1905, expressed his sense of the great importance 
of this treaty. ''The treaty," he said, "is an en- 
gine of tremendous power and tremendous lia- 
bility. Whatever else is certain, this at least is 
sure, that it will lead to countless animosities, 
many counter intrigues, and possibly hostile com- 
binations. But I want to point out to you the 
enormous importance of the engagements in 
which this treaty involves you, the reactions 
which it will cause elsewhere, and to bid you to 
be vigilant and prepared, and not negligent, as 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 75 

sometimes you are, of the vast bearings of your 
foreign policy." 

The German Emperor, having failed to obtain 
a treaty with England, now turned to his Rus- 
sian cousin with the design of inducing him to 
make an alliance. The Willy-Nicky correspond- 
ence which was published by the Russian Revo- 
lutionary Government in 1917, as well as the 
memoirs of Isvolsky, give us a complete insight 
into the action of William II in this matter. The 
correspondence shows that Emperor William neg- 
lected no means of arousing resentment and sus- 
picion of England in the mind of Nicholas, par- 
ticularly in attempting to show a complicity of 
England with Japan in the war against Russia. 
In November, 1904, William proposed the imme- 
diate signature by Russia, without the knowledge 
of France, of a defensive treaty of alliance, evi- 
dently directed against Great Britain. France 
was to be invited to join after the signature by 
Germany and Russia. The Czar, however, in- 
sisted that he could not entertain this proposal 
without first submitting it to his ally. William, 
in a long telegram, argued insistently upon the 
danger of informing France before the signature. 
He said: "Only the absolute, undeniable knowl- 
edge that we are both bound by the treaty to give 



76 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

mutual aid to each other, can induce France to 
exercise pressure upon England to remain tran- 
quil and in peace, for fear of placing France in 
a dangerous situation. Should France know that 
a GeTman-Eussian agreement is simply in prep- 
aration and not yet signed, she would immediately 
inform England. England and Japan would then 
forthwith attack Germany." Therefore, William 
concluded that if the Czar should persist in re- 
fusing to sign the treaty without the previous 
consent of France, it would be better not to at- 
tempt making an agreement at all. He stated 
that he had spoken only to Prince Buelow about 
it, and that as undoubtedly the Czar had spoken 
only to Count Lamsdorff, the foreign minister, it 
would be easy to keep it an absolute secret. He 
then congratulated the Czar on having concluded 
a secret agreement of neutrality with Austria. 
As a matter of fact. Count Lamsdorff had not 
been informed by the Czar of the Emperor ^s pro- 
posal. 

In the summer of 1905, Emperor William re- 
turned to the charge, taking advantage of the dis- 
couragement of the Czar due to many external 
and internal troubles resulting from the Japanese 
war. He visited the Czar at the Island Bjorkoe 
in July, and used every resource of his personal 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 77 

influence to prevail on Nicholas. This time he 
succeeded, and the two sovereigns signed a secret 
treaty of alliance, which contained four articles 
to the following effect : 

(1) If any European state shall attack either 
of the empires the allied party engages itself to 
aid with all its forces on land and sea. 

(2) The contracting parties will not conclude a 
separate peace. 

(3) The present agreement comes in force at 
the moment of conclusion of peace between Rus- 
sia and Japan, and may be denounced with one 
year's notice. 

(4) When the treaty has come into force Rus- 
sia will take the necessary steps to inform France 
and to propose to her to adhere to it as an ally. 

On this occasion the Emperor was accompanied 
by Von Tschirsky, who soon after became German. 
Foreign Minister and who countersigned the 
agreement. The Russian Foreign Minister was 
not present but Admiral Birileff, the Minister of 
the Navy, was called in to countersign the Czar's 
signature. After his return to St. Petersburg, 
the Czar allowed fifteen days to pass before in- 
forming Count Lamsdorff. When informed, the 
Czar's advisers took a very strong position 
against the agreement, with the result that not- 



78 SECRET BIPLOMACY 

withstanding the insistent arguments of Emperor 
William, who in his telegram signed himself 
**Your friend and ally," the treaty was never 
given full force. William strongly appealed to 
the gratefulness of the Czar for having stood by 
him during the Japanese war, at a time when, 
''as afterwards the indiscretions of Delcasse have 
shown, although allied to Russia, France had 
nevertheless made an agreement with England to 
attack Germany without warning, in time of 
peace." The latter phrase gives the effect upon 
William's mind of all he knew or believed to know 
about the arrangements concluded between France 
and Great Britain concerning Morocco. 

The Moroccan intrigues and secret negotiations, 
during the first decade of the twentieth century, 
contributed in no small measure to rendering in- 
ternational relations strained and generating a 
general sense of insecurity and suspicion. In 
July, 1901, a protocol was signed between the Sul- 
tan of Morocco and the French Government in 
which the latter declared its respect for the in- 
tegrity of Morocco. At the same time M. Del- 
casse began secret negotiations with Spain for 
a delimitation of spheres of influence in that coun- 
try. In September, 1902, the first Franco-Span- 
ish secret treaty concerning Morocco was given its 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 79 

final form. It was, however, not ratified because 
of British opposition at the time. In 1904, the 
formation of the Anglo-French Entente agree- 
ment, in which the French Government declared 
that it had no intention ''of altering the political 
status of Morocco, ' ' was accompanied by the con- 
clusion of a secret understanding concerning 
Morocco which was not revealed until 1911. Ac- 
cording to the terms of that agreement the Brit- 
ish Government was to be informed of any under- 
standing on Morocco which might be concluded 
between France and Spain. These two coun- 
tries, in fact, on October 3, 1904, consummated a 
convention for the partition of Morocco into 
spheres of influence. A copy of this secret agree- 
ment was given to Lord Lansdowne, the British 
Foreign Minister, who wrote, in acknowledging it : 
*'I need not say that the confidential character of 
the Convention entered into by the President of 
the French Republic and the King of Spain in 
regard to French and Spanish interests in Mo- 
rocco is fully recognized by us, and will be duly 
respected." 

The German Government, which had been ig- 
nored, now suggested the holding of an interna- 
tional conference. After considerable opposition 
the conference met at Algeciras, in February, 



80 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

1906. The Powers represented there again sol- 
emnly recognized the independence and integrity 
of Morocco. Meanwhile, various incidents were 
brought on by the actions of French and Spanish 
commissaries in Morocco. The French parlia- 
ment repeatedly reiterated its intention to ob- 
serve the act of Algeciras, particularly in the dec- 
laration of February, 1909, regarding Morocco, 
in which declaration Germany joined. In 1911, 
events happened which induced a serious Euro- 
pean crisis. The French Government undertook 
military operations against Fez, the capital of 
Morocco, on the ground that the foreign colony 
there was in danger. In reply to questions in 
the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey con- 
firmed that such measures were being undertaken 
by the French Government ''for the succor of 
Europeans in Fez." He added: "The action 
taken By France is not intended to alter the po- 
litical status of Morocco, and His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment cannot see why any objection should be 
taken to it. ' ' 

The facts of the Fez affair have been thus de- 
scribed by the French publicist, Francis de Pres- 
sense : 

"At this point the Comite du Maroc and its organs 
surpassed themselves. They organized a campaign of 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 81 

systematic untruth. Masters of almost the entire press, 
they swamped the public with false news. Fez was 
represented as threatened by siege or sack. A whole 
European French Colony was suddenly discovered there, 
living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and 
children was described in the most moving terms. . . . 
At all costs the Europeans — ^the Sultan, Fez itself must 
be saved. ... As ever from the beginning of this en- 
terprise, the Government knew nothing, willed nothing 
of itself." 



While these events were happening, the Foreign 
Offices both in Paris and London failed to give 
any information concerning the aims which un- 
derlay the action taken. On May 23d, Mr.- 
Dillon in the House of Commons asked to what 
extent England was committed to this "ill-omened 
and cruel expedition." The Foreign Secretary 
replied, "We are not committed at all." The 
French. Foreign Minister declared at the same 
time that he had never heard of any treaty with. 
Spain concerning Morocco. 

When the international crisis came to a head 
suddenly in July, 1911, through the disconcerting 
action of the German Government in sending a 
war vessel to Agadir, the public was totally taken 
by surprise and was absolutely in the dark as to 
the issues and interests involved as well as to the 
commitments which had been made by the British 



82 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

and French foreign offices. The text of the se- 
cret treaty between France and Spain had, how- 
ever, now been secured by the Paris papers Le 
Temps and Le Matin. This revelation led to 
party attacks on secret diplomacy in the British 
House of Commons and in the French Parlia- 
ment. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, in 
February, 1912, said: 



. . . "Why was the French Parliament told only half 
the truth when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our 
arrangement with England? Why was it allowed to 
suspect that this arrangement had as its complement 
and corrective some secret clauses and other secret 
treaties ? It is this, it is this double game towards Par- 
liament and towards the world which becomes morally 
an abuse of trust. . . . Now the whole effort of the ar- 
rangement of 1904 appears to-day in its truth and in 
its vanity. It was a treaty of friendship with England 
recognizing the freedom of our political action in Mo- 
rocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the integ- 
rity of that country; that was what the public kaew 
and approved. But the public was ignorant that at 
the same time, by other Treaties and by contradictory 
clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between 
Spain and France was prepared, of that Morocco of 
which we guaranteed the integrity." 

In the House of Commons, Mr. John Dillon 
charged that 'Hhe Foreign Office policy has be- 



TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY 83 

come during the last ten years progressively more 
secret every year. For ten years the foreign pol- 
icy of this country has been conducted behind an 
elaborate screen of secrecy.'* 



VI 

ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 

As the conunitments of the British Government 
gradually became more and more known the ques- 
tion arose as to how deeply and extensively Great 
Britain had been involved in continental affairs. 
Lord Rosebery, who was uninformed, with the 
rest of Parliament and the public, as to the actual 
details, said in a speech at Glasgow in January, 
1912: 

"This we do know about our foreign policy, that, 
for good or for evil, we are now embraced in the midst 
of the Continental system. That I regard as perhaps 
the gravest fact in the later portion of my life. We 
are, for good or for evil, involved in a Continental sys- 
tem, the merits of which I do not pretend to judge, be- 
cause I do not know enough about it, but which, at any 
rate, may at any time bring us into conflict with armies 
numbering millions, and our own forces would hardly 
be counted in such a war as they stand at present." 

Lord Rosebery realized perhaps more fully than 
most of the leaders of English public life the com- 
plications adherent to what had already become 
public knowledge at the time. 

84 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 85 

Meanwhile the government, in Parliament, con- 
fined itself to plain denials whenever the matter 
of international undertakings and obligations of 
a general nature was brought up. The denials 
could be justified from the point of view that the 
situation as stated by the uninformed questioner 
in Parliament, in each case did not exactly cor- 
respond to the facts. But the impression created 
by such denials that no serious obligations had 
been incurred was, as the result showed, entirely 
misleading. 

On March 8, 1911, Mr. Jowett asked in the 
House of Commons whether any undertaking, 
promise or understanding had been given to 
France that in certain eventualities British troops 
would be sent to cooperate with the French army. 
The "Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
replied: ''The answer is in the negative." On 
December 6, 1911, the Prime Minister said : 

' ' As has been stated, there were no secret engagements 
with France other than those that have now been pub- 
lished, and there are no secret engagements with any 
foreign Government that entail upon us any obligation 
to render military or naval assistance to any other 
Power. ' ' 

Upon another occasion Mr. Yerburgh, M.P., in- 
quired : 



86 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

"May I ask whether or not we are to understand that 
the Government arrived at no decision upon this par- 
ticular question? Is the right honorable gentleman not 
aware that this new definition of the two-Power stand- 
ard is a question of supreme importance, and that in 
arriving at our standard of naval strength previous 
Governments had regard to the power of the fleets of 
other countries?" 

The Prime Minister replied only : 

"I think this question shows the inconvenience of 
dealing with these matters by way of question and an- 
swer. ' ' 

In December, 1912, Lord Hugh Cecil made the fol- 
lowing inquiry: 

"There is a very general belief that this country is 
under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an 
obligation arising out of an assurance given by the Min- 
istry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send 
a very large armed force out of this country to operate 
in Europe. That is the general belief. It would be 
very presumptuous of any one who has not access to 
all the facts in possession of the Government — " 

The Prime Minister interrupted him with: "I 
ought to say that it is not true." Lord Cecil 
thereupon expressed his satisfaction for having 
elicited this explanation, "because," he stated, 
"it was certainly widely believed that the Gov- 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 87 

ernment has engaged in a military policy of an 
adventurous kind and that if such a policy had 
actually been contemplated by the Government it 
would involve a very serious consideration of the 
military resources of the country. " As a matter 
of fact, the latter was a just conclusion from the 
actual situation as it really existed, notwithstand- 
ing the denial by the Prime Minister. 

In March, 1913, when during the discussion of 
the Navy estimates, the Mediterranean situation 
came up, Lord Beresford suggested that Mr. 
Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) must be 
trusting to France the duty of guarding the 
Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill had said in the 
course of these discussions: "In conjunction 
with the Navy of France, our Mediterranean 
Fleet would make a combined force superior to 
all possible combinations." Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke 
referred to this as a remarkable statement, and 
one ''somewhat difficult to reconcile with the re- 
cent pronouncement of the Prime Minister as to 
our understanding with France in the matter of 
armaments." He added: ''In one case we have 
the Prime Minister repudiating an obligation on 
our side of any kind, and in the other we have 
the First Lord of the Admiralty relying for the 
safety of our Eastern Empire, our trade and our 



88 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

food supply, upon the assistance which he pre- 
sumes will be ready at any moment to be given 
to us by France." 

On March 24, 1913, Mr. Asquith, Prime Minis- 
ter, made a comprehensive answer to a question 
of Sir W. Byles in the following terms: 

"As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not 
tmder any obligation, not public and known to Parlia- 
ment, which compels it to take part in a war. In other 
words, if war arises between European Powers, there 
are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or 
hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament 
to decide whether or not Great Britain should partici- 
pate in a war." 

In August, 1913, Lord Haldane made a state- 
ment to the effect that the very friendly relation- 
ships with France rendered the situation in the 
Mediterranean most satisfactory. On June 11, 
1914, this same general matter was up again for 
discussion. Sir Edward Grey, in answering a 
question, referred back to the statement made by 
Mr. Asquith on March 24, 1913, and added: *'It 
"remains as true to-day as it was a year ago." 

The nation was meanwhile left entirely in the 
dark with respect to the actual matter of the re- 
lationships which had developed between Great 
Britain and France, and it was only after the 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 89 

Great War had broken out that Sir Edward Grey, 
in his speech of August 3, 1914, gave to Parlia- 
ment some account of what had actually hap- 
pened. 

The first important step in the new interna- 
tional policy of Great Britain was taken immedi- 
ately after the Liberal Government had been 
formed on December 12, 1905. It appears that 
Sir Edward Grey consulted in this matter par- 
ticularly Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane, inform- 
ing the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman, but not his other Cabinet colleagues. 
The above three men were the leaders of the Lib- 
eral Imperialist faction, and it is not at all cer- 
tain that in an aggressive foreign policy they 
would have been at that moment readily followed 
by their whole party. 

When in consequence of the attempted division 
of Morocco, relations between France and Ger- 
many became somewhat strained. Sir Edward 
Grey, Foreign Minister, made communications to 
the French Ambassador to the effect that, while 
no promises could be given to any Foreign Power, 
yet in Sir Edward Grey's opinion, if war was then 
forced upon France on the question of Morocco, 
public opinion in England would rally to the ma- 
terial support of France. Sir Edward Grey, as 



90 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

related in Ms own words, said : "I made no prom- 
ises and I used no threats, but I expressed that 
opinion. ' ' The accuracy of that opinion has been 
questioned, in view of the temper of the House 
of Commons elected at a time when resentment at 
the imperialist war in South Africa was powerful. 
On the basis of the statement made by Sir Ed- 
ward Grey, the French Government said to the 
British Foreign Minister, as reported by him: 

"If you think it possible that the public opinion of 
Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, jus- 
tify you in giving to France the armed support which 
you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to 
give that support, even if you wish it when the time 
comes, unless some conversations have already taken 
place between naval and military experts." 

Sir Edward Grey saw merit in this proposal and 
agreed to it. He authorized that conversations 
should take place, but with the distinct under- 
standing that nothing which would bind either 
Government should occur. However, the holding 
of conversations between two Powers concerning 
military cooperation is in itself a sufficiently seri- 
ous matter out of which expectations and rela- 
tionships are apt to arise that cannot be over- 
looked in future action. The Cabinet was not 
informed of the authorization given by Sir Ed- 



J 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 91 

ward Grey until later. He did not state how 
much later. 

We know from official sources that Colonel Bar- 
nardiston proceeded to Belgium and had inter- 
views with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff 
concerning combined operations in the event of a 
German attack directed against Antwerp. Colo- 
nel Barnardiston confided to the Belgian Chief of 
Staff that his Government intended to move the 
British base of supplies from the French coast 
to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been 
cleared of all German warships. When the Bel- 
gian documents were published in Germany, it 
was attempted by the press to represent these con- 
versations as an actual convention. These con- 
sultations occurred during the first quarter of 
1906. 

From an official source comes the statement that 
in July, 1911, the British Government informed 
the German, that on certain contingencies, Great 
Britain would support France (if Germany should 
demand the whole of French- Congo and Agadir 
as a naval base) . What actually happened at this 
time has never been fully revealed. 

In April, 1912, the British military attache at 
Brussels informed the Belgian General Jungbluth 
that Great Britain had 160,000 men available for 



92 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

despatch to the continent, and added that the Brit- 
ish Government in certain contingencies during 
recent events would have immediately landed 
troops on Belgian territory. 

About this time the Cabinet had a discussion 
of the whole situation and of the special relation- 
ship with France; and it was decided that there 
should be some definite expression in writing, of 
the latter. Accordingly, in November, 1912, an 
exchange of notes took place between Sir Edward 
Grey and the French Ambassador. The British 
Foreign Minister wrote the following letter: 

,,,, A Nov. 22nd (1912). 

'My dear Ambassador: 

"From time to time in recent years the French and 
British Naval and Military experts have consulted to- 
gether. It has always been understood that such con- 
sultation does not restrict the freedom of either Gov- 
ernment to decide at any future time whether or not 
to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that 
consultation between experts is not and ought not to 
be regarded as an engagement that commits either Gov- 
ernment to action in a contingency that has not yet 
arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in- 
stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at 
the present moment is not based upon an engagement 
to cooperate in war. You have, however, pointed out 
that if either Government had grave reason to expect an 
unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become 
essential to know whether it could in that event depend 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 93 

upon the armed assistance of the other. I a^ee that 
if either Government had grave reason to expect an 
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that 
threatened the general peace, it should immediately dis- 
cuss with the other whether both Governments should 
act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, 
and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to 
take in common. If these measures involved action, the 
plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into 
consideration and the Governments would then decide 
what effect should be given to them." 

A reply from the French Ambassador accepted 
this understanding. 

Side by side with the Anglo-French military 
and naval collaboration, there went the making of 
joint plans by France and Russia which culmi- 
nated in the Franco-Russian military convention 
of August, 1912. At the same time Russia had 
pressed upon France the need of increasing her 
army by raising the term of service to three 
years. Concerning the new disposal of the 
French fleet, according to the desires of Russia, 
President Poincare stated to Ambassador Isvol- 
sky in November, 1912 : 

"This decision has been made in agreement with Eng- 
land, and forms the further development and completion 
of arrangements already made previously between the 
French and English staffs." 



94 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

Thus the chain of cooperation was completed, and 
England was effectively tied up with the situation 
in the Balkans, in which only Russia had a pri- 
mary interest. 

Meanwhile, the repeated denials previously set 
forth kept the British Parliament and public from 
all knowledge of the exceedingly important rela- 
tionships which were growing up between the 
Naval and Military establishments of Great Brit- 
ain and France. 

How these relationships, though only partially 
known and suspected, were looked upon by out- 
siders is shown from expressions in the reports 
of Belgian diplomats. Count de Lalaing wrote 
from London in 1907 : ' ' England is quietly pur- 
suing a policy opposed to Germany and aimed at 
her isolation." Baron Greindl wrote from Ber- 
lin in 1908: ''Call it alliance or what you will, 
the grouping constitutes, none the less, a diminu- 
tion of Germany's security." Baron Guillaume 
wrote, in 1911, from Paris: "I have less faith in 
the desire of Great Britain for peace. She would 
not be sorry to see the others eat one another up." 
These expressions are not, of course, evidences 
of British policy, but simply of the impression 
which whatever leaked out concerning that pol- 
icy, made upon outside diplomats. 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 95 

In his clear and convincing analysis of the situ- 
ation created by the gradual formation in secret, 
of these relationships, Lord Loreburn brings out 
the following points: Through the communica- 
tions with the French Ambassador and military 
and naval conversations concerning plans for 
joint action, France was encouraged more and 
more to expect that Great Britain would stand 
by her in arms if she were attacked by Germany. 
Such a policy of a defensive understanding with 
France, no matter how right in itself, was obvi- 
ously a new departure of tremendous importance. 
Its execution and effectiveness could be assured 
only if understood by Parliament as a national 
policy, with all the risks involved, so that proper 
preparations could be made. Parliament was, 
however, never warned of the danger England 
stood of being thrown suddenly into a European 
war. Had Germany been told in July, 1914, that 
Great Britain would support France and Russia, 
the war would undoubtedly have been prevented ; 
but while the ministers had in fact incurred moral 
obligations over against France, they had not as- 
sured themselves of the necessary Parliamentary 
support and could therefore not make a statement 
involving such risk as the above declaration to 
Germany would have created. 



96 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

Of Sir Edward Grey's speech of the 3rd of 
August, 1914, Lord Loreburn says: 

"This remarkable speech began with an elaborate ef- 
fort to prove that the House of Commons was perfectly 
free to determine either for peace or war. It ended with 
a passionate declaration that this country would be dis- 
graced if we did not declare war, and the reasoning of 
the speech proved that Sir Edward Grey had committed 
himself irretrievably. It left the House of Commons 
convinced that it had in honor no choice but to join 
France in arms. It is an epitome of the reasoning by 
which Sir Edward Grey had been brought to believe that 
he could say and do what he said and did without limit- 
ing his freedom of action. But if this is legitimate we 
ought not to keep up the pretense that we are a self- 
governing nation in foreign affairs." 

Thus a minister, to whom national intrigue and 
duplicity were essentially foreign, who was 
trusted by his country and who wanted peace, was 
brought by the methods of secret diplomacy into 
a position where he had actually incurred the 
moral obligation to assist another country with- 
out having the power for peace whiqh the ability 
to avow that relationship openly, to take the re- 
sponsibility, and to confront Germany therewith, 
would have given him. 

As early as November, 1911, Lord Lansdowne, 
one of the founders of the Entente, in speaking 
of the secret agreement of 1904 concerning Mo- 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 97 

roccQ, which had then just become known to the 
public, had admitted that in such a case the prom- 
ise of purely diplomatic support might easily 
bring on the obligation to assist in other ways; 
that an entente cordiale creates close relation- 
ships between two countries; and that, should 
one of them get into difficulties without its guilt, 
it would expect to receive support. 

The moral responsibilities in which the For- 
eign Minister had involved the British Govern- 
ment were not simple, nor did they exist against 
France alone. Because of the Franco-Russian 
alliance the relationship established between 
Great Britain and France virtually involved shar- 
ing in the defense of France against the conse- 
quences of her alliance with Russia, as the subse- 
quent events showed; any serious situation aris- 
ing in the Balkans and affecting Russian interests 
would thereafter involve France, and through her, 
Great Britain. Accordingly, the effect of this 
policy was to make the peace of Great Britain 
depend upon, and to involve it with, the complex 
struggle for influence in the Balkans. 

After Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 
3rd, Mr. T. Edmund Harvey, M.P., said: ''I am 
convinced that this war for the great masses of 
the countries of Europe is no peoples' war. It 



98 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

is a war that has been made by men in high places, 
by diplomatists working in secret, by bureaucrats 
out of touch with the people, by men who are a 
remnant of an older evil civilization." 

Lord Loreburn sums up his indictment of se- 
cret diplomacy in the following language : ' * Se- 
cret diplomacy has undergone its 'acid test' in 
this country. It had every chance. The voice of 
party was silent. The Foreign Minister was an 
English gentleman whom the country trusted and 
admired, who was wholly free from personal en- 
mities of every kind, and who wanted peace. 
And secret diplomacy utterly failed. It pre- 
vented us from finding some alternative for war, 
and it prevented us from being prepared for war, 
because secret diplomacy means diplomacy aloof 
from Parliament." The issue is here quite 
clearly stated. Those who see in the methods and 
spirit of the old diplomacy the chief cause of war, 
do not hold, on the one hand, that secret diplo- 
macy involves at all times and in all cases un- 
scrupulous plotting. But they believe that the 
method of dealing with foreign affairs as a mys- 
terious matter, fit to be handled only by the se- 
lect, and the reliance on a policy of bargains and 
compensations, with the aim thus artificially to 
maintain a balance of power, may be blamed for 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 99 

this great catastrophe ; for they stood in the way 
of dealing with great public atfairs in a sounder 
manner, that is, with more regard of the actual 
public interest and of the underlying racial and 
popular factors. 

Those British critics who have attacked this 
method as practised in their own country before 
and during the war, do not thereby mean to im- 
pute to British statesmen a major share in the 
responsibility for the war. The high-mindedness 
and public spirit of the responsible statesmen is 
recognized by all fair critics, and most of them 
imply that Great Britain has far less to fear from 
this system than have nations with less responsi- 
ble governments and a less sound tradition of 
statesmanship. They attack the system as a 
whole as it exists throughout European diplo- 
macy, and as it has been used by the British Gov- 
ernment. 

From the point of view of historic evidence, 
and of strict reasoning from cause to effect, a 
great deal of doubt still remains as to how far 
secret diplomacy in itself, — that is, the failure to 
publish to parliament and the people, details of 
the situation as it developed, — could properly be 
considered the specific cause of the war ; no mat- 
ter how definite may be our judgment and belief 



100 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

that the secrecy and tortuousness of foreign pol- 
icy are bound to generate an air of uncertainty 
and suspicion which will so greatly favor mili- 
tarist intrigues and influence as to render the 
making of wars far more easy than they would 
otherwise be, were time and opportunity given 
to the public to consider the details of a critical 
situation. Yet it might be difi&cult to prove by 
historic evidence, the specific proposition that the 
war of 1914 was directly due to the fact that the 
development of international affairs was quite 
generally kept from the knowledge of the public. 
Nevertheless, unquestionably the atmosphere of 
secret diplomacy is a medium exactly suited to 
the most baneful influences. 

Viscount Haldane has made a strong defense of 
the policy of Sir Edward Grey. He asserts that 
**the failure of those who had to make the effort 
to keep the peace, does not show that they would 
have done better had they discussed delicate de- 
tails in public. ' ' He continues : ' ' There are top- 
ics and conjunctures in the almost daily changing 
relations between Governments as to which si- 
lence is golden. For however proper it may be 
in point of broad principle that the people should 
be fully informed of what concerns them vitally, 
the most important thing is that those to whom 



ENTENTE DIPLOMACY 101 

they have confided their concerns should be given 
the best chance of success in averting danger to 
their interests. To have said more in Parliament 
and on the platform in the years in question, or 
to have said it otherwise, would have been to run 
grave risks of more than one sort." This de- 
fense, however, also makes certain assumptions, 
particularly the underlying one that the war was 
not to be avoided by any method. It is based on 
the traditional concept of foreign affairs which 
considers that it is best to leave them at the dis- 
cretion of a few initiated and responsible offi- 
cials. There can be no question that from the 
highest plane conceivable under the older ideas 
and norms of diplomacy, the conduct of foreign 
relations by Sir Edward Grey must be consid- 
ered as a model of sagacity and caution. But 
when Lord Cromer describes the secret arrange- 
ments concerning Morocco as '^a. wise measure 
of preventive diplomacy," it is not easy to fol- 
low him. 



vn 

THE CRISIS OF 1914 

If secret diplomacy exhibits its drawbacks even 
in a country where parliamentary government is 
so highly developed as in England and where po- 
litical intelligence and independence of judgment 
exist, we shall not be surprised at the continuous 
prevalence of devious methods in diplomacy in 
countries where the conduct of foreign affairs is 
considered quite frankly a matter only for the 
initiated, and where little pretense is made of an 
appeal to public opinion except in the sense of 
holding it in subjection by vague general ideas 
of national danger, necessity, and honor. The 
main faults of German diplomacy were due to 
its bureaucratic point of view and its lack of con- 
tact with public opinion, both at home and abroad. 
It was distinctly an expression of the authorita- 
tive will of the state, guided by a supposed inner 
knowledge of its dangers and needs, but without 
any real effort to strengthen itself through con- 
tact with the public mind. The Reichstag was 
indeed occasionally informed of foreign develop- 

102 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 103 

ments, perhaps as frequently as in England, but 
there was no real mutual influence between the 
nation and the officials conducting foreign affairs. 
As has already been pointed out, German diplo- 
macy failed to reassure either the neighbors or 
the people of Germany; its lack of clear objectives 
was puzzling and disquieting. It was also hurt 
by its constant, evident dependence on what 
should have been only the very last resort — ^mili- 
tary force. A further disquieting characteristic 
of German politics was that there seemed to be 
a cynical approval of certain courses of action 
which might indeed resemble what some other na- 
tions were doing, but which were treated by the 
latter rather as regrettable necessities. Thus 
there is, for instance, the conception of Realpoli- 
iik, of which Frederick the Great's statement is 
an extreme instance: "Before declaring my in- 
tentions I consider on the one side the adverse 
incidents which I must risk ; on the other, the good 
fortune which I might hope; and after thorough 
consideration of pro and con, I decide for war." 
Coming now to the fateful crisis of 1914, it 
would appear that at this time a great danger 
was allowed to grow up without the men in con- 
trol of the government giving themselves a full 
account as to the fatal probabilities involved. 



104 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

whereas the parliament and the public remained 
entirely uninformed. Germany had always more 
or less backed her Austrian ally in the Balkan 
policy of the latter. Bismarck had indeed been 
very cautious in this respect, and had been fully 
aware of the danger inherent in such a policy, of 
committing Germany through giving Austria too 
much head. When the Servian question became 
acute, the heads of the German Government were 
indeed so reckless in encouraging strong Austrian 
action as to justify the impression that they de- 
sired to push Austria-Hungary into a conflict. It 
would, however, appear, from a full study q^ all 
the data which is now possible, that the Kaiser 
and Bethmann-Hollweg were quite optimistic in 
believing that the conflict could be localized and 
that the solution could be left to Austria and Ser- 
via. When it was beginning to become quite clear 
that Russia would in this instance not stand aside 
and that therefore France, too, would be thrown 
into the conflict, the German Chancellor began to 
make belated efforts to induce Austria to accept 
the mediation of the Powers on the basis that Bel- 
grade should be occupied to assure compliance 
with the Servian promises. The Austrian pre- 
mier. Count Berchtold, however, was not in- 
clined to reverse his engines. He took advantage 



THE CRISIS OF 1914j 105 

of the encouragement given to Austria in the first 
place, to persist in an irreconcilable attitude 
toward Servia. The documentary material which 
has so far been published, shows that Berchtold 
insinuated to the Eussian and British embas- 
sies that he was favorable to mediation; mean- 
while, he did not answer the proposals to that 
effect made from Berlin, but in fact stubbornly 
pursued his stern policy against Servia. In turn- 
ing a deaf ear to all proposals of mediation at 
this time, Berchtold gave the militarists at Berlin 
and Petrograd the control of the situation. 

Berchtold had inherited the Balkan policy of 
Aehrenthal, who had in 1909 carried out the am- 
bition of laying the two Slavic Provinces, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, "at the feet of Emperor Fran- 
cis Joseph at his Sixtieth Jubilee." Count 
Berchtold himself was not considered a man of 
strong initiative; he vacillated and was unde- 
cided upon questions of great moment; he, how- 
ever, displayed great stubbornness on the fatal 
point that the "honor" of Austria-Hungary did 
not permit of any mediation with Servia. Count 
Forgach, who was his chief adviser, hated Rus- 
sia and Servia intensely, and it is believed that 
he was very influential in spurring Count Berch- 
told to aggressive action. Countess Leutrum 



106 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

holds Mm responsible for the war, ''next to 
Aehrenthal. " The German Ambassador at Vi- 
enna, Von Tschirsky, also harbored a great deal 
of personal resentment against Eussia. There 
would appear to be great reason to doubt whether 
such efforts as Bethmann-Hollweg made to urge 
moderation upon Berchtold were strongly empha- 
sized by the personal influence of the German am- 
bassador. Count Czernin states that all of Herr 
von Tschirsky 's private speeches at this time were 
attuned to ''Now or Never," and he asserts that 
the German ambassador declared his opinion to 
be ''that at the present moment Germany was pre- 
pared to support our point of view with all her 
moral and military power, but whether this would 
prove to be the case in future if we accepted the 
Serbian rebuff appears to me doubtful." Count 
Czernin believes that Tschirsky in particular was 
firmly persuaded that in the very near future Ger- 
many would have to go through a war against 
France and Russia, and that he considered the 
year 1914 would be more favorable than a later 
date. Count Czernin adds: "For this reason, 
because first of all he did not believe in the fight- 
ing capacity of either Russia or France, and sec- 
ondly, because — and this is a very important point 
— he was convinced that he could bring the Mon- 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 107 

arcliy into this war, while it appeared doubtful to 
him that the aged and peace-loving Emperor Fran- 
cis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany on 
any other occasion where the action would center 
less round him, he wished to make use of the Ser- 
vian episode so as to be sure of Austria-Hungary 
in the decisive struggle. That was his policy, 
and not Bethmann's. ... I am persuaded, how- 
ever, that Tschirsky, in behaving as he did, widely 
overstretched his prescribed sphere of activity. 
Isvolsky was not the only one of his kind." 

It is not the purpose of this essay to enter into 
the difficult question of the specific guilt for bring- 
ing on the war of 1914. However, in examining 
the quality and methods of contemporary diplo- 
macy it is not possible to avoid considering some 
of the phases of this difficult question. The docu- 
ments and other evidence which have recently 
been published, make it appear that Bethmann- 
Hollweg, when the- terrible crisis was actually at 
hand, honestly attempted to bring about a mod- 
eration of the course pursued by Austria. The 
original belief of the German statesman itself 
could, however, be accounted for, only on one of 
two alternative reasons, either because of an un- 
believable lack of foresight, or the conviction that 
a threatening attitude would again, as in 1909, be 



108 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

successful, and that Russia would not dare to fol- 
low up her constantly declared interest in the 
Servian situation. And if worst should come to 
worst, "well then," the German leaders seemed 
to think, "now will be better than later." No 
matter what reasonable occasion German states- 
men had during the years leading up to the war to 
fear a hostile policy on the part of neighboring 
governments, yet their attitude and action at a 
critical time shows uppermost in the minds of 
these statesmen and diplomats, a narrowly tac- 
tical, primarily bureaucratic, view of the factors 
involved. There was always present in the back- 
ground the notion of the necessity of a preventive 
war. Those who make the actual decision to be- 
gin a war without any immediate provocation 
making it plainly defensive, who begin it because 
of contingent dangers in the future, no matter 
how great, take a very serious responsibility. As 
has been said, the indicative "Germany made 
war," is far more apt to leave a powerful impres- 
sion in the record of history than the subjunc- 
tive, "If Germany had not made war then the 
others would have done so later on." 

The fact that military action against Servia | 
would probably involve Russia and thus set in 
motion the complete chain of international forces 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 109 

involving Europe in a world war, that is, the fu- 
tility of the attempt to localize the struggle in 
Servia, is practically admitted in the statement 
of the German White Book, issued August 3, 
1914, to the following effect: "We were aware 
of the fact that warlike undertaking against Ser- 
via would bring Russia into the war and that 
therefore our duty as an ally might entangle us 
likewise. We could, however, not advise our 
Ally to yield in a manner incompatible with its 
dignity, nor could we deny our assistance at this 
difficult moment." 

Austria-Hungary had judged that it would be 
incompatible with its dignity and honor to submit 
the Servian matter to arbitration. This illus- 
trates a very characteristic feature of contempo- 
rary diplomacy, still adhering to the traditions 
and prejudices of the past. The term "honor" 
is one that is not translatable into terms which 
can be reasoned about. It is in fact a direct 
descendant of the conception of "honor" during 
the eighteenth century, in the code of the duelist. 
Men constantly translate the concepts of their 
private life into public affairs, and to these men 
who at Vienna, Petersburg and Berlin, had the 
destiny of the world in their hands, honor was 
an indefinable term which could be felt but not 



110 SECRET BIPLOMACY 

discussed. In practice, when applied to human 
affairs of the utmost importance, it cannot be dis- 
tinguished from the character of the personal 
duel, in which the conception of justice was. en- 
tirely subordinate. When it was said that Aus- 
tria-Hungary found arbitration "beneath its dig- 
nity," there was speaking the mentality of the 
Feudal junker who considers himself too noble 
to appeal to a court against a peasant neighbor, 
but prefers to send his servants to give him a 
thrashing. The honor of Austria-Hungary is of 
such a special kind in the mind of these men that 
it does not suffer arbitration, but sees in war the 
only possible satisfaction. In this as in many 
other points, secret diplomacy is a superstition 
of the past. As late as May, 1916, the Pester 
Lloyd, a semi-official paper, declared: ''Even if 
the Eussian Government had stopt its mobiliza- 
tion, which it had secretly begun notwithstanding 
all its hypocritical assurances, nevertheless Aus- 
tria-Hungary would not have gone to any con- 
ference but would have insisted without interfer- 
ence from third parties to settle its affairs with 
Servia in consonance with the future security of 
Austria-Hungary." It would appear plain that 
the Austrian leaders wanted war, but with Servia 
alone ; trusting that the formidable power of their 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 111 

great ally would again block outside intervention. 
Thus when we look at the men in whose hands 
at this time such a fateful power of decision was 
placed, we find them, as the great crisis ap- 
proaches, themselves stunned by the enormity of 
the forces about to be unchained, seeking still and 
hoping for some fortunate escape; yet guided in 
their specific action, not by a general masterly 
grasp of the entire situation, such as is ordinarily 
expected of the diplomatic superman, but just by 
details happening to be most prominent in their 
mind, such as the incompatibility of arbitration 
with the honor of Austria, or the personal judg- 
ments and inclinations of individual diplomats. 
As to a correct estimate of how the forces would 
work out, as to foresight of determining factors, 
these men showed no unusual ability; in fact, the 
guess of the intelligent man on the street would 
have been as safe as their judgment. They stood 
on too narrow a base; they believed that Italy 
would remain neutral, that England would not 
enter the contest, and later that the United States 
would never engage in hostilities. When we con- 
sider the mental attitude of the controllers of 
foreign affairs in all countries during this long 
period of secret manipulations, we can find noth- 
ing sacrosanct about the deductions and judgments 



112 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

of secret diplomacy; in fact, tlie lack of contact 
■with public opinion and the deeper forces of life, 
is everywhere painfully apparent. A Swiss 
writer has stated: "The World War is the work 
of a small minority of men in power. Their 
power rests on the principle of authority, and on 
the erroneous supposition of wisdom and fore- 
sight exceeding the average. The means of main- 
taining this erroneous supposition is secret di- 
plomacy, which deprives the people of all possi- 
bility of insight and control in the most momen- 
tous questions. The result of this system is the 
ruin of Europe." It is too great a risk to take, 
to leave in the hands of individual men, no mat- 
ter how highly gifted personally, the control of 
such forces and the playing of such chances. 

In Russia, the conduct of foreign affairs under 
the Empire was in the hands of a narrow group 
of men of special training and experience, but 
without an element of responsibility to the public 
at large, except that involved in the general re- 
sults of diplomatic policy. It is a notable fact 
that during the nineteenth century only six men 
held the position of foreign ministers in Russia. 
This is by far the longest average tenure in any 
country. Sazonov, who became foreign minister 
in 1911, further emphasized the esoteric charac- 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 113 

ter of foreign policy by definitely divorcing it 
from home affairs. He did not consult with the 
Council of Ministers, but only with men of his 
own chosen environment, a select group of a few 
collaborators. Russian foreign policy was there- 
fore controlled by a very small clique, represent- 
ing the traditions of secret diplomacy, and playing 
at a game of chance, though never so shrewdly, 
with the lives, fortunes and interests of vast 
populations. In the Balkan states Russian di- 
plomacy had for a long time applied all its arts in 
order to establish the predominance of Russian 
influence. The secret alliance between Servia and 
Bulgaria was nurtured by Russia evidently with 
the desire of raising a barrier to the eastward ex- 
pansion of Austrian influence. In 1912, the fear 
was entertained that the alliance might spend its 
main efforts against Turkey instead of Austria. 
At this time a loan was arranged for King Ferdi- 
nand of Bulgaria, the funds for which were ad- 
vanced by the Czar. The Russian Foreign Of- 
fice was fully informed concerning the Balkan al- 
liance, which commenced the war in 1912 with Rus- 
sian assent and encouragement. What direction 
the thoughts of Russian diplomats were taking, is 
apparent from a remark of Sazonov, Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Servian Min- 



114. SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ister, on April 29, 1913, reported by the latter as 
follows : 

"Again Sazonov told me that we must work for the 
future because we would acquire a great deal of terri- 
tory from Austria. I replied that we would gladly give 
Bulgaria Monastir (Bitollia) if we could acquire Bosnia 
and other territory of Austria." 

A Belgian diplomat, in a report written from 
Berlin in 1913, says that notwithstanding the 
great Russian influence in the Balkans, Russian 
diplomacy had vacillated a great deal there since 
the beginning of the Balkan war; he goes on to 
say: ''In a moment of confidence the French am- 
bassador spoke particularly concerning the influ- 
ence which M. Isvolsky has maintained, who has a 
personal desire of revenge against Austria-Hun- 
gary, and takes great pains to spoil the game 
whenever there is any appearance of Austrian 
success. " (Baron Beyens to the Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, March 18, 1913.) 

When the great crisis came on, the diplomacy 
of Russia worked in close connection with the 
militarists. The irreconcilable stubbornness of 
Count Berchtold greatly strengthened the hands 
of the militarists, both in Petersburg and Berlin, 
and virtually put the decision in their hands. The 
Russians did their part to bring on the war by 



THE CRISIS OF 1914 115 

first ordering mobilization and making that mobi- 
lization general almost immediately. The facts 
concerning this matter have become known. On 
July 29, 1914, General Janushkevich, the Russian 
Minister of War, under directions from the For- 
eign Minister Sazonov, gave the German military 
attache his word of honor as a soldier, to the ef- 
fect that ' ' no general mobilization had taken place, 
or was desired. ' ' At the very time, he had with 
him the Czar's mobilization order. During the 
night of July 29th, the Czar gave directions to 
suspend the execution of the order for general 
mobilization. Generals Janushkevich and Sukh- 
omlinoff, with the approval of M. Sazonov, made 
the momentous decision to go on with the execu- 
tion of the order, in disregard of the Czar's com- 
mand. It is quite evident that this action made 
the peaceful settlement of the crisis far more dif- 
ficult, and gave full control into the hands of the 
military party in Berlin. As late as July 31, M. 
Viviani told the German Ambassador at Paris 
that he was in no way informed of a general mobi- 
lization in Eussia. The Russian militarists had 
got away. 



vin 

THE SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 

While the war lasted, the demands of self -pro- 
tection required the careful concealment of nego- 
tiations and policies from enemy knowledge. But 
though it is easy to understand the need of se- 
crecy at such a time, yet the spirit displayed in 
these negotiations had but little in common with 
the ideals professed in the same breath. More- 
over, there was a lack of complete sincerity among 
the Allies themselves, and particularly was there a 
concealment from some of them of important facts 
and agreements affecting their interests. How- 
ever, the most baneful effect of secret diplomacy 
during the war is found in the undermining of pub- 
lic confidence in a moral foundation of public ac- 
tion. As Lord Loreburn says: ''It was not 
wholesome that while our people were stimulated 
to unparalleled exertions by a parade of lofty mo- 
tives there should be at the same time in existence 
agreements of this kind, of which no public men- 
tion could be made, and from which little has re- 
sulted except the right of foreign Powers to de- 
ne 



SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 117 

mand their fulfilment on our part." That at a 
time when the people in the vast armies were 
actually fighting for ideals of freedom and peace, 
common to humanity, the chief care of responsi- 
ble statesmen should have been the division of 
prospective spoils, did certainly not lay solid 
foundations for peace. 

Japan in her action with respect to Shantung 
and in secretly making the twenty-one demands 
on China, was first in the attempt to utilize the 
great struggle for narrowly selfish gain, in this 
case not entirely at the expense of the enemy but 
of a neutral and of her allies. Nor did other gov- 
ertiments keep themselves free from the tempta- 
tions of prospective conquest, with the risk of 
making war interminable and putting the world 
face to face with revolution, anarchy and famine. 
As early as February, 1915, the Russian Foreign 
Minister informed the French and British am- 
bassadors of the territorial acquisitions which 
Russia desired to make through the war, includ- 
ing a great part of Turkey in Europe and in Asia. 
The French and British Governments expressed 
their readiness to agree, provided a number of 
claims made by France and England were satis- 
fied. Italy entered the war, as is well known, on 
condition of her claims for territorial annexations 



118 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

being satisfied. She agreed to the Russian de- 
mands on the same condition. 

On March 9, 1916, the Russian Foreign Minister 
instructed the Russian Ambassador at Paris to 
the following effect: "It is above all necessary 
to demand that the Polish Question should be ex- 
cluded from the subjects of international negotia- 
tion, and that all attempts to place Poland's fu- 
ture under the guarantee and control of the 
Powers should be prevented. ' ' Thus did the Rus- 
sian Government attempt secretly to lock the door 
against any chance of Poland regaining her lost 
national rights. The entry of Roumania in 1916 
led to additional arrangements. These agree- 
ments were kept strictly secret and the millions 
who were laying down their lives in the war had 
no conception of this intricate web of bargains. 

An effort to settle at a time when the Allies 
were united in their main aim in the furnace heat 
of the war, questions which might divide them 
when peace had come in sight, could be under- 
stood; and that such agreements should be kept 
secret during the war, might have been consid- 
ered a necessity. However, the necessity of war 
in this case was stretched to cover arrangements 
which in themselves went diametrically contrary 
to the publicly professed principles for which the 



SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 119 

war was being fought, and gave rise to the just 
suspicion that in several cases at least, very spe- 
cific advantages had been the controlling incen- 
tive for entering the war. But these agreements 
have aroused the greatest resentment because they 
were in several cases directed against the inter- 
ests of third parties, and particularly because 
when the United States was making its enormous 
and unselfish sacrifices, these treaties were kept 
from its knowledge. That the American Govern- 
ment should not have been informed of the secret 
treaties made at the instance of Japan in which 
American interests were most seriously affected, 
and that just after these agreements had been 
concluded the statesmen who had been closely con- 
nected with acceding to these arrangements on 
the part of Great Britain, at the price of the 
British control of the islands of the South Pa- 
cific, came to the United States to stimulate the 
practical devotion there to the cause of the Al- 
lies, is a fact that will unfortunately help to give 
munition to those who are unfavorable to any 
real friendly understanding between the two great 
English-speaking powers. The secret commer- 
cial policy pursued by Great Britain during the 
war is also justly subject to severe criticism as 
giving food and subsistence to the growth of deep 



120 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

suspicion on the part of even the most faithful of 
friends. 

The secret treaties relating to the division of 
territories in Europe did not come to the knowl- 
edge of the public until 1918. At that time they 
were republished by one or two British papers, 
but were suppressed by the remainder. The 
treaties were, however, distributed in innumerable 
copies by their own governments among the 
troops of the Central Powers in order to stimu- 
late them to fight in a spirit of self-defense. It 
is reported from various reliable sources that the 
Slovenes were the most eager to fight, of any part 
of the Austrian army, after the Pact of London 
had become known to them, with its various prom- 
ises to Italy. 

The secret assurances which had been given to 
Italy in the Compact of London were probably 
the cause of prolonging the war, with its enor- 
mous slaughter, for more than a year. In the 
Spring of 1917, secret negotiations were pursued 
between the Emperor of Austria, the President 
and Premier of France, and the British Prime 
Minister. The intermediaries in these negotia- 
tions were the Bourbon Princes Sixtus and 
Xavier, brothers of the Empress of Austria. The 
negotiations were carried on from Switzerland 



SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 121 

with a confidential envoy of the Emperor of Aus- 
tria. Only the Emperor, the Empress and the 
Duchess of Parma were in the secret. Count 
Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of For- 
eign Affairs at this time, at first knew only of the 
general fact, not of the details. A note of Count 
Czernin, with a secret personal note written by 
the Emperor, were brought to Prince Xavier and 
taken by him to Paris. The proposals in Count 
Czernin 's note related to the restoration and in- 
demnification of Belgium, and the German renun- 
ciation of Alsace-Lorraine, which ''Austria- 
Hungary naturally would not oppose." Count 
Czernin stated that Austria-Hungary could not 
make a separate peace; that it had no idea of 
crushing Servia, but needed guarantees against 
such affairs as led to the murder at Sarajevo; 
that Austria-Hungary had no desire of crushing 
Roumania, etc. The secret addenda made by the 
Emperor, without the knowledge of Count 
Czernin, stated: ''We will support France and 
exercise pressure on Germany with all means [in 
connection with Alsace-Lorraine]. We are abso- 
lutely not in Germany's hands; it was against 
Germany's will that we did not break with 
America. ' ' 
When President Poincare received the Prince 's 



122 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

report lie stated that the secret note afforded 
a basis for discussion, that he would communi- 
cate the two notes, with arrangements of ab- 
solute secrecy, to the Premier, and inform the 
Czar by personal letter, as well as the King of 
England, and Mr. Lloyd George, "who is a dis- 
crete man." But the President thought that 
Italy would be the stumbling block. After this 
interview the Princes proceeded to Vienna for a 
personal interview with the Emperor, which took 
place on the night of March 23rd. The Emperor 
discussed the whole situation, saying that Servia 
was naturally the friend of Austria, and that all 
that Austria needed was the suppression of revo^ 
lutionary propaganda there. He stated that one 
of the Entente Powers was secretly conversing 
with Bulgaria; Bulgaria does not know that the 
secret has leaked out. *'It has not much impor- 
tance, because all these dreams of empire of the 
East will have to end in the status quo, or very 
nearly that." Count Czernin later joined in the 
conversation, which is described as ''rather gla- 
cial." He expressed his belief that peace must 
be made at any price, and that it might be neces- 
sary for Austria to secure a divorce from Ger- 
many because the latter would never abandon Al- 
sace-Lorraine. After a second visit, the Emperor 



SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 123 

gave Prince Xavier an autographed letter, en- 
joining absolute secrecy because ''an indiscre- 
tion would force him to send troops to the French 
front." The autographed letter of Emperor 
Charles, dated March 24th, contains the following 
proposals: That he will support the just French 
claims to Alsace-Lorraine by all means, using all 
his personal influence with his allies ; Belgium and 
Servia are to be restored to full sovereignty ; Bel- 
gium is to secure indemnities for her losses ; and 
Servia is to have access to the Adriatic Sea. On 
the basis of this letter, discussions took place 
among the men concerned in France and in Eng- 
land. But Italy remained the obstacle. 

Another trip was taken by Prince Xavier to 
Vienna, where he met the Emperor on May 8th, 
The question now was, What compensations should 
Austria receive for ceding its territory to Italy 
in accordance with the Pact of London? Count 
Czernin joined the meeting and on the following 
day prepared a memorandum, which was based 
upon the principle, "Austria-Hungary can cede 
no territory without compensation; but if the ter- 
ritorial question is arranged, then a separate 
peace with the Entente might be concluded." 
"When the matter was taken up again at Paris, 
:the Italian difficulty remained. M. Ribot strongly 



124 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

adhered to the idea that without Italy, no result 
could be had. Meanwhile, the unsuccessful Ital- 
ian offensive of July, 1917, had supervened, and 
the war had to go on for another sixteen months, 
although the acceptance of the proposals of the 
Emperor would undoubtedly have brought it to 
an early end. 

Count Czernin has given in his book, In the 
World War, an unimpassioned and coldly-bal- 
anced view of the diplomacy of the time. He does 
not relate the details of the secret negotiations of 
1917, but he evidently did not approve of the man- 
ner in which they were carried out because their 
effect was to suggest to the Entente a willingness 
of Austria-Hungary to separate from her allies, 
without strengthening her position in any way. In 
a letter written to Count Tisza in the summer of 
1917, Czernin said: ''It is possible to turn and 
steer the Entente course if thought feasible; but 
then courage would be needed to make the turn 
fully. Nothing is more stupid than trifling with 
treachery and not carrying it out ; we should lose 
all ground in Berlin and gain nothing either in 
London or Paris." 

The policy pursued by Japan throughout the 
war made use of all the devices of secret diplo- 
macy for the attainment of ends narrowly na- 



SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 125 

tional. After having possessed herself of Tsing- 
tau, with a marked cold-shouldering of her Brit- 
ish allies, Japan set about an attempt to arrange 
things in China so that no effective resistance 
might be offered there to Japan's expansionist 
desires. In January, 1915, the Japanese minis- 
ter in an interview with the President of China, 
after enjoining the strictest secrecy on the pain 
of most disagreeable consequences, proposed the 
famous twenty-one demands. That it should have 
been attempted to dispose of matters so funda- 
mentally important, involving the national rights 
of a population of 350,000,000 people, through de- 
mands secretly forced upon a President, at a time 
when the national representative body did ftot 
function, — that is one of the startling facts of mod- 
ern history. Strange as it may seem, the Japa- 
nese Foreign Office had apparently persuaded 
itself that secrecy could be maintained in a mat- 
ter of such transcendent importance. For when 
contrary to that expectation and in accordance 
with nature and with the salutary fact that, after 
all, such tremendous issues can not be thus se- 
cretly disposed of, the facts of the case began to 
leak out, categorical denials were made by the 
Japanese Foreign Office and by various embas- 
sies. In this case, those who had the right to 



126 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

object to the disposal of important interests in 
which they themselves had a share, were not mere 
neutrals or outsiders but the allies of Japan, en- 
gaged in a life and death struggle at the time. 
As the twenty-one demands aimed at the estab- 
lishment of a predominant position in China 
through control of finance and armament, every 
other nation there interested would have been ad- 
versely affected by the proposed arrangement. 
The Chinese, though isolated, would not immedi- 
ately yield to the threatening attitude of their 
neighbor and the negotiations were strung out 
over months. Though they were assiduously kept 
secret, the nature of the transaction in general 
and in detail became quite well known outside, so 
that the results could not be kept hidden ; yet the 
whole procedure constituted an affirmation that it 
was proper to deal with the destinies of a people 
in a secret council chamber, where the demandant 
backed by strong military forces, confronted the 
first official of a vast, peaceful but unmilitant na- 
tion, which would never in the world agree to such 
procedure and the resultant undertakings. Japan 
did indeed get certain concessions, but at the cost 
of making her diplomacy and policy universally 
suspected on account of the methods which had 
been used. 



SECRET TREATIES OF THE WAR 127 

The policy of Japan at the time did not look 
with favor upon China associating herself with 
the Allies. Demarches which were made to bring 
about the entry of China into the alliance were 
negatived by Japan. This in itself might have 
been based on sound reasons, yet the real inward- 
ness of this policy was revealed at the time when 
the United States had broken off relations with 
Germany and when the Chinese Government in 
the days immediately thereafter was considering 
whether to follow the example of the United 
States. From a report of the Russian Ambassa- 
dor at Tokio concerning an interview with the 
Foreign Minister of Japan, which took place on 
February 10, 1917, we learn that the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs alluded to a rumor that an at- 
tempt might be made to induce China to join 
the Allies to the extent of breaking off relations 
with Germany. The Foreign Minister said in ef- 
fect: ''It would be unwise and dangerous to at- 
tempt to bring China to the side of the Allies 
unless we can be sure that it can be carried 
through. This is, however, doubtful. Yet the 
Japanese Government is willing to undertake the 
task of inducing China to take the step. But be- 
fore making any such proposal, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment desires to be informed as to the attitude 



128 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

of the Russian Government in the matter of Shan- 
tung and the Pacific Islands. Will the Russian 
Government support Japan at the Peace Confer- 
ence in these matters 1 ' ' The Russian ambassador 
was requested to get the opinion of his govern- 
ment on this point. In other words, in return 
for a commission paid largely by China herself, 
the Japanese Government was ready to permit 
that China should join the Allies in the Great 
War. It was assumed by the Foreign Minister 
that Japan's persuasion should be necessary to 
induce China to take this step ; but in fact, at the 
very time when this conversation between the 
minister and ambassador was going on, the Cab- 
inet of China was in the all-day session from 
which resulted the decision to follow the United 
States in breaking off relations with Germany. 
This step was taken without compulsion, urgency 
or the promise of advantages, upon a careful con- 
sideration of the underlying conditions and equi- 
ties, without assurances of gain, merely in the ex- 
pectation of fair treatment as an ally and as- 
sociate. 



IX 

HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT DEFERRED 

The world has not yet recovered from the sur- 
prise and disillusionment which overcame it when 
the secret treaties of the war became known and 
when it became evident that they would be made 
the basis of the Treaty of Peace. The secrecy 
of the procedure of the Peace Conference — which 
had been heralded as an assembly of the peoples 
for carrying out and making permanent those 
great principles for which men had grimly and 
silently suffered and died and which had been 
eloquently voiced by the American President — 
seemed to be so complete a return to the old meth- 
ods of diplomacy that from the day when the 
muzzle was clamped on, public faith in the con- 
ference and its results was shaken. The motives 
of the men who made this decision were probably 
good. It was their desire that the work should 
be rapidly accomplished and should not be con- 
fused by divided counsels. But again the results 
of the secret method are hardly apt to increase 
confidence in its usefulness as a procedure for 

-^ 129 



130 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

dealing with the affairs of the peoples of the 
world in such a manner as to place them upon a 
sound and lasting foundation. 

The solemn document which was prepared for 
the information of the newspaper men on the de- 
cision of the peace conference to enforce secrecy, 
did not satisfy any one. To the public there 
seemed to be no larger principle at issue than 
that, on this occasion if ever, open covenants 
should be openly arrived at, and it was feared 
that if the peace conference did not base its action 
upon an appeal to public opinion, no adequate 
solution could be found at all. When the treaty 
itself had been framed, it was sedulously kept se- 
cret until distributed by the French paper Bon- 
soir. The deliberations of the Council of Five 
were secret beyond all precedents in public ac- 
tion. No secretaries were admitted and no offi- 
cial minutes were kept, nor were there communi- 
cations to the public through the press. Doctor 
Dillon's description of the Five as ''a gang of 
benevolent conspirators, ignoring history and ex- 
pertship, shutting themselves up in a room and 
talking disconnectedly," unfortunately appears 
not entirely untrue ; particularly as to the ignor- 
ing of history and expertship, which was quite 
patent, although from the nature of things we 






HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT 131 

cannot exactly know how disconnectedly the Five 
talked. 

Unfortunately, after the war the use of secret 
diplomatic policy has continued without noticeable 
diminution. The details of certain situations 
make one feel as if we are after all only a genera- 
tion removed from the eighteenth century. These 
matters are so recent and still so controversial 
that I do not desire to enter upon them in any 
detail. 

It is, however, surely to be regretted, that it 
should have been found necessary to surround the 
mandates with peculiar secrecy. This institution 
was conceived in a desire to create a trusteeship 
in behalf of the world in general and for the par- 
ticular benefit of the populations comprised in the 
mandates. Not only has the assignment of cer- 
tain mandates given rise to great popular resist- 
ance indicating that the local populations were 
far from ready to trust their interests to a for- 
eign mandatory, but the fact that these arrange- 
ments are so carefully guarded with secrecy 
comes near to destroying all hope that there is 
any intention to handle them otherwise than from 
the imperialist point of view and for the benefit 
of the mandatory. 

Among the many things that have happened 



132 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

since the armistice, the Franco-Hungarian in- 
trigues are specially to be noted as emphasizing 
the great danger of secret methods, in which a 
government runs the risk of being committed by 
persons, irresponsible or not properly controlled, 
into embarrassing and harmful situations. We 
know of these particular facts through confiden- 
tial reports discovered and published, officially 
recognized by certain governments, though for- 
mally denied by the Magyar Cabinet. These 
papers give working details of what was already 
known in general terms concerning reactionary 
Hungarian intrigues in Czecho-Slovakia and Aus- 
tria, including preparations for an armed upris- 
ing, and other assistance to monarchists. French 
interests were at the same time active in Hun- 
gary. They made an agreement for a leasing of 
the Hungarian state railways for fifty years. Ac- 
cording to this contract, the Hungarian Govern- 
ment is bound to consult the diplomatic repre- 
sentative of the French Government concerning 
every measure which may have a bearing on any 
clause of the agreement. A political compact was 
simultaneously initialed in which the French Gov- 
ernment withdrew its opposition to universal mili- 
tary service in Hungary, and that country was to 
be assisted in boundary rectifications at the ex- 



HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT 133 

pense of Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. A third 
agreement provided for the sending of a Hun- 
garian army against Soviet Russia under French 
command. These agreements were undoubtedly 
accepted by many people as fully concluded. The 
Magyar Premier in open session of the national 
assembly boasted of having achieved an alliance 
with France; the same understanding was also 
accepted by certain Paris newspapers. The 
French Government, however, did not sanction 
what secret negotiators had prepared in Hungary 
and disavowed the agTeements, with the exception 
■of the lease of the Hungarian railways. This il- 
lustrates how in times of unsettlement and sharp 
national rivalry, representatives on the spot or 
agents of powerful interests in close touch with 
the home government may by secret means try 
to bring about arrangements which the conscience 
of their nation does not approve and which serve 
merely to generate suspicion and distrust. 

There is reason to believe that the draft of a 
secret treaty between France and Yugo-Slavia 
which was published in 1920 by the Idea Naeionale 
was at the time actually being considered by the 
two governments concerned. One of the points 
of the proposed treaty was that upon the declara- 
tion of war between France and any Mediterra- 



134 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

nean power, Yugo-Slavic troops would be massed 
along the hostile boundary according to previ- 
ously determined plans. In connection with this 
provision the representatives of France made the 
following suggestion: "In case of a conflict it 
would be better that the Yugo-Slavic troops, in- 
stead of massing on the hostile frontier, should 
rather provoke a * Casus Belli' on the part of the 
nation at war with France. Otherwise their in- 
tervention might bring on the interference of 
other powers." The proposed arrangements, 
even though not adopted by the two governments, 
nevertheless illustrate the methods acceptable to 
secret diplomacy, but which open public opinion 
would never sanction. 

Whatever we may think about the exact share 
of the blame for having brought on the great 
catastrophe which should be attributed to secret 
methods and policies, we cannot have any doubts 
about their influence since the armistice. Whether 
or not secret diplomacy brought on the war, it 
certainly has not ended it. War still exists, not 
only when actual hostilities are going on, but in 
the whole temper of international affairs — con- 
tinuing enmity, continuing armaments, unending 
waste of human effort. Thus, for one thing, the 
entire Near Eastern situation remains unsettled. 



HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT 135 

As an expert on this troubled region has said: 
"The principle of settlement as revealed by these 
treaties is fundamentally wrong. The East must 
be resuscitated, not exploited." But be it East 
or West, there is the same return to the old game 
of balancing off gains and changing boundaries, 
without consideration of the rights of the respec- 
tive peoples. The costly mistakes of the Con- 
gresses of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin are being re- 
peated. 



X 

THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 

Our historical survey of diplomatic policy and 
practice does not hold much assurance that the 
evils of secret diplomacy have very appreciably 
waned since the eighteenth century. The cruder 
methods of deception and corruption which were 
at that time employed would indeed now be con- 
sidered beneath the dignity of diplomats; al- 
though it is unhappily true that some of the most 
despicable tricks, such as stealing correspondence 
and placing informers in houses to be watched, 
are still practised occasionally. However, it may 
be said that while in general the trade-secrets of 
diplomacy have lost greatly in prestige, the spirit 
of diplomatic action itself has not yet been 
brought into accord with democratic ideals. 

A secret service attached to the diplomatic es- 
tablishment is still considered useful by some gov- 
ernments. It is, however, certainly very doubt- 
ful whether the results thus obtained in the nature 
of accurate information, are at all commensurate 
to the expense and to the constant danger of being 

136 



DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 137 

misinformed througjb secret agents who think that 
they must earn their pay. My own observation 
leads me to believe that people who use secret 
service information are frequently confused and 
worried by an abundance of unauthenticated re- 
ports brought to them ; they would have been far 
better off without backstairs information, relying 
on the fundamental facts and on knowledge which 
can be obtained only by seeking the confidence 
of the men who control public action. Secret serv- 
ice gossip may often give the key to the aims and 
desires of an individual person, and if one is 
willing to appeal to motives through corrupt and 
deceitful means, the information may be actually 
useful. However, he whose policy rests upon an 
essential reasonableness and mutual benefit, can 
afford to disregard such gossip. 

We might distinguish between a secrecy which 
is vicious in itself, and one that pursues beneficent 
objects. The former seeks to conceal the pres- 
ence of harmful motives and projects, to confuse 
and mislead people to their disadvantage, and in 
general, to play on weakness and ignorance. The 
other keeps secret its plans and negotiations which 
in themselves have honest motives, from a desire 
to prevent interference with their prompt and 
complete realization. Opinions as to the charac- 



138 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ter of a policy may differ widely and those who 
secretly advance a policy generally condemned by 
many, may perhaps claim credit for honest pur- 
poses. This type of secrecy is common. Unfor- 
tmiately, though it may advance a good object, it 
incidentally has an evil influence upon public con- 
fidence. It must be confessed that the distinction 
here pointed out is difficult to apply in practice 
in a thoroughly objective manner, because there 
are probably among diplomats very few indeed 
who do not persuade themselves at least that the 
means applied by them are designed to achieve 
useful purposes. 

A good example of how stratagem may be used 
for a laudable purpose is found in the action of 
William J. Buchanan, American Minister to Ar- 
gentina, in adjusting the Chili- Argentinian bound- 
ary dispute. Buchanan, one of the most original 
of American diplomats, had nothing whatever of 
the suave manipulator of the old school of diplo- 
macy. He was direct to the verge of bruskness, 
yet his ability to go straight to the essential point, 
and his mastery and. bigness, made him highly 
successful as a negotiator. In this particular 
case, Buchanan had been designated, together with 
a Chilian and an Argentinian representative, on 
a commission to settle boundary questions and re- 



DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 139 

quested to make a preliminary report. He agreed 
to act only on the following conditions : That be- 
cause of the complexity and difficulty of the ques- 
tions involved, it would be necessary to report on 
the suggested boundary by sections, that each sec- 
tion should be voted upon as reported by him, 
and that a majority vote on each section should 
be decisive. This proposal was accepted. After 
a careful investigation, Buchanan made his report, 
and it was found that on each section the sug- 
gested boundary was carried by two votes against 
one; the American always voted in the affirma- 
tive; the Chilian and Argentinian, as in the par- 
ticular section the allotments seemed favorable or 
unfavorable to their respective country. In ac- 
cordance with the terms agreed upon, the entire 
report had thus to be accepted, and all the thorny 
problems of long-standing boundary controversies 
were settled. Had Buchanan not used this strata- 
gem it is very unlikely that the report as a whole 
would have been accepted, as each of his associ- 
ates would have felt that he could not vote for a 
report containing arrangements for giving up spe- 
cific tracts of territory which his country had 
hitherto always insisted upon retaining. By this 
clever arrangement Buchanan made it possible 
for them to vote against such relinquishment in 



140 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

each case without defeating the project as a 
whole ; but if he had revealed to them his plan at 
the beginning, the object could not have been 
achieved. 

This incident illustrates that a complete solu- 
tion will often be accepted as satisfactory al- 
though it may contain details which, by them- 
selves, would have been resisted to the last. It 
may be said that the disadvantage of public dis- 
cussion lies in the emphasizing of such points of 
opposition, and the obscuring of the general rea- 
sonableness of a solution. 

Mr. Balfour in his defense of the secrecy of 
diplomatic intercourse, says that the work of 
diplomacy is exactly similar to the work which is 
done every day between two great business firms. 
He then argues that, in all such relationships, it 
is unwise to air difficulties in public. Bismarck 
used the more homely illustration of a horse trade, 
the participants in which should not be expected 
to tell each other all they know about the prospec- 
tive bargain. That view is putting diplomacy on 
a rather lowly footing. One might expect a 
somewhat different temper among men dealing 
with momentous public affairs than the bluff-and- 
haggle of a petty private transaction. Yet such 
tactics have actually been found useful in diplo- 



DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 141 

macy. Mr. Balfour is on sounder ground when 
lie says, *'In private, in conversations which need 
not go beyond the walls of the room in which you 
are, both parties may put their case as strongly 
as they like and no soreness remains," but "di- 
rectly a controversy becomes public, all that fair 
give-and-take becomes difficult or impossible." 
This, of course, implies a somewhat low estimate 
of public intelligence and self-control, of which 
more later. 

The greatest vice of a secret diplomatic policy, 
working in the dark and concealing international 
undertakings, lies in the inevitable generating of 
mutual suspicion and the total destruction of pub- 
lic confidence among the different countries which 
compose the family of nations. No nation is so 
bad as imagination, confused and poisoned by 
secrecy and by the suggestion of dire plottings, 
would paint it. Agreements and understandings 
which do not exist at all are imagined, the nature 
of those which actually have been made is mis 
judged, and animosities are exaggerated ; thus th 
public is quite naturally put in that mood of sus 
picion and excitement which renders it incapable] 
of judging calmly when apparently startling f actsl 
^suddenly emerge. 

Secret diplomacy destroys public confidence^ 



142 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

however, in a still more insidious manner : by the 
practice of using a language of ideal aims and 
humanitarian professions in order to conceal and 
veil the most narrowly selfish, unjust and uncon- 
scionable actions. The conventional language of 
diplomacy still carries in it many of the phrases; 
and concepts instilled by the false idealism of the 
eighteenth century, to which at that time diplo- 
macy gave lip worship. The most disconcerting 
performances of this kind are the profuse and 
reiterated declarations promising the mainte- 
nance of the sovereignty, independence and in- 
tegrity of certain countries, when in fact the ac- 
tion really taken was quite to the contrary effect. 
The diplomacy of Japan has manifested pe- 
culiar expertship in the use of phrases that are 
associated with some wise public dispensation or 
arrangement and which have a calming effect — 
to cover action not remotely in fact contributing 
to such beneficent providences. The sovereignty, 
integrity and independence of a neighboring coun- 
try are guaranteed in solemn terms at the very 
moment when force, intrigue and every tricky arti- 
fice are secretly employed to destroy them. 
*' Strong popular demand" is alleged as a reason 
for barsh action abroad, in a country where the 
expressions of public opinions as well as policy 



DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 143 

itself are controlled by a narrow group, with ab- 
solutist authority. There is so much talk of 
''frank discussion" that every one is put on his 
guard as soon as the word "frank" is uttered. 

The ''peace of Asia," a "Monroe Doctrine for 
Asia," the "Open Door," "greatest frankness," 
"hearty cooperation with other powers," are her- 
alded at times when the context of facts makes 
a strange commentary. But while such a dis- 
crepancy is very strident in a country where mili- 
tary absolutism wields control over diplomacy, 
with a grudging obeisance to representative 
forms, yet other countries are by no means free 
from this hypocrisy. What blasted promise of 
equity in all that succession of declarations con- 
cerning Korea, China, Persia, parts of Turkey, 
and Morocco. What confusion of political ideals 
in supporting Denikin, Wr angel, and Ho r thy as 
defenders of "representative government." 

When Russia and Japan, in response to Secre- 
tary Knox' Manchurian proposal had made their 
secret arrangements to defeat his policy, Great 
Britain, though it had made many reassuring pro- 
testations at Washington, nevertheless had se- 
cretly acquiesced (to cite a Russian diplomatic 
paper) in the "recognition of our (Russian) 
sphere of influence in Northern Manchuria, Mon- 



144 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

golia, and Western China, with the exception of 
Kashgar, as well as the undertaking not to hinder 
ns in the execution of our plans in these terri- 
tories, and herself to pursue no aims which we 
should have to regard as incompatible with our 
interest." And it was also stated that Great 
Britain, in return, was to receive ^'recognition of 
her freedom of action and her privileged position 
in Tibet." This was in 1912. 

Thus were the solemn declarations relating to 
the Open Door and the integrity of China applied 
in action. 

Subsequent departure from the letter and spirit 
of such declarations may indeed sometimes be ex- 
cused on account of changed circumstances; but 
frequently it is quite apparent to those who know 
what is going on, that such well-sounding declara- 
tions are made for public consumption, at the 
very time when the contrary action is taken se- 
cretly. 

This is indeed nothing less than a crime against 
the public opinion and conscience of the world, 
which cannot be condemned in terms too strong. 
It shows a thorough contempt of the people, who 
are supposed to be either of so little intelligence 
or of so short a memory that such vain profes- 
sions may succeed in veiling the true inwardness 



DESTRUCTION OE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 145 

of polilical intrigne. This practice tends to en- 
gender thorough confusion in the public mind as 
to standards of right and justice in international 
affairs; it shakes the basis on which alone sound 
international relations can 'grow up ; as, indeed, 
all social relations must rest upon confidence in 
an underlying justice and equity. 
^ Closely allied to the practice of making public 
declarations in international affairs which do not 
correspond with the specific action taken, is the 
control of the press and the censure of news. 
This is indeed a matter which transcends the sub- 
ject of diplomacy, because a system of press con- 
trol and censure is often applied by other de- 
partments of the government than the diplomatic 
branch. As far as foreign affairs are concerned, 
it is used in an effort to support foreign policy, 
and it therefore shares the same defects which in- 
here in the old diplomacy. Like secret diplomatic 
control, it is accounted for on the assumption that 
the people cannot be trusted with the entire truth, 
and that carefully selected portions of the truth 
have to be put forth in order to make them ready 
to support the policy considered necessary by the 
leaders. This involves the assumption of an enor- 
mous responsibility by a few leaders in determin- 
ing by themselves what the public interest re- 



146 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

quires and instead of relying on the strength nat- 
urally to be gained from a spontaneous public 
opinion, to attempt to fashion that opinion for 
specific purposes. Press control and censure, 
with the incomplete and warped information 
which it implies, is one of the evil accompani- 
ments considered necessary in the conduct of a 
war, for the safety of the combatant nation. The 
principle that strategic information must be kept 
secret is extended, at such times, out of all rea- 
son. After hostilities have actually been con- 
cluded, this practice tends to subsist and to con- 
tinue the evils of misinformation and confusion 
in the public judgment. The manner in which 
all news emanating from the Balkan and Near 
Eastern countries has been censured since the 
war, has made it impossible for the public of the 
world to form a just conception as to what is 
there going on. Control of the press and censor- 
ship likewise resulted in such confusion in the 
public mind concerning the problems of Russia, 
that there remained no reliable basis for a policy 
which would facilitate the restoration of more nor- 
mal conditions there, in a sympathetic spirit with 
the struggles and difficulties of the Russian peo- 
ple. 

On account of the natural fact that men are 



DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 14T 

apt to be influenced in their action unconsciously 
through persons with whom they have constant 
associations, it is a matter of no mean impor- 
tance that the armament interests should have 
been so strongly represented in many capitals by 
men of high professional and social standing, al- 
ways on the ground, eager to advance the busi- 
ness in military supplies. In many capitals, very 
close relationships have grown up between the 
diplomatic officers and the representatives of the 
great armament firms. As a mutual apprehen- 
hension of excessive preparation for war greatly 
stimulates these industries, it is not surprising 
that their representatives do not exert themselves 
to prevent occasional war scares. In fact, highly 
misleading information on war plans has often 
been given out, as in the case of a representative 
of the Coventry Ordnance Works, who in 1909 
informed the British Government of excessive 
shipbuilding by Germany. The news was later 
found to be erroneous; but new orders had been 
given in Great Britain, and through action and 
reaction armaments were stimulated elsewhere. 
The close connection of the Krupp Iron Works 
with the German Government and with associa- 
tions favoring aggressive foreign action is well 
known. 



148 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

It has often happened that what represents 
itself to be a national interest and enlists diplo- 
matic and political support in that way, is really- 
only the enterprise of individuals to make profits. 
The men who support it with their best energies 
and talents are not villains, but their method of 
assuming a great national interest where only a 
tradition, a prejudice or a private plan of profit 
are involved, renders their doings far from bene- 
ficial to the commonweal. Similarly, those who 
operate on the principle that the public mind must 
be nourished with certain carefully selected facts 
and kept from the knowledge of others, may have 
honest motives, but their ideas of public action 
are obsolete or deserve to be so, as they are left 
over from the absolutist regime in politics. 



XI 

PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

In considering the relation of legislative bodies, 
and of the public opinion therein represented, to 
the conduct of foreign affairs, it will be useful to 
glance briefly at the relevant historical facts. 
When the United Colonies of America formed a 
separate political organization from the mother 
country, the conduct of foreign atfairs was en- 
trusted to a committee of Congress, a successor 
to the Committee of Secret Correspondence. In 
1781 a Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, with a 
permanent department, was created and in 1782 
the conduct of foreign affairs was regulated in 
the following terms: 

''All letters to sovereign powers, letters of credence, 
plans of treaties, conventions, manifestoes, instructions, 
passports, safe conducts, and other acts of Congress 
relative to the department of foreign affairs, when the 
substance thereof shall have been previously agreed to 
in Congress, shall be reduced to form in the office of 
foreign affairs, and submitted to the opinion of Con- 
gress, and when passed, signed and attested, sent to the 

149 



150 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ofl&ce of foreign affairs to be countersigned and for- 
warded. ' ' 



Congress therefore retained a very close control 
over this matter ; a control which under the Con- 
stitution passed to the Senate, though in a re- 
stricted form. In no other country did a legisla- 
tive committee participate in the conduct of for- 
eign affairs with similar power and influence. 
The policy of the arrangements under the Con- 
stitution is explained by John Jay in the Feder- 
alist as follows : 

"It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of 
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immedi- 
ate despatch are sometime requisite. There are cases 
where the most useful intelligeney may be obtained, if 
the persons possessing it can be relieved from appre- 
hensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will oper- 
ate on those persons whether they are actuated by mer- 
cenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are 
many of both descriptions, who would rely on the se- 
crecy of the President, but who would not confide in 
that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large poou- 
lar assembly. ' ' 

Jay's explanation is dominated by the conception 
which the eighteenth century had of the functions 
of diplomacy and the conditions of its work. The 
constitutional system as conceived at that time 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 151 

implied (1) Full power of negotiation in the 
President, (2) Taking counsel with the Senate, 
(3) Formal ratification of treaties by the Senate, 
and publication thereof as parts of the law of the 
land. The system has been highly praised by 
European publicists as reconciling the mainte- 
nance of confidential relations with publicity of 
the results, in that treaties are given the charac- 
ter of laws. 

In the course of the nineteenth century there 
occurred many instances resulting in a growing 
practice of making special agreements by the Sec- 
retary of State alone, without the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate. When President Roosevelt 
in 1905 attempted to deal with the Dominican sit- 
uation in this manner, the Senate objected and in- 
sisted that all international agreements of any 
kind must be submitted to its action. The sys- 
tem of the United States, however, actually per- 
mits of the current conduct of foreign affairs 
without information to the people or even without 
constant and complete information to the Senate 
which is, moreover, usually preoccupied with mat- 
ters of internal legislation. 

In England, the mother of Parliaments, we 
might expect that there should have been a con- 
stant effort at parliamentary control of foreign 



152 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

affairs, with strong remonstrance when effective 
control was denied; yet on account of the spe- 
cific nature of the system of Cabinet government, 
such has not been the case. Under the two-party 
system as it exists in England the conduct of for- 
eign affairs is always in the hands of a minister 
trusted and supported by the majority in the 
Lower House. Even if the minority should at- 
tempt to censor the conduct of foreign affairs as 
being carried on apart from the knowledge and 
active consent of the House, the majority whose 
leaders form the Cabinet which is managing 
things, will always prevent such a vote from, suc- 
ceeding. Only in case of a cabinet going abso- 
lutely and openly counter to the policy of its own 
party in Parliament could a real conflict of this 
nature arise ; and such a contingency is itself im- 
possible, because of the party control exercised by 
the cabinet. 

According to the theory of the Stuarts, the man- 
agement of foreign affairs belonged entirely to 
the Crown which had not at that time been put in 
commission. In 1677 the House of Commons ob- 
jected to granting money for alliances and for 
wars, unless the matter in question had been pre- 
viously communicated to it. Charles II, however, 
declared the conduct of foreign affairs to be the 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 153 

Crown's fundamental prerogative in which it must 
remain free from direct control of Parliament. 
William III was in fact to a very large extent his 
own Minister for Foreign Aifairs. "With the in- 
troduction of responsible Government under the 
Hanoverians, however, the situation changed. 
The dominant party being represented by the 
ministers was quite ready to submit to their 
guidance in matters of foreign affairs. It was 
the opposition who occasionally attacked the gov- 
ernment on its foreign policy, and particularly 
the opposition in the House of Lords. In a Lords ' 
protest of March 26, 1734, it was urged that ''the 
interposition of the British Parliament would be 
more effectual than the occasional expedients of 
fluctuating and variable negotiations." In 1740 
it was moved that a select committee consisting 
of peers should be appointed to inquire into the 
conduct of the Spanish War. The motion was re- 
jected. Another Lords' protest in the same year 
opposes the argument that absolute secrecy is es- 
sential because this claim is often used in bar of 
all inquiries. Such secrecy is ''much oftener the 
refuge of guilt than the resort of innocence." 

Wyndham, in 1733, on a motion calling for cer- 
tain letters of instructions, argued for the neces- 
sity of giving such information to Parliament. 



154 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

He asked how could members of the House of 
Commons judge of the estimates to be laid before 
them as a provision for national safety if they 
did not know by what danger the nation was con- 
fronted. The motion, however, was rejected. 

When Pelham was criticized in the House for 
not having informed Parliament of the prelimina- 
ries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle he argued: 
*'If Parliament should encroach upon the pre- 
rogative of the Crown, by assuming a right to 
make peace or war, and to inquire into foreign 
transactions under negotiation, our affairs will be 
reduced to a dangerous predicament; for no for- 
eign State will negotiate with our ministers, or 
conclude any treaty with them, either political or 
commercial." This is an argument often made 
in the eighteenth century to show the unwisdom 
of Parliamentary control. The change of min- 
isters following party changes in the House, and 
the fact that the Foreign Minister would not by 
his own word be able to give complete assurances 
to foreign governments, were considered to put 
the British Government under a disadvantage in 
negotiations. It was therefore considered unde- 
sirable that negotiations should be submitted to 
the control and sanction of Parliament. Walpole 
had stated the matter in the following words : 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 155 

"Therefore while our happy constitution remains en- 
tire, while the Parliament meets but once a year, and 
does not continue assembled above three or four months 
in the twelve, it is impossible for either House of Parlia- 
ment to intermeddle, much less to prescribe to the 
Crown, in any affairs relating to peace or war, without 
exposing the nation to imminent danger." 

Throughout the nineteenth century Parliament 
interfered very little with the conduct of foreign 
affairs. The minister for foreign affairs or the 
premier would from time to time give information 
or make a systematic discourse on foreign affairs 
and it was understood that the House would be 
kept informed concerning the aims and tendencies 
of the Government's foreign policy. Specific 
questions were asked by members but not fre- 
quently. The nature of the British system would 
have rendered unmeaning any struggle for control 
between the House and the Cabinet. 

The manner of keeping Parliament and the pub- 
lic informed on foreign affairs was discussed. 
The Earl of Clarendon spoke of the practice of 
laying before Parliament official information in 
the Blue Boohs. He stated : 

"I am perfectly certain there is always laid before 
Parliament a very fair and complete view of the trans- 
actions between this country and any otner to which 
those papers may relate. I know that foreign Govern- 



156 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ments rather complain of our Blue Books, and to a cer- 
tain extent they may curtail some of the communications 
that are made to our foreign Ministers, but I should be 
extremely sorry to see our system of publication of diplo- 
matic papers in any way curtailed, or different from 
what it is; of course, there must always be care taken 
not to compromise individuals for the information they 
have given, but I believe it is an immense advantage to 
this country that our despatches and diplomatic transac- 
tions should be known, because if they have the appro- 
bation of Parliament and of the country, the Government 
then has the whole weight of public opinion in its favor, 
and it is that which gives such strength to our policy 
and to our opinions in foreign countries." 

That is a very statesmanlike presentation of the 
advantages of constant public knowledge of for- 
eign policy in giving the government a secure base 
of intelligent support. 

When dissatisfaction or doubt was felt by large 
numbers concerning the foreign policy of the gov- 
erimaent, as in 1857 and again in 1878 after the 
concealment of the Schuvalof agreement, com- 
plaint was frequently made in Parliament and in 
the press to the effect that Parliament on the one 
hand was not given a chance to acquire a com- 
plete knowledge of foreign policy, and on the other 
it was not sufficiently alert and active in using 
its opportunities for control. In 1886 the follow- 
ing resolution was moved: 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 157 

"That in the opinion of this House it is not just or 
expedient to embark in war, contract engagements in- 
volving grave responsibilities for the nation, and add 
territories to the Empire, without the knowledge and 
consent of Parliament." 

Like other similar resolutions, it did not pass. 
Mr, Gladstone opposed it on the ground that the 
House of Commons under existing arrangements 
actually possessed all necessary power of control 
and that the passage of this resolution would 
mean simply that the House of Lords would share 
this power with it. 

In 1885 when Earl Granville had objected to 
public criticism of negotiations which were still 
in progress between Russia and Great Britain re- 
garding Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury made the 
following interesting and important statement 
with respect to the relations of foreign policies 
to public opinion, which in temper resembles that 
of Lord Clarendon cited above: 

"The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine 
which we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the 
duty of an Opposition not to canvas or condemn the 
conduct of the Government, if by so doing it should have 
the effect of discouraging friends and allies in other 
parts of the world. That seems to be a very far-reaching 
doctrine, and one which it is impossible to assent to. 
... If we are of opinion that the course of public af- 



158 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

fairs is going ill, and that our Government has misman- 
aged, that faults are being committed and dangers are 
being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to whom 
we can appeal in order to correct the evil; our abso- 
lute Sovereign is the people of this country, and it is 
they, and they alone, who can bring a remedy to the 
mischief which is going on. You have a form of Gov- 
ernment which in many points is purely democratic, 
and you must take it with the incidents which naturally 
adhere to it, and one of these incidents is publicity of 
deliberation. The Cabinet is the people, and their de- 
liberations are conducted in the open field. If they are 
to be rightly informed, you must deal fully and frankly 
with the subjects which form the basis of their deter- 
mination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes, 
but it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help 
it if Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privi- 
leged communications between you and those by whose 
verdict you must stand. You cannot suppress the argu* 
ment because somebody else outside hears it and you 
may be adversely affected by it. . . ." 

The concealment of important obligations and 
the growing secrecy of diplomatic affairs during 
the first decade of the Twentieth Century brought 
on many expressions of dissatisfaction in the 
House of Commons. After the secret agreement 
concerning Morocco became known, Mr. John 
Dillon expressed himself as follows, in a speech 
in the House of Commons in September, 1911 : 

"I do not believe any representative assembly in the 
history of the world has ever been called upon to dis- 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 159 

cuss a matter so vital and so far-reaching as that which 
the House of Commons has before it to-day to consider, 
and with so absolute a lack of information. . . . The 
House was summoned for this discussion to-day without 
any papers whatsoever. . . . We ought at all events to 
have had an account of diplomatic correspondence be- 
tween the four great Powers intimately interested in 
the question of Morocco, as is customary to be given to 
the House of Commons on such an occasion. This would 
have enabled members of the House before the debate 
commenced, to form a really well-grounded judgment 
upon the whole matter. "We have heard a good deal to- 
night of the secrecy of the Foreign policy of this coun- 
try. It is no use attempting to deny it. Those of us 
who have been a long time in this House, and can re- 
member the methods of the Foreign Office twenty-five 
years ago, know as a matter of fact, which cannot be 
successfully denied, that the Foreign Office policy has 
become during the last ten years progressively more 
secret every year. Until this present year this has gone 
on, when the intense pressure of Foreign Affairs and the 
danger of war has forced the hands of the Minister to 
give some time for the discussion of Foreign Office af- 
fairs. For ten years the Foreign policy of this coun- 
try has been conducted behind an elaborate screen of 
secrecy. Some of us pointed out years ago that the se- 
crecy of Foreign Affairs was the inevitable and logical 
result of that new departure which was heralded about 
ten years ago, and which we heard praised once more 
on the floor of this House to-night. I refer to what is 
known as the policy of the continuity of the Foreign 
policy of this country; of the withdrawal of the For- 
eign policy of this country from the sphere of party 
politics. ' ' 



160 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

At the same session Mr. Swift MacNeill ex- 
pressed Mmself very strongly on the subject of 
withholding information from Parliament, in the 
following terms: 



*'Prom generation to generation, yon have allowed 
treaties involving the highest international obligations 
— involving questions of peace and war — to be taken 
absolutely out of the hands of the House. It is no ex- 
aggeration to say, so far as international policy is oon- 
cerned, you have rendered the House as little effectively 
powerful as any man walking over Westminster Bridge. 
Over and over again treaties involving matters of life 
and death, involving questions of first-class importance, 
have been ratified behind the back of Parliament. . . . 
The people themselves must be allowed to know all about 
this diplomacy and what it is. And there should be no 
jsecrecy in regard to high diplomatic statecraft about it. 
The House of Commons is sample judge of what is dis- 
creet and what is indiscreet, and it is a complete ab- 
surdity for others to treat us as children or for us to 
allow ourselves to be so treated in matters of such high 
international importance as those involving questions of 
peace and war." 



Sir Edward Grey in his reply stated that secrecy 
Tip to a certain point was necessary and that par- 
ticularly the ratification of treaties could not be 
previously discussed. He then made the very sig- 
nificant remark that not until the House of Com- 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 161 

mons "was really free to devote itself to discus- 
sions of imperial affairs would it get control." 
In other words as long as the House of Conunons 
remains a body occupied primarily with domestic 
and local legislation it cannot spare the attention 
necessary for an effective control of foreign pol- 
icy. 

Early in 1914, evidence was taken by a select 
committee on House of Commons procedure. Mr. 
Balfour during these discussions rather empha- 
sized the need of secrecy in dealing with foreign 
affairs. He thinks that such matters should not 
be aired too frequently in the House of Commons, 
because indiscreet speeches, which can be per- 
fectly appraised in the House, may make bad 
blood when reported. Diplomatic conversations 
must be kept confidential if you are to work the 
European system at all. But though the House 
of Commons does not and cannot know the cur- 
rent details of international negotiations, it is not 
uninformed. This plainly is the language of a 
statesman to whom the idiosyncrasies of the Euro- 
pean system are so familiar that they seem to be 
the only natural state of affairs. The statement 
is made from the point of view of the expert who 
rather resents any sort of interference on the part 
of the less well informed. 



162 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

In March, 1918, it was moved in the House of 
Commons : 

''That, in the opinion of this House, a Standing Com- 
mittee of Foreign Affairs should be appointed, repre- 
sentative of all parties and groups in the House, in order 
that a regular channel of communication may be estab- 
lished between the Foreign Secretary and the House of 
Commons, which will afford him frequent opportunities 
of giving information on questions of Foreign policy and 
which, by allowing Members to acquaint themselves more 
fully with current international problems, will enable 
this House to exercise closer supervision over the general 
conduct of Foreign Affairs. ..." 

Mr. Balfour expressed himself quite in length on 
this motion and further elaborated the ideas 
which he had put forward in 1914. In a speech 
delivered March 19th, he gave what is probably 
the most complete and persuasive exposition of 
the value of traditional methods in diplomacy: 

"... A Foreign Office and a Diplomatic Service are 
great instruments for preventing, as far as can be pre- 
vented, and diminishing, even when you cannot prevent, 
friction between States which are, or which ought to be, 
friendly. How is the task of peace-maker — ^because that 
is largely the task which falls to diplomatists and to the 
Foreign Office, which controls diplomatists — to be pur- 
sued if you are to shout your grievances from the house- 
top whenever they occur? The only result is that you 
embitter public feeling, that the differences between the 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 163 

two States suddenly attain a magnitude they ought 
never to be allowed to approach, that the newspapers of 
the two countries agitate themselves, that the Parlia- 
ments of the two countries have their passions set on 
fire, and great crises arise, which may end, have ended 
sometimes, in international catastrophes. . . . Office of- 
ficials, or officials of any Department, — to expend some 
of their energy in getting ready for cross-examination, 
you will really be destroying the public service. There 
is nothing on which I feel more strongly than that. 
They are not accustomed to it, and they ought not to 
be accustomed to it. ... I do not hold the view that 
antique methods are pursued by diplomatists which no 
man of common sense adopts in the ordinary work of 
everyday life. On the contrary, the work of diplomacy 
is exactly the work which is done every day between two 
great firms, for instance, which have business relations, 
or between two great corporate entities which have in- 
terests diverging or interests in common. If you are a 
man of sense you do not create difficulties to begin with. 
You try to get over all these things without the embit- 
terment which advertisement always brings with it. It 
is when you begin to press your case in public that an- 
tagonism arises. In private — in conversation which need 
not go beyond the walls of the room in which you are, — 
you can put your case as strongly as you like, and the 
gentleman with whom you are carrying on the discus- 
sion may put his case as strongly as he likes, and if good 
manners are observed and nothing but fair discussion 
takes place no soreness remains and no one is driven to 
ignore the strong points of his opponent's ease. Di- 
rectly a controversy becomes public all that fair give- 
and-take becomes either difficult or impossible. . . . But 
if all you mean ... is that it is wrong for the nations 



164 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

of the world to find themselves hampered in their mu- 
tual relations by treaties of which those countries know 
nothing, that, I think, is an evil. I do not say that 
there have not been secret treaties which were inevitable; 
but I do say that, if they are necessary, they are a 
necessary evil. Please remember that two nations make 
a treaty together for their mutual advantage. Both are 
desirous of passing it. One nation says, 'It is against 
our interest that this treaty should be made public at 
present.' The other says, 'We do not like being com- 
mitted to any treaty the terms of which we cannot make 
public at once.' Which is going to prevail? ... It 
does not rest with any single Foreign Office, British or 
other. It is always an arrangement between two — pos- 
sibly three or four, Foreign Offices. You cannot lay 
down — and I do not think you would be wise to lay 
down, an absolute rule that under no circumstances, and 
for no object, could you so far concede the point as to 
say that a treaty is to be made which is not to become 
public property. I am perfectly ready to admit that 
that is not a process which, to me, is a very agreeable 
one. To reduce secret treaties to the narrowest possible 
limits should, I think, be the object of every responsible 
statesman who has the control of foreign affairs. Be- 
yond that I do not feel inclined to go. I do not see any 
signs of a grasp of the true realities of life in the Mo- 
tion before us. You should have your control over 
those who manage your affairs, but it is not the kind of 
control which the honorable Member wishes to set up 
with his Committee of forty or fifty. It is quite a dif- 
ferent control. You must know, broadly speaking, what 
the general lines of policy are, and I maintain that that 
is thoroughly known with regard to foreign affairs at 
this moment by every man in this House who takes the 



PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 165 

trouble to think. The general lines on which we are 
proceeding are thoroughly known." 

This argument brings out all the strong points 
of the system of secret diplomacy under the ex- 
isting conditions of international politics, but it 
contains no hint that these conditions need im- 
provement. They cannot, as a matter of fact, be 
improved until some strong nations, even at the 
risk of disadvantage to themselves, take the lead 
in placing diplomatic affairs on a broader basis. 



XII 

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 

In consequence of the startling developments 
in diplomacy which preceded and accompanied 
the great war, the relation of democracy to diplo- 
macy has been earnestly discussed of late, par- 
ticularly in Great Britain. 

When considering this important matter, the 
distinction between the methods of diplomacy and 
diplomatic policies should be borne in mind for 
the sake of clearness of thought. The develop- 
ment of public opinion, the disappearance of 
purely dynastic aims of state action, and the con- 
stantly broadening outlook of political life, have 
led to the elimination of most of the cruder meth- 
ods of deception and intrigue. But two questions 
still remain: Should diplomatic negotiations be 
carried on in the public view, that is with con- 
stant and full information given to the public or 
parliament, on all important details'? and. Should 
the diplomatic policy of a democratic government 
at all times be kept fully before the representative 
bodies, and the public? 

166 



THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 167 

Most discussions which favor the use of secret 
diplomacy, refer to the presumed necessity of 
confidential methods of negotiation. But there are 
some publicists and statesmen who believe that 
the policy of foreign affairs itself can best be 
handled by responsible statesmen keeping their 
own counsel and giving to the public only a gen- 
eral adumbration of the trend of policy. These 
two questions are constantly mixed up in current 
discussion; and their absolute separation is in- 
deed difficult. Thus, a strictly secret diplomatic 
policy will naturally accentuate the secrecy of 
the methods employed. Abstractly considered, it 
would be quite possible to have the foreign policy 
of a country determined by public action, and 
still to surround diplomatic negotiations with se- 
crecy. But if the substance of the policy were 
definitely known in detail, the secrecy of methods 
would lose much of its effectiveness. 

The use of such methods is defended from two 
points of view ; from that of the trader who looks 
for a better bargain through not having given 
away his entire hand at the beginning; and from 
that of the builder who desires to work quietly 
without interruptions from an excitable public, 
who desires to avoid difficulties and smooth away 



168 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

contrasts which publicity would tend to exag- 
gerate. 

There is an ex post facto publicity of diplomatic 
policy. If this is afforded as soon as a new situ- 
ation has arisen or a new agreement has been cre- 
ated, some of the harm of secreicy is avoided. In 
such a case the statesmen, cabinet, or conference, 
practically give assurance that, if allowed to work 
quietly on a certain problem, they will produce 
a solution which will commend itself in general 
to the sense of equity of the nation or nations con- 
cerned ; although the sum total of the arrangement 
may contain details which, considered by them- 
selves, would be unacceptable and which might 
have interfered with the making of an accord, if 
unduly emphasized or given publicity during the 
negotiations. 

Mr. Balfour in his speech of March 19, 1918, 
which has already been referred to, indeed speaks 
quite convincingly of the advantage of confiden- 
tial relations and of secrecy in negotiations, but 
he goes so far as strongly to deprecate a demand 
for information on the part of Parliament. In 
that he certainly shows a measure of anti-demo- 
cratic bias, as when he says, ''Do not suppose 
that we can do the work better by having to ex- 
plain it to a lot of people who are not responsible. 



THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 169 

That is not the way to get business properly- 
done." He therefore rejects the idea of a par- 
liamentary committee of control in the matter of 
foreign relations. He agrees, however, that the 
existence of secret treaties is an evil, although he 
thinks that it may be at certain times necessary, 
because the associated treaty power may desire it. 
He is mildly deprecatory, at best. 

Count Czernin, speaking to the Austrian dele- 
gations on June 24, 1918, concerning President 
"Wilson's fourteen points, stated that he has no ob- 
jection to the introduction of the principle of 
'^open covenants," although he confesses that he 
does not know by what means effective adherence 
thereto can be assured. Concerning diplomatic 
negotiations, which he treats simply as a matter 
of business, he points out the advantages of se- 
crecy from the point of view of trading. More- 
over, if there were full publicity, the general pub- 
lic might passionately oppose every action involv- 
ing any concession as a defeat. This would not 
be conducive to peaceable relations. 

There are those who believe that the chief evils 
of secret diplomacy would be avoided if ample 
opportunity were given for discussion in repre- 
sentative assemblies, if there were a parliamen- 
tary committee keeping constantly in touch with 



170 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

the conduct of foreign relations, and if treaties 
and declarations of war could not be made with- 
out the consent of the national legislature. Some 
advocates of democratic control go so far as to 
reason that a decision to make war and thereby 
to order the shedding of human blood, should not 
be made without a national referendum vote. 

On the other hand, those opposed to all public- 
ity of diplomatic affairs argue that international 
policies cannot be determined in the market place. 
They hark back to DeTocqueville, who holds that 
as democracy cannot be expected to regulate the 
details of an important undertaking, it is particu- 
larly unqualified to deal with international mat- 
ters where secrecy, discretion, and patience are^ 
required. Followers of this opinion believe that 
the conduct of foreign affairs is best placed quite 
unreservedly in the hands of responsible states- 
men, who have greater information, larger experi- 
ence and more self-control than the average of 
humanity. They generally have in view the pres- 
ervation of national interests, under conditions 
of peace if possible ; they will not be inflamed by 
exciting incidents, but will keep these in proper 
subordination to the general plan. Such details, 
if made public, would easily lead to occurrences 
that would upset the results of wise planning. 



THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 171 

As Lord Cromer has said, it is such untoward 
chance incidents which cannot be controlled that 
are to be feared, rather than any deliberate plot- 
ting on the part of diplomats. Such responsible 
statesmen always remain accountable for the gen- 
eral results of their policy ; they are conscious of 
the importance of their trust, and therefore are 
a safer repository of discretionary powers than 
a general committee. 

Back of these arguments, however, there 
usually lies the conviction that the public is su- 
perficial, easily swayed, excitable and altogether 
delighting more in the hurrah of war than in the 
humdrum of peace. It might be remarked that 
if such had actually been the case, the most re- 
cent experience of the people with war has prob- 
ably given them a different idea of the attractive- 
ness of that kind of excitement ; unless indeed the 
mass of humanity are irremediably and forever 
fools, when taken in the aggregate. 

The sensational character of the daily press 
must be considered in this connection. The news 
value of normal, peaceable developments is very 
small. It is therefore a godsend to the news- 
papers when something extraordinary happens, 
particularly in international affairs. For this 
reason, the daily news frequently presents an un- 



172 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

true or warped picture of the actual situation. 
Gilbert Murray asks what people are referred to 
by those who demand popular control of diplo- 
macy; are they the people of educational socie- 
ties, or of the music halls? The public is not 
homogeneous, or so organized as to give expres- 
sion to convictions on current affairs which have 
been maturely considered. It lacks the leisure 
and training for penetrating superficialities and 
going to the bottom of difficult questions. Lord 
Cromer believes in general that democracies are 
not peaceful, and he refers particularly to the 
American democracy for proof ; Lord Lytton said, 
"Governments are generally for diplomacy, the 
people for war." 

Men of all shades of opinion are agreed that 
the people are not greatly interested in foreign 
affairs, and the opponents of proposals of demo- 
cratic control argue that it would be useless to 
create machinery for action where there exists 
no interest, nor purpose to act. 

It is quite true that the public during the nine- 
teenth century seemed less interested in foreign 
affairs than during the eighteenth. At the ear- 
lier time, diplomacy was a fascinating, personal 
game, about which the wiseacres in the coffee 
houses were eager to make their criticisms and 



THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 173 

prognostications. When the middle class came 
to power in the nineteenth century, it was pri- 
marily interested in economic and other domes- 
tic questions, and was satisfied to leave the con- 
duct of foreign affairs to statesmen and diplo- . 
mats. The constantly growing political con- 
sciousness of the public at large was concentrated 
chiefly on questions of internal politics and re- 
form. Foreign affairs, as they reached the pub- 
lic, were thought of still from the point of view 
of the onlooker, rather than of him who actually 
had to bear the brunt of the burden. Those who 
had to bleed and die when hostilities had been 
brought about, never had any chance, nor deter- 
mination, to influence the course of diplomacy 
leading up to wars. 

With such a general apathy of the public, it 
was not surprising that diplomacy should cling 
to its caste privileges, should try to preserve its 
discretionary powers, and should often attempt 
deliberately to keep people in the dark. ''In the 
public interest" is the curtain beyond which no 
one may peer. Even in the American G^overn- 
ment, particularly during and since the war, for- 
eign affairs have been handled with what would 
ordinarily seem insufficient information to the 
public; in fact, with occasional putting forth of 



174> SECRET DIPLOMACY 

misleading and entirely partial information, or 
the refusal to furnish information even when re- 
quested by those having official responsibilities. 
This is a notable change, as up to 1914 it was 
substantially true that the United States had no 
diplomatic secrets. 

While from the point of view of traditional 
diplomacy, and of international relations as they 
were up to the Great War, it seems quite natural 
that democratic control should be thought by 
many to be unpractical; and while indeed no 
one can flatter himself that through a change of 
method the conduct of international affairs could 
suddenly be rendered more wise and entirely ef- 
fective towards the public welfare, yet I cannot 
avoid the conclusion that there is a wrong ori- 
entation in the emphasis of the need of secrecy 
and of the unfitness of the people to deal with 
problems of foreign affairs. The belief in the 
unfitness of the people in this matter appears to 
be the result of a preconceived notion as to the 
overpowering difficulty, complexity and almost 
sanctity of foreign affairs. Modern governments 
are based on the principle that all legislation 
must meet the test of public criticism and rest 
on public consent; certainly it cannot be argued 
that matters of the incidence of taxation, the 



THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 175 

proper organization of credit, and the determina- 
tion of commercial policies, are less complex and 
intricate than are foreign affairs. It is indeed 
true that it is difficult for one nation thoroughly 
to appreciate in detail the conditions of life in 
another. This truth should have its greatest 
value in dissuading a nation from meddling with 
the internal affairs of another, even from good 
motives. Those international questions which 
are apt to produce war may indeed relate to in- 
tricate matters, but the essential point is always 
the contention for power, influence or commercial 
advantage, and it is not apparent why the public 
in general should be unfit to judge as to whether 
national treasure and life are eventually to be 
spent in huge quantities to bring about, or to 
prevent, any such shifting of power or influence. 
It is, however, because the motives involved are 
so largely connected with class interests, or sur- 
vivals of pride of race, that those concerned in 
them are eager to deny the fitness of the general 
public, which if called on to decide would put into 
the foreground the question, "How does the con- 
trol of this or that group of capitalists in Mo- 
rocco, for instance, or the greater or smaller in- 
fluence of Austria or Russia in Servia, affect the 
daily life and welfare of our people?" It is cer- 



176 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

tainly true that questions of peace and war have 
never definitely been reasoned out on that basis. 
There has always been the assumption that cer- 
tain things were essential to national prestige 
and could not be questioned; it is only when the 
actually existing broader base of national political 
life is organized also for active control of foreign 
affairs, that these considerations will have their 
full weight. Only the most exceptional states- 
men could lift themselves out of the narrow 
groove of tradition and precedent; and more ex- 
ceptional still, in fact all but impossible, is the 
capacity of one man to represent in himself in 
just proportion, all the interests and feelings of 
a nation. 

Infallibility cannot be expected in the handling 
of foreign affairs, whether under a broad discre- 
tion of statesmen or under strict democratic con- 
trol. There will always be an alternative of wis- 
dom and rashness, constructive planning and 
headlong action, carefulness and negligence. But 
past experience has certainly established beyond 
peradventure of doubt that secret diplomacy is 
not infallible, and particularly that diplomacy 
acting under absolutist traditions, as in Germany 
before the war, may make the most fatal mistakes 
of judgment and of policy. Balfour said: "I 



THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY 177 

do not think the Government in June, 1914, had 
the slightest idea that there was any danger 
ahead." A remarkable statement, when we con- 
sider the actions and reactions of secret diplo- 
macy during the decade preceding the war. It 
has been quite truly said that diplomacy is far 
more eminent in autopsy than in diagnosis. M. 
Cheradame somewhat severely observes, "The 
typical diplomat lives in a world of his own. His 
information is rarely obtained by direct observa- 
tion of people and facts." And while ordinarily 
men of exceptional talents are selected for the 
difficult position of Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
yet all considered, it is hard to believe that were 
decisions on the essential matters of international 
life made on a broader basis, and influenced more 
by a direct action of public opinion, the result 
would be less wise. 

Active participation of the people in the mak- 
ing of momentous decisions regarding foreign af- 
fairs, is denied either under the assumption that 
the people might not be ready to face the fateful 
test, or, by the majority, with the thought that 
the people are too excitable and rash to be trusted 
with such far-reaching decisions. While it is in- 
deed easy to generate warlike excitement among 
the masses, it must be remembered, when such a 



178 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

charge of rashness is made, that the people have 
never been currently informed of the develop- 
ment of international dangers, but usually at a 
critical time shreds of information have been 
flashed on them, designed or at least apt to stir 
up all their atavistic love of fight and fear of at- 
tack. Even thus, the greatest noise is made 
usually by those who do not in the event of hos- 
tilities actually have to risk their blood and bones. 
It stands to reason that if honestly kept in- 
formed about international relationships, the peo- 
ple would be far less prone to sudden excitement. 
Very few people indeed appear to doubt that had 
the decision of war or no war been laid before the 
peoples of Europe in 1914, with a full knowledge 
of the facts, the terrible catastrophe would never 
have come about. As Mr. Lowes Dickinson has 
said, if the people had been allowed to share the 
apprehension and precautions of the diplomats 
before 1914, there would have been quite a sim- 
ple and clear question before the English people, 
for one. It could have decided whether it would 
pursue a policy that might lead at any moment 
to a general European war, or to take the alterna- 
tive which Sir Edward Grey later spoke of, 
namely, *'to promote some arrangement, to which 
Germany could be a party by which she could be 



THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY IT? 

assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would 
be pursued against her by France, Russia and our- 
selves, jointly or separately." Without the sup- 
port of the people, kept in line by fear of hidden 
dangers, not even the militarists of Germany 
could have forced military action. 

One of the first acts of the Eussian Soviet Gov- 
ernment was to announce its hostility to secret 
diplomacy. When it first published the secret 
treaties and documents of the Czarist Govern- 
ment, its motive was, as shown by Trotsky's dec- 
laration made at the time, thoroughly to discredit 
the management of affairs under the old regime. 
In the same connection, it announced its own pur- 
pose of conducting foreign affairs in the open. 
Such seems indeed to have been its general prac- 
tice with respect to the announcement of policies, 
though its agents continued to use underground 
methods. One thing, however, the Soviet Gov- 
ernment is evidently trying to bring about, namely, 
a broad public interest in the conduct of foreign 
affairs. It desires the Eussian people, and more 
particularly the members of the ruling Commu- 
nist Party, to be currently informed about the 
progress of international affairs and about ar- 
rangements concluded. Observers report that at 
the meeting of the provincial Soviets the first busi- 



180 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ness ordinarily taken up is the reading and dis- 
cussion of a report on international relations sent 
by the central government. We have no means 
to check up the truth of these reports; but this 
effort to interest the broad mass of the popula- 
tion in the outward relations of the state is cer- 
tainly worth notice. The expectation is encour- 
aged that the reason for acts relating to foreign 
affairs will be explained, particularly when sac- 
rifices are demanded. 



XIII 

A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 

Those who view the modern state as a purely 
predatory organization, — for exploitation within 
and without, — point to the methods, practices and 
results of diplomacy as one of the plainest indi- 
cations of the sinister nature of the political state. 
Such criticism cannot be safely brushed aside as 
utterly unreasonable ; it should rather call forth a 
searching inquiry as to whether, as a matter of 
fact, the conduct of foreign affairs could not and 
should not be brought into greater consonance 
with genuinely democratic principles, and be 
placed on the sound basis of well-informed pub- 
lic support. 

No matter what opinion one may hold with re- 
spect to the necessity of secret diplomacy, it must 
be recognized that this practice involves a very 
narrow conception of the active scope of democ- 
racy. It is in fact a historical survival from the 
period of the absolutist state ; or in other words, 
that aspect of the modern state which deals with 

181 



182 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

foreign affairs has retained the character of abso- 
lutism. It is a superstition, in the picturesque 
sense of that word used by Lowell, when he de- 
fines it as ''something left standing over from 
one of the world's witenagemotes to the other." 
In this case, indeed the most recent witenagemote 
approached the question and proposed a step in 
advance towards its solution. But the difficulty 
still persists. 

In its relations with other states, the state is 
considered to be absolute, not bound by any laws, 
responsible only for its own security, welfare and 
progressing influence. The struggle for political 
power still exists among states, in essentially the 
same keenness and rigidity with which it appeared 
to the eyes of Machiavelli. The importance of 
world-wide human relationships, and of interna- 
tional cooperation in scientific and economic life, 
has indeed been brought forth and given its place 
in the public mind ; but because of the manner in 
which the conduct of international affairs is 
actually handled, the feeling thus generated does 
not have much chance to influence action at crit- 
ical times, when the people are startled and ex- 
cited by the sudden revelation of dangers, which 
awaken in them all the bitter feelings engendered 
by the past struggles of mankind. 



A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 183 

This survival is given strength by class inter- 
ests, pride of race, and by the manipulations of 
plutocratic control. Where affairs are handled 
by a narrow circle of men, no matter how high- 
minded and how thoroughly conscious of their 
public responsibility, yet with the necessary limi- 
tations of the human mind, they cannot but be 
influenced at every turn by the opinions of others 
with whom they are actually in contact; so that 
in decisions on these momentous matters, the 
thing which is concretely present is very often 
an interest comparatively narrow in itself, and 
related to the public welfare only by a series of 
remote inferences which are accepted at their face 
value. The most successful statesman of the 
nineteenth century said that the whole Balkan 
question was not worth the bones of one Pom- 
eranian grenadier; yet his successors in power 
risked the very existence of the nations of Europe 
for one phase of that question. 

Powerful interests will always have means, for- 
mal or informal, to lay their needs and desires 
before the men in power. They may indeed be 
very important and may deserve special atten- 
tion, but unfortunately, many cases have hap- 
pened in which their point of view has been 
adopted without making sure that there existed a 



184 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

general public interest sufficiently important to 
warrant taking the risks involved. 
• A diplomatic caste recruited from a certain 
class of society, trained in the traditions of au- 
thority, in contact all the time with men of simi- 
lar views and principles, cannot in the nature of 
things free itself from the limitations of such 
environment and such training. 

From the personal point of view diplomacy has 
adhered to the belief in the superior intelligence, 
ability and foresight in the handling of foreign 
affairs, on the part of those who by inherited tra- 
ditions and special experience may be said to be- 
long to a caste distinguished from the mass of 
humanity. Some one has said, there is a great 
danger in that there exists a caste of people who 
have taken the making of history as their profes- 
sion; who still cling to the erroneous idea that 
the manipulation of large masses of people, the 
redistribution of territories, and the modification 
of the natural processes of grouping and settle- 
ment, is history. But such people who believe 
they are making history are really obstructing it. 
Even so unusual a man as Bismarck, working 
as he did on a great national problem, did not 
gain lasting success in action whereby he endeav- 
ored to anticipate the developments of history. 



A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 185 

The artful contrivance and harsh, ruthless exe- 
cution of many of his plans left a heritage of evil 
to the world; but the greatest evil lay in the ex- 
ample given by so successful a man in making it 
seem that history could actually thus be made. 
The attitude which is taken in behalf of such men, 
in claiming for them a completely free and full 
discretion in controlling foreign affairs, recalls a 
statement made by H. G. Wells concerning a Brit- 
ish leader: "He believes that he belongs to a 
particularly gifted and privileged class of beings 
to whom the lives and affairs of common men are 
given over — the raw material for brilliant careers. 
It seems to him an act of insolence that the com- 
mon man should form judgments on matters of 
statecraft." The diplomats of the old school in- 
deed do require the people, but only as material 
with which to work out their grandiose projects. 
Their view not too distantly resembles that of the 
German militarists to whom ordinary humanity 
existed only for one purpose, "to do their damn'd 
duty." 

We should naturally expect to find the great- 
est secrecy and the most callous use of secretive 
methods, where absolutism remains most com- 
pletely established. In the last remaining abso- 
lutism, that of Japan, these expectations are ful- 



186 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

filled, both as regards carefully-guarded secrecy 
of all diplomatic action, and the habitual use of 
well phrased declarations of a theoretical policy, 
announced for public consumption, but bearing 
only a Platonic relation to the details of actual 
doings. But more liberally governed states have 
not by any means all freed themselves from this 
practice, even to the extent of faithfully keeping 
the representative bodies, and the public, in- 
formed of the true character and aims of impor- 
tant national policies. 

During the discussions of the last few years, a 
great many remedies for this state of affairs have 
been suggested. The Constitutional practice of 
the United States has been taken as a model in 
England in the suggestion that there should be a 
representative committee on foreign affairs in the 
House of Commons, which should keep in con- 
stant touch with the diplomatic officials and su- 
pervise the conduct of foreign relations; that 
there should be at least two days given to the dis- 
cussion of the Foreign Office Vote; that there 
should be full reports made on the progress of 
all important negotiations ; and that treaties and 
alliances should not be concluded, nor war made, 
without a previous authorization on the part of 
Parliament. The last formal proposal of this 



I 



A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 187 

kind was the motion made in March, 1918, in the 
House of Commons, the opposition to which by 
Mr. Balfonr has already been alluded to. That 
he should object particularly to the prying into 
foreign affairs on the part of persons "not re- 
sponsible," and by "politicians," that the pro- 
posed committee of the House of Commons should 
be thus characterized, throws light on the preju- 
dices involved; but it also reveals the absurdity 
of the present arrangement from the point of view 
of free government. In France there has existed, 
since 1902, a standing committee on foreign and 
colonial affairs in the Chamber of Deputies. 

When he was premier, in 1920, Signer Giolliti 
introduced a bill carrying the following provi- 
sion: "Treaties and International understand- 
ings, whatever be their subject and character, are 
valid only after they have been approved by Par- 
liament. The Government of the King can de- 
clare war only with the approval of the two Cham- 
bers." The ministry of Giolliti fell before this 
sound measure could be passed. 

It may be questioned whether many of the ar- 
rangements suggested could be more than pallia- 
tives, as long as an intelligent and constant pub- 
lic interest in foreign affairs has not been aroused, 
and as long as the absolutist aspect of foreign 



188 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

policy continues. The suggestion that war should 
not be made without a previous national referen- 
dum, has indeed logic on its side from the point 
of view of the democratic theory of state, but it 
has thus far not entered into the state of practical 
consideration. 

The most important remedy as yet attempted 
is the provision in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, that all treaties shall be made public. 
No greater encouragement, indeed, could be given 
to the growth of confidence and the destruction 
of baneful suspicions and fears, throughout in- 
ternational life, than if it were possible to assure 
the nations of the world that all engagements im- 
posing international obligations of any kind what- 
soever would be made known immediately upon 
their conclusion. This provision of the Covenant 
has already gone into force, and numerous new 
treaties have been submitted, even by govern- 
ments who are not as yet members of the League. 
But certain governments have delayed compliance 
in cases where treaties are known to have been 
made secretly. As there is no specific sanction for 
this provision in the Covenant, and as actually 
binding agreements can be made without taking 
the form of a treaty or convention, this remedy 
is not in itself powerful enough to remove the 



A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 189 

evil. If two or three states are willing to keep 
an engagement secret at the risk of later incur- 
ring a certain amount of opprobrium when the 
fact is discovered, there is no means as yet avail- 
able for obliging them to abandon such course. 
Nevertheless, this provision of the Covenant con- 
stitutes a great advance in the work of placing 
the public business of the world on the only sound 
basis, and cultivating that confidence upon which 
depends the future immunity of mankind from 
constant danger of suffering and destruction. It 
will, however, not be a real remedy until the na- 
tions agree actually to outlaw all secret agree- 
ments as a conspiracy against the general wel- 
fare and safety. 

The other important advance made in the Cove- 
nant is found in the provisions for the investi- 
gation of any cause of conflict before hostilities 
shall be resorted to. If after the first shock of 
excitement, which accompanies the revelation of 
a serious international crisis, public opinion can 
be given a certain space of time to inform itself, 
then it may indeed be hoped that a different tem- 
per will control the giving of the fateful doom 
of war. As Count Czernin has stated, on the 
night of August 4, 1914, between the hours of nine 
and midnight the decision as to whether England 



190 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

would come into the war, lay with the German 
Government. A system under which such tremen- 
dous issues have to be decided in such a manner, 
is absurd to the verge of insanity.* 

While the above arrangements, if they could be 
effectively carried out, would undoubtedly serve to 
moderate the evils which now result from the con- 
duct of international affairs on so narrow a basis, 
yet it is difficult to expect from them more than 
relatively superficial results. It is only if a new 
spirit can be developed among the nations, and 
if the absolutist conception of the state as far as 
it still remains, can be transformed into some- 
thing more consonant with the complexity and 
delicacy of human relationships, that we may hope 
to hail the dawn of a new era. It would be as 
great a transformation as that which separates 
the Pagan from the Christian ideal. Mankind is 
still somewhat blinded by the glitter and pa- 
geantry of the absolutist state ; the pride of power 
manifests itself now particularly in foreign in- 
tercourse. When Portugal became a republic, it 



* A German writer puts the blame for the outbreak of the 
war on the telegraph. He says that if there had been no tele- 
graphic communication between the capitals, the fatal crisis 
would not have arisen; there would have been time for reflection 
and a decision to make war would never have been taken in 
blood. 



A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 191 

desired at first to abolish the entire diplomatic 
establishment, and to allow all international busi- 
ness to be done by the consuls. That proposal 
may have resulted from an instinctive feeling that 
there was something incompatible between a 
really free community, and the sense of absolute 
power embodied in diplomacy. 

A change can be brought about only when the 
underlying unity of mankind is more intensely 
felt and when the common interests in science, 
commerce, industry and the universal lang-uage 
of art are valued at their true importance to the 
welfare of the people of all nations. Joint effort 
in the constructive work of developing resources, 
particularly in the tropics, will make it possible 
for vastly increased populations to live in com- 
fort on their present sites, without the need of 
crowding each other. A higher valuation of hu- 
manity, a more just proportion in the influence 
permitted different interests, a keener scrutiny 
of traditions and watch-words — all this is neces- 
sary. Men and women to-day feel an intense ap- 
prehension, when they think of the fate of their 
children in a world in which the unreasoning 
prejudices and unenlightened practices that have 
recently again come to the fore in international 
life should prevail, leaving mankind in a dazed 



192 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

confusion, and pushing the people from time to 
time into w^iolesale slaughter with ever more hor- 
rible instruments of destruction. They feel also 
that if secret policies, engendering fears and sus- 
picion, are to continue to be the dominant factor, 
then all improvement in human welfare, education 
and science, will have to be in a large measure 
postponed to the preparation of constantly more 
formidable engines of death. One cannot but re- 
member the worst imprecations of the Greek 
tragic poets and philosophers, on the miserable 
destiny of man. In fact, if we should have to be- 
lieve that no better way could be found to man- 
age the vital interests of mankind, a great nat- 
ural catastrophe, which would extinguish once and 
for all the miserable breed on this planet, would 
almost appear in the light of a redemption. 

But we cannot believe that the peoples of the 
world will be so foolish as to allow themselves 
to remain in this condition and not to find their 
way to a reorganization of public affairs which 
will make such a haphazard and perilous situation 
impossible. It seems plain that the idea of the 
state and of state action will have to be trans- 
formed in accordance with the greater self-con- 
sciousness of humanity which has developed in 
the last century, or the desire to scrap the po- 



A SURVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM 193 

litical state and to find some more adequate and 
natural form of organization will rapidly gain in 
strength. Meanwhile, there is a need of the 
formation of a great freemasonry of all publi- 
cists, political men and teachers of the people, 
united in the resolve to know and make known 
the essential elements in current international af- 
fairs, to arouse the public to a sense of the im- 
portance of these matters to their every-day life, 
and to support the men more directly responsible 
for the conduct of foreign policy, with an intelli- 
gent, searching, reasonable and broad public 
opinion. 



< 



XIV 

RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 

Up until a recent date Americans could con- 
template the play of secret diplomacy in Europe 
and Asia with a feeling of entire aloofness, as 
belonging to a political society which had neither 
need nor inclination to utilize such methods. Our 
unmenaced continental position, the natural pro- 
tection and separation implied in distance and 
ocean boundaries, and the conscious intention of 
keeping clear of international entanglements, all 
contributed to make the foreign policy of the 
United States entirely public and straightforward. 
The fathers of the Constitution had established 
the sound principle that treaties are the law of 
the land. This not only involves mature consid- 
eration of a treaty before it is made, but publicity 
as well. The American people have known at all 
times what obligations had been incurred, and the 
world had the same information. There has been 
no room for guesswork and suspicion. 

The instructions which were issued to John 
^ay when he was sent as special envoy to Eng- 

194 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 195 

land in 1794 lay down the following rule of con- 
duct: ''It is the President's wish that the char- 
acteristics of an American minister should be 
marked on the one hand by a firmness against im- 
proper compliances, and on the other by sincer- 
ity, candor, truth and prudence, and by a horror 
of finesse and chicane." These straightforward 
w^ords began a tradition which has ever since ani- 
mated the American diplomatic service. "When 
after the Spanish war, under Secretary Hay, 
American diplomacy entered more fully into 
world-wide problems than in any previous era, 
the expression "the new diplomacy" was cur- 
rently used in a laudatory sense to designate what 
Hay had implied when in a public address he had 
declared the Golden Rule to be the cardinal prin- 
ciple of American diplomacy — an ideal which 
makes secrecy and intrigue unnecessary. ^ / 

In order to give the public an opportunity of 
informing itself concerning the conduct and de- 
velopment of foreign affairs, the United States 
Government has from an early date published an 
annual collection of diplomatic correspondence. 
Since 1861, this publication is known as Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States. It was formerly published within two or 
three years of the year to which it related, but 



196 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

during the war this interval was considerably ex- 
tended. The precedents and principles elabo- 
rated in the diplomatic correspondence of the 
United States have been collected, codified and 
published in a very important and useful com- 
pendium by Francis Wharton, under the title of 
Digest of International Law. This work was ex- 
panded, amplified and brought down to date by 
Prof. John Bassett Moore, under the same title, 
in 1906. It is of the highest importance, not only 
as a repository of diplomatic and legal precedent, 
but as a definite and public record of the position 
taken by the American Government on all inter- 
national questions that had arisen up to the date 
of its publication. The preparation of such di- 
gest on the part of other governments is highly to 
be desired for the purpose of clarifying interna- 
tional law and policy, and for giving them a sound 
basis of reason and experience upon which the 
people and governments may rely. The fact that 
a precedent reported in this digest, might be cited 
against the American Government as an admis- 
sion, does not imply a disadvantage which would 
at all offset the benefits resulting in general from 
public knowledge. 

"With respect to the details of negotiation, there 
are confidential relationships which have always 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 197 

been observed by the American Government. Or- 
dinary considerations of courtesy require that 
those who may speak to us frankly in confidence 
shall not be made to suffer by being quoted and 
thus perhaps be exposed to misunderstanding and 
criticism. On our part, in preparing a sound 
basis of action, favorable as well as unfavorable 
matters have to be considered; yet there is ordi- 
narily no need of publicly advertising the short- 
comings of individuals and governments as set 
forth in reports on such unfavorable matters. 
Such considerate action is not based on a desire 
to mislead or to take advantage, but to save un- 
necessary irritation. For the purpose of permit- 
ting complete freedom of discussion and of criti- 
cism without the risk of giving offense, the United 
States Senate, as a matter of its ordinary pro- 
cedure, goes into secret session when discussing 
a treaty submitted to it. There have, however, 
been several exceptions. Thus, for instance, the 
debates on the Bayard-Ohamberlain Fisheries 
Treaty of 1888, on the Taft arbitration treaties 
of 1912, and on the Nicaragua Treaty of 1916, 
were carried on, and concluded, in open session. 
Many senators are in favor of making this the 
common practice. 

Before the war, as Prof. John Bassett Moore, 



198 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

whose knowledge of the records is unequaled^ 
said to me, the State Department had no secrets 
whatsoever, with the exception of personnel re- 
ports. We, too, however, can depart from a well- 
established tradition, as is shown by our diplo- 
matic history during the war. I do not believe it 
will ever be charged that in any matter big or 
little the American Government sought narrow,, 
selfish advantages. Secrecy due to such motives, 
there was none. There was no American policy 
or enterprise that needed concealment, apart from 
military policies and strategy during a war. 
When I glanced over at the end of my mission 
in Peking the extra-confidential cable correspond- 
ence, I was inwardly amazed by the entire lack of 
anything that really needed concealing, in that 
closely guarded dossier. 

Yet American diplomacy did during the war fall 
somewhat under the spell of the traditional meth- 
ods still in vogue in Europe. We were not a 
party to any secret engagements for the division 
of spoils after the war, although from the time 
of the peace conference on, the influence of the 
American Government was exercised mostly in se- 
cret, and the agreements subsidiary to the gen- 
eral settlement were secretly signed. These did 
not contain any apportionment of advantage to 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 199 

the United States, but on the contrary were sup- 
posed to contain the nearest approach to the 
equitable ideas of American policy which was, un- 
der existing conditions, obtainable. But through- 
out this trying period the conduct of American 
diplomacy did not rest on the foundation of a con- 
tinuous, frank appeal to the public opinion of our 
own nation or of the world. 

Even before the armistice some very important 
matters were dealt with in this fashion. Though 
the permanent importance of the Lansing-Ishii 
note as affecting in a concrete and specific way the 
definition of rights and policies in the Far East 
is very doubtful, yet in its immediate effect under 
all of the circumstances of the time, this was cer- 
tainly a noteworthy document to issue from the 
American foreign office. Yet, its conception and 
execution was absolutely surrounded with secrecy 
so that not even the high officials normally con- 
sulted in such matters, with the exception of the 
Secretary of State himself, were informed as to 
what was coming. This secrecy worked entirely 
in the interest of the Japanese government. By 
privately giving out the agreement in Japan and 
in China before the date when its publication had 
been agreed upon, the Japanese government suc- 
ceeded to a certain extent and for a time, in giv- 



200 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ing this matter the appearance of a great Japa- 
nese diplomatic victory and of a highly important 
concession on the part of the United States. 

It is not necessary to recall the general disil- 
lusionment that came about when President Wil- 
son agreed to the policy of secrecy at the peace 
conference. Undoubtedly this decision was based 
on the motive to secure, with a promptness re- 
quired by the stress of the times, a settlement 
which would in general commend itself to the sense 
of justice of the world, although it might neces- 
sarily contain details which, if published by them- 
selves, would cause lengthy public discussion and 
delay the final solution. If such an expectation 
was entertained, it was not as a matter of fact 
fulfilled in the results of these secret consulta- 
tions. The method adopted did not favor the 
broad and permanent view, but rather the more 
shortsighted bargaining in which the old diplo- 
macy excels. In their solutions neither the con- 
sultations of the peace conference, nor the sub- 
sequent diplomatic negotiations among the Al- 
lies, got beyond the old methods of bartering the 
destinies of small and weak peoples, which had 
been used by the Congresses of Vienna and of 
Berlin with disastrous results. The various con- 
ferences of 1919 to 1920 recorded a complete re- 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 201 

turn to the system of secret diplomacy, to such 
an extent that it appeared constantly as if the 
plenipotentiaries feared to let their doings be 
known. Even when there was no reason from 
any point of view for concealment, information 
came out in a roundabout fashion which left the 
public mind confused ; as for instance in the giv- 
ing out of a decision regarding the fate of Con- 
stantinople, and in the reports concerning the 
text of President Wilson's Adriatic memorandum 
which were current before its publication. 

From the entanglements of this procedure 
American diplomacy did not keep itself free, nor 
did it, at this time, assist the world in finding a 
more straightforward method more in accord with 
American political experience. 

The disadvantages of secret methods of trans- 
acting public business have been brought home to 
the American people through several incidental 
matters of no small importance. It evidently was 
the intention of President Wilson to reserve 
American rights as to the Island of Yap which is 
a vital link in the chain of cable communication 
between America and the Far East, and a reser- 
vation of this kind is indicated by references in 
the official minutes, though not by a written proto- 
col. Without the knowledge of the United States, 



202 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

the Council of the League of Nations later dis- 
posed of the mandate for all of the North Pacific 
Islands. As this action was secret, it could not 
be known whether the American interest bearing 
on Yap Island had been safeguarded or not. It 
was stated as late as January 26, 1921, that the 
American Government was not in possession of 
the greater part of the minutes of the Peace Con- 
ference. Notwithstanding the protests of the 
United States, Japan based her claim to the 
North Pacific Islands on the secret treaties made 
during the war. 

The secrecy of the peace conference, and the 
revelations before and during its sessions, con- 
cerning the secret treaties for the division of the 
spoils, produced a great disillusionment in the 
public mind. The fact that the United States 
though asked to make enormous sacrifices in the 
common cause had been kept in the dark concern- 
ing at least some of these treaties, and particu- 
larly of those which affected its own interest, did 
not inspire the American public with any confi- 
dence in the general conduct of affairs among the 
nations. 

After the adjournment of the conference the 
American President and Government still contin- 
ued to take a part in the various attempts to set- 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 203 

tie outstanding questions, particularly with re- 
spect to the Adriatic. "When President Wilson 
towards the end of February, 1920, addressed a 
note to the allied powers concerning the Adriatic 
settlement, the documents and negotiations which 
had gone before were entirely unknown to the 
public. On December 9, 1919, an agreement had 
been signed by Great Britain, France and the 
United States, Undersecretary Polk signing for 
the latter. On January 9th, the British and 
French premiers had agreed with the Italian 
premier on a modified plan of settlement. On 
February 10th, the American Secretary of State 
wrote a note containing President Wilson's ob- 
jections to the plan of January 9th. The allied 
premiers replied to this note on February 18th. 
All these agreements and this correspondence 
were kept secret, nor was President Wilson's final 
answer given out for some time; only more or 
less accurate prognostications appeared in the 
press. 

The American Government at this time was at 
a disadvantage in not participating in the ne- 
gotiations directly; the American ambassador at 
Paris was invited from time to time to hear what 
the conference of premiers cared to tell him, but 
the proceedings of the conference were apparently 



204. SECRET DIPLOMACY 

not transmitted to the American Government. 
The British press at the time quite generally ex- 
pressed great dissatisfaction with the methods 
[followed by the diplomats. The Westminster Ga- 
zette wrote: "The whole of both peoples is 
acutely concerned in the result. We must, there- 
fore, register a protest against the manner in 
which the negotiations are being conducted. 
They are being carried on in secrecy, only broken 
by unreliable rumors, by the three principal gov- 
ernments. The peoples have a right to know 
what is being done in their name, so that they 
may be able to protest, if need be, against deci- 
sions which may affect their future relations." 
The Times protested: "We are not going to 
stand by and have our friendship and relations 
with America jeopardized by the proceedings of 
a triumvirate sitting behind closed doors. The 
American democracy, we imagine, will not be less 
resolved to assert their rights and stifle this ef- 
fort at secret diplomacy." 

At this time Mr. Bonar Law, the government 
spokesman in the House of Commons, denied ab- 
solutely that a harsh and uncompromising reply 
had originally been drafted to President Wilson's 
despatch, and that it had subsequently been 
changed through the influence of Viscount Grey 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 205 

and Lord Robert Cecil. The Times characterized 
this denial as ''an example of verbal quibbling 
which inferior intelligences mistake for diplo- 
macy," and maintained that "though it may be 
verbally true, it conveys and is designed to con- 
vey what is untrue"; and the Daily Mail stated 
that the country owed a debt of gratitude to Lord 
Grey for his activities in the matter. This all 
illustrates on how insecure a foundation, and with 
what chances of confusion, public opinion has to 
work in matters of foreign affairs where the prac- 
tices of the old diplomacy are followed. 

The American people at this time very nearly 
lost patience with the entire business, and turned 
away from European affairs with complete dis- 
gust. This is the most outstanding effect pro- 
duced by the secret diplomacy of Europe as far 
as the American people are concerned. The dan- 
ger now is that their feeling of disgust and con- 
fusion, and their impatience with the selfish and 
shortsighted manipulations of European diplo- 
macy, will over-emphasize the desire of America 
to live by and for herself alone. If such a mood 
and temper should prevail, it would be a great 
loss to America and to the world. At no time has 
the world needed America more than at present, 
not so much from the point of view of direct eco- 



206 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

nomic assistance, as on account of the fact that 
American experience, principles and ideals con- 
stitute at the present time the hope of the peo- 
ples of the whole world; and America could, if 
she desired, exercise an enormous influence in 
making the popular desire for such action active, 
vital and fruitful. 

But even aside from the general confidence 
which is felt by the peoples of Europe and Asia 
in the character and ideals of the United States, 
there are a great many specific contributions 
which America could make to the solution of Eu- 
ropean problems. No matter how much we shall 
desire during the next decade to hold aloof from 
Europe and to concentrate on our own affairs, 
nevertheless, should European affairs go radically 
wrong through a constant denial and deception of 
the hopes and aspirations of the people for hon- 
est and sensible solutions, America in the end will 
again have to share the burden thus laid on the 
shoulders of mankind. 

The fundamental American principle that 
treaties have the force and status of law con- 
tains in itself the promise of solving some of the 
worst troubles of the world, if it could be gener- 
ally applied. America should continue, for her 
own safety and that of the world, to use her whole 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 207 

influence for making that principle a part of the 
universal public law. No international engage- 
ment shall be binding unless ratified by a repre- 
sentative body, and published to all the nations. 
Otherwise it shall be absolutely void, and shall 
not give rise to any rights or obligations ; in fact, 
an attempt to make an agreement contrary to 
these conditions shall be considered an act hostile 
to the peace of the world. That should be the 
recognized law. 

Nothing shows so clearly how human develop- 
ment has halted at this point, as the fact that it 
should still require an argument to show the ne- 
cessity of publicity and lawfulness with respect 
to the most essential interests of the vast popula- 
tions that make up the international family. 

The record and constant practice of the United 
States, as well as her great actual and potential 
power, fit her above all others to be a leader in 
the establishment of this principle. The Amer- 
ican nation possesses a great moral capital in the 
confidence and trust that the peoples of the world 
repose in it. No matter if unsympathetic chan- 
ceries should plot to prevent America from mak- 
ing her influence felt in the affairs of the world, 
no matter how European diplomacy may occa- 
sionally sneer at American idealism, the peoples 



208 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

themselves, great and small, including particu- 
larly those areas so immensely important — Rus- 
sia and China — would willingly look to America 
for leadership and guidance, with complete trust 
and confidence. When this is fully realized, we 
shall also be able to judge how vitally what Amer- 
ica stands for in the world will be strengthened 
by a constant adherence to open and straightfor- 
ward methods in international intercourse. 

But America herself, it will be said, cannot fun- 
damentally change the spirit that animates for- 
eign policies, and bring about the universal use 
of honest and open practices. We are living un- 
der a system which is the result of historic forces 
that have not yet fully spent themselves and 
which put the potential enmity among nations in 
the foreground. 

1 do not believe that it is necessary to shut our 
eyes to reality and to seek recourse in a Utopian 
policy, in order to escape the menace inherent in 
current international practices. If America will 
only not fall in line with the absolutist tradition 
in diplomacy, but will emphasize at all times, with 
all her influence, those principles of international 
conduct which our natural freedom from entan- 
glements has permitted us to develop as of actual 
experience, America will contribute in a most po- 



RECENT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 209 

tent manner to the realization of that new spirit 
which must surely come to deliver humanity. 
That spirit is not a mere ideal, — it is fortunately 
already present in much of international prac- 
tice ; but it needs constantly to be followed up and 
supported in order that it may become the custo- 
mary and instinctive guide, superseding such 
prejudices as are still current which favor tor- 
tuous manipulation and perpetuate an uninformed 
and confused state of the public mind. 

In order to fulfil this promise and destiny the 
United States would have to rely in the first place 
on the inherent merit of her ideals and princi- 
ples of action, and on the support which they will 
receive from the approval of the peoples of the 
world. As far as organized governments go, as 
distinguished from the people, some will be more 
inclined than others to cooperate with the United 
States in a reform of international practice. 
There is no question but that the great majority 
of governments will thus cooperate, though some 
of the most important may for a time be left on 
the other side. 

With those peoples and governments who are 
in language, political traditions and general im- 
pulses most closely related to us, there should 
grow up a particularly strong feeling of confi- 



210 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

dence making all our intercourse absolutely open. 
There certainly need not be any secrets between 
the United States and the great commonwealths 
of Canada and Australia. Our interests, our con- 
dition, our institutions, all make for the closest 
understanding. Through them there may be also 
realized that harmony which ought by every nor- 
mal reason to exist between the United States and 
the English people, and which is disturbed only 
from time to time when the policy of the British 
government is determined more from the point 
of view of the supposed needs of the British Em- 
pire in India, than of that of the true tradition 
of the English-speaking world. I do not think of 
treaties or of alliances, but of something much 
stronger — an intimate understanding among peo- 
ples, based on mutual trust and confidence, and 
the consciousness of a common destiny, common 
purposes, and a common belief in the things which 
alone will prevent civilization from extinguishing 
itself in senseless hatreds. 



CONCLUSION 

In modern diplomacy there still persists the 
image of the chess players intent on their compli- 
cated game, planning each move with long fore- 
sight of all the combinations that could possibly 
be organized by the opponent. In the popular 
image, too, the great diplomat is conceived as 
spinning a complicated web of actions and rela- 
tionships in which every detail is subordinate and 
subservient to a general dominant purpose. Then 
comes the international publicist and with inge- 
nuity still more refined than that of the imagined 
diplomat, he reasons out the innermost ambitions 
that dominate and inspire the makers of foreign 
affairs. So it has remained possible for the most 
extravagant imaginary constructions to be put 
forth in volumes of sober aspect, which purport 
to give the key to diplomacy or to expose the per- 
nicious ambitions of this or that foreign office. 
It has become a game in which nothing is impos- 
sible to the constructive imagination. 

To any one familiar with the usual methods of 
foreign offices and of diplomatic representatives, 

211 



212 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

the idea that foreign affairs are really handled in 
this manner, like mental legerdemain, becomes 
quite grotesque. Complicated manipulations with 
respect to movements far in the future, looking 
to still more distant results, — that kind of diplo- 
matic planning exists more in the imagination 
than in the actual conduct of foreign affairs. In 
the majority of cases foreign offices meet each 
situation as it arises, relying indeed on prece- 
dents and having certain underlying aims and 
purposes, but giving most attention to the facts 
immediately present and often satisfied with any- 
thing that will ease a troublesome or embarrassing 
situation. Foreign offices indeed differ greatly in 
the definiteness and constancy of their objectives 
and the completeness with which they subordi- 
nate details to central aims. The Russian for- 
eign office always had the reputation of great con- 
tinuity of policy; it gave the central place to 
fundamental objectives to which problems that 
arose from day to day could be referred ; and thus 
it solved them with a cumulative effect upon the 
advancement of its political aims. 

From the point of view of the older traditions 
of diplomacy, there would be a decided advantage 
in definiteness of plan and in the harmonious sub- 
ordination of all details to the main idea. How- 



CONCLUSION 213 

ever, the advantage of this method is frequently 
defeated through the narrowness of the objects 
aimed at, when diplomatic poKcy is conceived in 
this manner. Immediate purposes may indeed be 
achieved more readily, but the permanent results 
will usually be barren or lead ultimately to con- 
flicts of forces. In such a system there is too 
much abstraction from the multiform forces of 
actual life; and while those who pursue it may 
flatter themselves that they are making history, 
they are not often building in accordance with 
natural and historic forces. 

The concept of diplomacy which has been criti- 
cized in these pages does not exclude the possibil- 
ity of immediate brilliant success; but its inef- 
fectiveness appears when we view it over longer 
periods of history. It is built on too narrow a 
foundation. We have seen that even with the 
greatest statesmen, any plan of action conceived 
in this manner has such positive limitations that 
the very success in executing such policies through 
a shrewd play of diplomatic forces, conjures up 
new dangers and difficulties. The wisdom of no 
man nor small self-contained group of men is at 
present sufficient to measure the needs of society 
and to transform its impulses into effective ac- 
tion. A broader basis for policy is needed. But 



214. SECRET DIPLOMACY 

the greatest weakness of the old method lies in 
the fact that just at the very times when men 
are most in need of confidence and of a spirit of 
reason and sane judgment, this mode of action 
leaves the public mind in confusion, excitement 
and the darkest fears. 

If democracy means anything, its significance 
for the welfare of humanity must lie in the value 
of allowing constantly more and more minds to 
participate in the great things of the world. Not 
only would such participation seem to be a nat- 
ural right of the human mind but also the things 
most worth while can be achieved only when the 
ablest and best can freely lend their efforts. To 
all this a narrow system of secret management by 
a limited hierarchy is hostile. The old diplo- 
macy rests entirely on skepticism as to the wis- 
dom and self-control of the people. The people 
are merely material for statesmanship. This 
conception is blind to the fact that everything that 
is great in modern life has arisen through the 
freedom with which talent may manifest itself 
wherever found and that in all pursuits of hu- 
manity that are worth while, innumerable minds 
cooperate, in a degree as warranted by their ca- 
pacity to bring about sound action and improve- 
ment. The older diplomacy assumed that the peo- 



CONCLUSION 215 

pie furnished only passive material for states- 
manship to work upon, and it saw in the public 
only potentialities for vague and general influ- 
ences which statesmanship in turn was to mold 
and utilize. The greatest distance it went, was 
to admit that national policy must rest on popu- 
lar instinct ; a principle which is quite compatible 
with the practice of secret diplomacy. When we 
come to talk of political instincts, however, we 
are dealing with one of the vaguest and most in- 
definite concepts known to thought. These in- 
stincts may be interpreted and given active ex- 
pression as it suits any diplomatic policy. Un- 
fortunately the "instincts" most to the fore are 
not usually helpful to calm and sound action. In 
international affairs, an instinctive dislike or 
hatred of anything different has again and again 
been made the basis of aggressive action, stirring 
up otherwise peaceful populations to warlike and 
murderous intent. Great national policies may 
often truly be said to rest on instinct in the sense 
that undivided popular support is given to a pol- 
icy from a variety of motives which are not clearly 
reasoned out but which all express themselves in 
an overpowering impulse which may be called in- 
stinctive. Thus the Monroe policy in which the 
most fundamental motive is the desire for peace 



216 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

and for the safety of the continental position of 
the American nation, may be said to rest on the 
instinct of self-preservation. 

But it is quite plain that unless what is here 
called instinct can be transformed into an intelli- 
gent, wise and discriminating public opinion, such 
instinct is but a shifting sand, affording material 
which may be molded into any desired form by an 
ambitious policy working through suggestion and 
propaganda. Instinct can be transformed into a 
true public policy only through publicity and 
through the training of large groups of men to 
see things with true eyes and to judge with rea- 
son and wisdom. Here is the crux of the mat- 
ter. Secret diplomacy treats all except the inner 
official ring as outsiders and "persons without re- 
sponsibility." Among these outsiders there may 
be numerous persons actually better qualified than 
the officials themselves, through experience and 
thought, to judge of international affairs. No 
one can here assume infallibility. Safe counsel 
can come only if the entire intelligence and moral 
sentiment of a nation can find expression and if 
its fittest individuals can concentrate their atten- 
tion upon every great problem as it arises. A 
sound, just, wise public policy without publicity 
cannot be imagined. To consider publicity an 



CONCLUSION 217 

evil, to consider it as impeding the proper flow 
of international influences and obstructing the 
solution of international difficulties, appears as an 
unbelievable perversion when we consider the true 
implications of such a thought. 

It is therefore inestimably important that the 
facts of international life, the materials out of 
which policies are formed, should be known freely 
and fully to the public of every nation. The 
manipulation of international communications for 
political purposes is the most sinister and dan- 
gerous part of the system with which secret di- 
plomacy is entwined. According to this theory 
it is not only not good for the people to know 
everything but they must also be made to know 
things about the truth of which we need not bother 
our heads but which will stimulate the passions 
and arouse the instincts our policy desires to 
work upon. Thus the void left by secrecy, by a 
concealment of the true nature and character of in- 
ternationally important matters, is frequently sup- 
plied by an intelligence service carrying distorted 
and colored versions of facts; all this confuses 
and discourages the public mind to such an extent 
that it becomes unable to sever fact from fiction 
and to form a consistent and firm judgment. 

The abolition of secret diplomacy is not a mat- 



218 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ter of agreeing to have no more secrets. It is a 
matter of arousing among the public so powerful 
a determination to know, so strong a sentiment of 
the value of truth, such a penetrating spirit of 
inquiry, that the secrets will fade away as they 
always do when the importance of a situation is 
really understood by a large number of people. 

Meanwhile it need not appear futile to work for 
the positive elimination of secrecy. No one can 
doubt that the provision of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, which requires that all treaties 
shall be made public, is salutary and that its en- 
forcement would greatly increase public confi- 
dence. But it is necessary to go beyond this and 
to outlaw any agreement which is kept secret, by 
making it the public law of the world that no 
rights or obligations can be founded on such at- 
tempts against the peace and common welfare of 
the nations. 

The personal relationships of diplomacy also 
require attention. The spirit of the Diplomatic 
Service should be transformed in accordance with 
the modern organization of society. The most es- 
sential weakness of caste diplomacy lies in the 
fact that it does not provide means for a suiffi- 
cient contact among the peoples of the world. 
Contact is maintained only within a narrow class. 



CONCLUSION 219 

The diplomatic fraternity lives in its own realm 
of precedences, rivalries and traditions. To con- 
fine the intercourse and interchange of influences 
so narrowly, is a great weakness of our present 
political system. 

The diplomatic office should be conceived as 
having the function to represent not only the spe- 
cial national interest of the respective country, 
but also, on an equal plane, its participation in 
all the activities and interests which are common 
to the nations of the world. The legations and 
embassies should be provided with a personnel 
of attaches not only for political and military af- 
fairs, but for commerce, education, science and 
social legislation. All these matters are already 
dealt with to some exten^t by common action among 
the nations. The sending of ministers as dele- 
gates to international technical conferences has 
often been criticized as importing into such con- 
ferences the narrow, separatist point of view of 
diplomatic politics. It should be exactly the 
other way; participation in such conferences 
ought to impart to diplomats a broad spirit of co- 
operation instead of a desire to maintain intact 
a theoretical isolation. That is the essence of the 
matter. As long as it is supposed that by jeal- 
ously scrutinizing every international relation- 



220 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ship from the point of view of abstract political 
independence, and assuming that it is best to 
make the very least possible contribution of en- 
ergy and cooperation, the national interest can be 
most promoted ; so long will diplomatic action con- 
tinue on a strained basis, always being painfully 
conscious of the potential enmity among nations. 
But when it is realized that in nearly every case 
the national interest, or the interest of the people 
of the nation which ought to be synonymous there- 
with, is best advanced by whole-souled coopera- 
tion in constructive work in commerce, industry, 
science and the arts, then the political factor of 
diplomatic rivalry will assume more just propor- 
tions as compared with the other interests of hu- 
manity. 

This borders upon a very broad subject dealing 
rather with general international policy than with 
the specific problems we were considering; and 
yet we ought to be aware of this background. 
We need not give up our conviction that the au- 
tonomy of the national state must be preserved 
and that each political society shall dispose of its 
own affairs within its borders as its wisdom and 
judgment may dictate, free from intervention 
from without. But complete freedom of local 
self-determination can rest only upon a universal 



CONCLUSION 221 

recognition of that right in all others, in a spirit 
of confidence and security engendered by the ab- 
sence of intrigue and secret ambitions. In a still 
greater measure does the happiness of the na- 
tional state depend on free and full cooperation 
with all others in all pursuits, activities and in- 
terests common to humanity and in making the 
earth a place for dignified and happy human life. 
Unless diplomacy looks forward to this and helps 
to bring it about, it will remain ensnared in the 
old practices which ever lead only to barren re- 
sults. 

Lincoln's simple faith in the people has not yet 
been adequately applied in international affairs. 
International action has shown the impersonal 
character of calculated manipulations coldly dis- 
posing of the rights and lives of millions with 
cruel callousness. The last great war has made 
us consider the relation of war sacrifices to the 
daily welfare of the people. A great deal of the 
prevailing unrest in the world is undoubtedly due 
to a lack of confidence that great affairs are being 
handled with wisdom and with regard to the true, 
lasting welfare of the people themselves. It is 
diflScult to reduce to personal terms relations so 
abstract and general as those obtaining in inter- 
national affairs. We think of the armies m ser- 



222 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

ried ranks and are impressed with the impact of 
their force and the great feats it may accomplish. 
But we are too apt to forget the individual des- 
tiny carried in every breast, the human feeling in 
every heart, among all the millions that make up 
this engine of power and destruction. Human 
welfare rather than human power has not yet 
been made the constant and overshadowing aim 
of diplomacy. That will be done only when the 
people themselves demand that international af- 
fairs shall be dealt with in a different spirit and 
with other methods. Then we shall have policies 
that can be avowed and understood by the people 
who bear the burden and who pay the bill. 

The questions which we have been considering 
are not distinct and isolated but are bound up 
with all that goes toward a more adequate organ- 
ization of modern society. Even in the indus- 
tries, men are no longer satisfied with a narrowly 
centralized control. They call for information 
and accountability, they claim a share in man- 
agement, at least of an advisory or consultative 
nature. All who contribute in bearing the risks 
of industry demand to be kept informed of the 
policies and actions of the management. In ever 
extending circles men share in the responsibility 
for action taken in their name. It is a truism 



CONCLUSION 223 

that risk is diminished and tends to disappear as 
it is distributed over greater and greater num- 
bers. Under our present political system na- 
tions are carrying a tremendous risk in interna- 
tional affairs — they are risking their wealth, the 
lives of their citizens, their own very existence. 
The responsibility for bearing these risks and 
for arranging the conditions of safety is now too 
narrowly centralized. It is an elementary de- 
mand of safety that it should be more widely dis- 
tributed, that a larger number of competent and 
representative minds should take part in carrying 
this burden. And they should at all points be 
supported by a well-informed public opinion 
throughout the nation. 

But there is a condition that lies still deeper. 
The popular psychology cultivated under the nar- 
row aims of nationalism has exhausted itself in 
international matters in dislike and hatred of 
everything alien and of all that lies beyond the 
national pale. Such a state of mind is ever ready 
to act the bull to any red rag of newspaper sensa- 
tionalism. So, the inside managers of diplomatic 
affairs may still say with some justification, 
' ' Open discussion would too much excite the pub- 
lic mind." This fundamental condition cannot 
be suddenly purged of all its potency for evil. 



224 SECRET DIPLOMACY 

Only by gradual degrees may an attitude be 
brought about within the national communities 
which will be more just to the outside world and 
to everything that is. strange and unaccustomed. 
What the great imaginative writers of the first 
half of the nineteenth century accomplished in 
breaking down social prejudices and abuses will 
have to be done for humanity by a new host of 
inspired molders of human sentiment. We may 
not get rid of artificial hostilities now still nur- 
tured by nationalism, until ideals of international 
goodwill and fellowship have been expressed in 
the form of human experience and portrayed as 
part of the struggles and triumphs of the indi- 
vidual human soul. Patient, sound, upbuilding 
influences shall have to work powerfully on the 
masses of men, and on their leaders, before we 
may finally overcome the evils that express them- 
selves in practices inherent in a system such as 
that we call "secret diplomacy," before the world 
may be made an abode of mutual confidence and 
helpfulness instead of a house of imprisonment, 
suspicion and terror. 



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Laboucheee, Heney. Life of. 1916. 

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Lansing, Robeet. The Peace Negotiations. 1921. Chapter 17. 

Leuteum, Countess. Court and Diplomacy in Austria. 1920. 
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Loeebuen, Eael. How the War Came. 1919. 

Macknight, Thomas. Thirty Years of Foreign Policy. 1855. 

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Maxwell, Sie Heebeet. Life of Lord Clarendon. 1913. 

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INDEX 



Absolutism, survival of, 181 ff., 

208 
Absolutist politics, 148 
Absolutist tradition in diplo- 
macy, 208 
Adams, John Quincy, 24 
Adriatic memorandum, 201, 203 
Aehreiithal, 106 
Afghanistan, 157 
Afghan war, 69 
Agadir, 81 
Algei,'iras, Act of, 80 
American government, 16, 18, 

119, 173, 194 If., 196 
American idealism, 207 
Alexander I, 46 
Alliances, 70, 73 
Alsace-Lorraine, 64, 121, 123 
Anglo-French Entente, 79, 89, 

93 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 73, 74 
Antwerp, 91 

Apathy of the public, 172, 173 
Appearances, 32 
Archives, 51 

Armament interests, 147 
Asquith, Herbert H., 85, 87, 88 
Australia, 210 
Austria -Hungary, 48, 49, 61, 62, 

65, 70, 104,' 105, 107, 109, 

110, 120, 121, 123, 124, 132 

Balfour, Arthur J., 140, 141, 
161, 162, 168, 176, 187 

Balkans, 97, 104, 113, 146 

Barnardiston, Colonel, 91 

Bavaria, 61 

Beaconsfield, Lord, 67, 68, 69 

Belgian General Staff, 91 

Belgian neutrality, 62, 91 

Benedetti, 53, 62 

Berchtold, Coimt, 104, 105, 106, 
114 

Beresford, Lord, 87 



Bethmann-Hollweg, 104, 106, 

107 
Beyens, Baron, 114 
Bismarck, 5, 11, 31, 49, 51, 53, 

61, 63, 64, 70, 140, 184 
Bjorkoe meeting, 1905, 76 
Blue Books, 156 
Borgo, Pozzo di, 46 
Bosnia, 114 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 65, 

105 
Bribery, 41, 42, 48 
Bright, John, 55, 67, 157 
British diplomacy, 20 
Buchanan, William J., 138 
Buelow, Prince, 76 
Bulgaria, 122 
Byles, Sir W., 88 

Cabinet, 158 

Cabinet and Parliament, 56 

Calliferes, practice of diplomacy, 
27, 29, 32 

Canada, 210 

Canning, Stratford, 54, 57 

Caste, diplomatic, 184 

Castlereagh, 47 

Catherine, Empress, 36, 42, 43, 
44 

Cavour, 60 

Cecil, Lord Hugh, 86 

Censure of news, 145 

Central Powers, 120 

Charles, Emperor of Austria, 
121, 123 

Charles II, 152 

Cheradame, M., 177 

Chili-Argentinian boundary dis- 
pute, 138 

China, 117, 126, 127, 143, 199, 
208 

China, breaking off relations 
with Germany, 127, 128 

Chinese people, 20 



227 



228 



INDEX 



Chinese public opinion, 21 

Cliino-Japanese war, 72 

Christian ideal, 190 

Clarendon, Earl of, 55, 57, 155, 
157 

Comite du Maroc, 80 

Common interests, 14, 219 

Communist Party and interna- 
tional affairs, 179 

"Compensations," 65, 98, 123 

Conference diplomacy, 15, 219 

Conferences, international tech- 
nical, 219 

Congress, 150 

Constantinople, 54, 201 

Continental system, 84 

Council of Five, 130 

Counter-Insurance Treaty, 70 

Crimean war, 54, 55, 56, 59 

Cromer, Lord, 101, 171, 172 

Cromwell, 34 

Crown, prerogative of the, 153, 
154 

Cyprus protectorate, 67 

Czech o- Slovakia, 132 

Czernin, Count, 106, 121, 123, 
124, 169, 189 

Daih/ Mail, London, 205 

De Bass, 34 

Ue Tocqueville, 170 

De Torcy, 31, 41 

Deceit, 28, 29, 39 

Deception, 136 

Declarations, general, 142, 144, 

186 
Delcass^, M., 78 
Dementi, 66, 125 
Democracy, 10, 158, 159, 170, 

172, 214, 221 
Denmark, 37 
Derby, Lord, 69 
D'Estournelles de Constant, 

Baron, 82 
Dickinson, G. Lowes, 178 
Digest of International Law, 

196 
Dillon, Dr. E. J., 130 
Dillon, John, 81, 82, 158 
Diplomacy, personal, 23, 52, 55, 

184 



Diplomacy of authority, 64 
Diplomacy resembling war, 49 
Diplomatic fraternity, 219 
Diplomatic literature, 51 
Diplomatic Service, spirit of 

the, 218 
Disillusionment, 200, 202 
Disraeli, 50, 67, 68, 69 
d'Orsat, Cardinal, 30, 33 
Double-dpaling, 73 
Drake, 33 
Du Luc, Count, 31 
Dual Alliance, 71 

"Empire," 68 
Ems dispatch, 63 
English-speaking powers, 119, 

204, 210 
Experts, 8, 111 

Falsiloquy, 26 

Far Eastern situation, 72, 199, 

201 
Federalist, 150 
Ferdinand of Bulgaria, 113 
Feria, Duke of, 33 
Fez, 80 

Forgach, Count, 105 
France, 48, 60, 61, 62, 70, 75, 

78, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95, 97, 

117, 132, 133 
Francis Joseph, Emperor, 105, 

107 
Franco-Hungarian intrigues, 

132 
Franco-Prussian war, 64 
Franco-Russian Alliance, 97 
Franco-Russian military con- 
vention of August, 1912, 93 
"Frankness," 32, 40, 64, 143 
Frederick II, 38, 39, 42, 103 
French Parliament, 82 
"Friends of liberty," 38 
Foreign Office Vote, 186 
Foreign Relations of the United 

States. 195 
Fox, Charles James, 43 

German diplomacy, 103 
German- Russian agreement, 76, 

77 



INDEX 



^29 



Germany, 62, 64, 70, 71, 78, 81, 

89, 95, 102, 103, 106, 176 
Giolliti, Signer, 187 
Gladstone, 67 

Golden Rule, 47, 195 
Gossip, 137 

Granville, Lord, 55, 66, 157 
Great Britain, 48, 65, 67, 72, 
84, 88, 97, 117, 119, 143, 210 
Great War, 6, 99, 112, 174, 178 
Greindl, Baron, 94 
Grey, Sir Edward, 80, 88, 89, 

90, 96, 97, 100, 160, 178 
Gross, M., 38 

Grotius, 11, 14, 15, 24, 26 
Guillaume, Baron, 94 

Haldane, Viscount, 88, 100 

Harris, Sir James, 29, 38, 40, 
42 

Harvey, T. Edmund, 97 

Hayashi, Count, 73 

Holy Alliance, 46 

Honor, 110 

House of Lords and foreign af- 
fairs, 66, 153 

Hughes, Secretary, 16 

Human equation, 9 

Human welfare, 222 

Humanitarian professions, 142 

Hungarian railways, 133 

Ideals professed, 117, 142, 186 
India, 20, 210 
India, frontier of, 69 
Indifference, public, 172, 173 
Infallibility does not exist, 176 
Instincts, 215 
Isvolsky, 75, 93, 114 
Italy, 117, 124 
Ito, Marquis, 73 

Japan, 19, 72, 73, 117, 119, 124, 

126, 127, 142, 143, 199, 202 
Japan, absolutism, 185 
Janushkevich, General, 115 
Jay, John, 150, 194, 195 
Jowett, F. W., 85 
Jungbluth, General, 91 

Kinloch-Cooke, Sir C, 87 



Knox, Secretary, 19, 143 

Korea, 143 

Krupp Iron Works, 147 • 

Labouchere, 50, 51, 55 
Lalaing, Count de, 94 
Lamsdorff, Count, 76, 77 
Lansdowne, Lord, 73, 79, 96 
Lansing-Ishii notes, 199 
Law, Bonar, 204 
League of Nations, 7, 188, 218 
Leutrum, Countess, 105 
Liberal theory of state, 3 
Lincoln, 221 
Lloyd-George, 122 
London, Pact of, 120, 123 
Loreburn, Lord, 95, 96, 98, 116 
Lords, House of, 66, 153 
Louis XI, 28 
Louis XV, 52 
Lowell, J. R., 182 
Lytton, Lord, 172 

Macartney, Sir George, 37 
Machiavelli, 11, 14, 24, 28, 40, 

182 
MacNeill, Swift, 160 
Malmesbury, Lord, 29, 38, 40 
Manchuria, 143 

Manchurian railway neutraliza- 
tion, 19 
Mandates, 131 
Manipulations, 212, 221 
Mankind, underlying unity of, 

191 
Manteuffel, 50 
Marcy, Secretary, 50 
Marlborough, Duke of, 41 
"Material for statesmanship," 

215 
Matin, 82 

Mazarin, Cardinal, 33 
Mediterranean situation, 87, 88 
Meh6e de la Touche, 33 
Memoirs, Eighteenth Century, 

25 
Methods of diplomacy and of 

private business, 4, 140, 163, 

169 
Metternich, 35, 46, 47 



230 



INDEX 



Militarists, German, 105, 185 
Militarists, Russian, 105, 115 
Military assistance, 85, 90, 92, 

93 
Minority interests, 183 
Monarchist diplomacy, 23 
Monroe Doctrine, 18, 215 
Moore, John Bassett, 196, 197 
Morny, Due de, 53 
Morocco, 60, 71, 78, 79, 82, 89, 

101, 143 
Murray, Gilbert, 172 

Napoleon I, 35, 46, 48 
Napoleon III, 5, 52, 53, 56, 60, 

62, 63 
Naval assistance, 87, 90, 92, 93 
Nationalism, 11 
Near East, 134 
Necessity of war, 118 
Newspapers, 171, 223 
Nicholas II, 56 
Nicholas III, 75, 77, 115 
North Pacific islands, 19, 128, 

202 
Notes, exchange of, November, 

1912, 92 

Objectives, constancy of, 212 
Open covenants, 130 
Open Door, 18, 144 

Pact of London, 120. 123 

Palmerston, 31, 54, 56, 59, 68 

Panin, 37, 42, 43 

Parliament and foreign affairs, 
149 flf. 

Parliament and secret diplo- 
macy, 82, 85, 94, 95, 98, 149 flf. 

Peace Conference of Paris, 129, 
130 

"Peace of Asia," 143 

Pelham, 154 

"People who are not responsi- 
ble," 168, 216 

Pester Lloyd, 110 

Pinckney, 44 

Plutocratic control, 183 

Poincare, President, 93, 121 

Poland, 47, 118 

Policy, diplomatic, 48, 58, 166 



Polish Question, 118 
Politics, essence of, 13, 39 
Polk, Undersecretary, 203 
Port Arthur, surrender, 72 
Portugal, 15, 190 
Potemkin, Prince, 41, 43 
Press, control of, 145, 171 
Pressense, Francis de, 80 
Prestige, 176 

Preventive war, 13, 64, 106, 108 
Private business and diplomatic 

affairs, 4, 140, 163, 169 
Propaganda, 216 
Prussia, 49, 53, 61, 62 
Public opinion, crime against, 

144 
Public opinion and diplomacy, 

58, 102, 112, 144, 166 ff. 
Publicity, 216, 217 

Rashness, alleged, of the people, 
177 

"Raw material for brilliant ca- 
reers," 185 

Realpolitik, 103 

Reichstag, 102 

Representative government, 58 

Ribot, Alexander, 123 

Roosevelt, President, 151 

Rosebery, Lord, 66 

Rosebery, Lord, on Anglo-Jap- 
anese treaty, 74 

Rosebery, Lord, on Entente, 84 

Rosen, Baron, 74 

Roumania, 118 

Russell, Lord John, 52, 57 

Russia, 7, 37, 55, 65, 67, 70, 
75, 78, 97, 104, 105, 108, 109, 
114, 143, 146, 208, 212 

Russian diplomatic policy, 112 

Russian local agents, 54 

Russo-Freneh Alliance, 70 

Russo-Turkish war, 65 

Salisbury, Marquis of, 66, 157 
San Domingo, 151 
San Stefano, treaty of, 65 
Sandwich, Earl of, 37 
Savoy and Nice, 60 
Sazoiaov, 112, 115, 133 



INDEX 



231 



Schleswig-Holsteiu, 61 
Schuvalof agreement, 156 
Secret diplomacy, abolition of, 

127, 218 
"Secret diplomacy" used in a 

special sense, 52, 57 
Secret procedure, Paris Confer- 
ence, 7 
Secret service, 22, 28, 41, 50, 

136, 137 
Secret treaties, 48, 61, 65, 67, 

71, 76, 78, 79, 113, 116 ff., 

119, 134, 164 
Senate and foreign affairs, 151, 

197 
Servian question, 104, 108, 113 
Shantung, 117, 125, 128 
Sixtus, Prince, of Bourbon, 120 
South Pacific Islands, 119 
Soviet Russia, 133, 179 
Speech of August 3, 1914, 89, 

96 
Spheres of influence, 79 
St. Petersburg, 40, 52, 73 
Standing Committee of Foreign 

Affairs, proposed, 162, 164, 

186 
Standing committee on foreign 

and colonial affairs in France, 

187 
Stanhope, Lord, 31 
Stratagem, 138 
Stratford de Redcliffe, 54, 55, 

57 
Survival, 13 
Suspicion, 6, 17, 54, 72, 100, 

126, 136, 141 
Sweden, 37 

Talleyrand, 44, 46 
Temps, 82 
Tibet, 144 

Times, London, 204, 205 
Trait6 de diplomatie, Garden, 
48 



Treaties, publication of all, 

188, 205, 206 
Treaty of Versailles, 129 
Triple Alliance, 70 
Trotsky, 179 
Truthfulness of diplomacy, 12, 

30 
Tschirsky, Von, 77, 106, 107 
Turkey, 38, 67 
Turkish Empire, 60 
Twenty-one demands, 117, 125 
Two-party system, 152 

United Colonies of America, 

149 
United States, 119, 151, 174, 

186, 194 ff., 201, 209 

Vattel, 26 

Vienna, Congress of, 45 

Viviani, M., 115 

Walpole, Sir Robert, 154 
Walpole, Horace, 45 
War, declaration of, 186, 187 
Washington, Conference of, 

1921, 16 
Wells, H. G., 185 
Westminster Gazette, 204 
Whist, 50 
William L 63 
William II, 75, 76, 78 
William III of England, 153 
Willy-Nicky correspondence, 75 
Wilson, President, 21, 129, 169, 

200, 201, 203, 204 
Wotton, Sir Henry, 28 
Wyndham, i53 

Xavier, Prince of Bourbon, 120, 
123 

Yap, 201, 202 
Yerburgh, Mr., 85 
Yugo-Slavia and France, 133 



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